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at Constance Corthwaite's, he gave no sign.

"I told Constance he'd be back at it within a year," remarked Nancy Bromley, when Levering had left the floor and the lights had again been brightened. "A taste of good fortune to a man like that always goes to the head. . . . Cantor! It is to laugh."

The others were silent; then Taylor spoke: "That's not the man we knew though. Don't you get the difference? Those first songs were superb. The man who wrote that music is a genius."

"Changed, nothing! That's the same old Levering. I'll prove it to you." Nancy called a waiter and told him to ask Mr. Levering if he would speak to Miss Bromley.

"What are you going to do?" asked Greville.

"Never mind; you'll see when he comes," answered Nancy.

In a few moments Levering appeared and walked through the aisles of tables to where the party was sitting. He did not cross the floor in his old swaggering manner, receiving homage as he went; but with dignity he walked and, reaching the table, bowed quietly to the four people.

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"No, thank you, just the same. Is there anything I can do for you?"

"I am having some people down over the week-end of the twentythird, Mr. Levering," said Nancy. "I should like very much to have you come."

"That is very kind of you, Miss Bromley," replied Levering quietly; "I should be very glad to come on Saturday evening and entertain your guests. My charge for such an affair is one thousand dollars. I presume you will not want me after eleven-thirty. I must be back in town early, for I sing in a concert Sunday afternoon."

Nancy's face was crimson as she answered, “That will be all right, Mr. Levering." Hal bowed and, turning, walked away.

John Taylor looked with amusement at the discomfited Nancy and then at the proud set of the head of the Jew who was now a Jew, a Prince of Israel, and a verse that he had learned as a child came to him: "For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour."


Psychology of the American People Concerning National Defense



ILITARY legislation had to take the place of military action." In these pregnant words the late General Emory Upton of Civil War fame sums up the disadvantages under which we labored at the outbreak of the war of 1812-15.

The sentence epitomizes the history of the opening months of every war we have fought, including the World War. Despite the consequent risk of defeat and inevitable excessive expenditures and the long period of high taxation, apparently we have learned nothing. General Upton's statement would fit the case should we have war to-day, or in the near future.

The National Defense Act of 1920, our first and only military policy, the 5-5-3 Navy ratio established by the Washington Arms Conference treaties, and the five-year aviation building program resulting from the Morrow Board recommendations and Colonel William Mitchell's charges and trial, furnish definite, well considered standards as to what constitutes adequate national defense. They eliminate all necessity for discussion as to what we mean to-day by the word "adequate."

We are not, however, living up to these three standards of defense.

Public indifference, which has in the past been the principal reason for peace-time neglect of our armed forces, is only one of the reasons. There are to-day new and dangerous factors.

One is the business man who considers questions of national defense outside his province, at the time when, more than ever before in our history, necessities compel us to engage in the fierce competition of overseas trade and finance. Such competition has always been a fruitful cause of war.

The World War taught foreign nations our peculiar susceptibility to sentimental propaganda, with our resultant tendency, when in pursuit of what we think right, to grasp eagerly at pleasant theories and overlook disagreeable facts.

As a consequence, too many politicians, seeing the indifference of business men, harried by organized groups of sentimentalists, and urged on, only too often, by foreign propagandists, have joined in or remained indifferent to the attacks which have resulted in failure to carry out the three adequate national defense programs.

With a few distinguished exceptions, business men can be placed under one of two headings in con

sidering national defense. Probably the larger class is made up of those who believe that national defense is the business of the Army, the Navy, and those civilians "foolish" enough to give part of their time to service in the National Guard or the Organized Reserve. They see no more reason to devote time and energy to the business of defense than to any other business they do not happen to be engaged in. They are simply not interested.

The other class of business men is largely made up of those who think of national defense only from the point of view of tax reduction, of how much could be saved if expenditures for the Army and Navy were materially cut. Neither group gives any constructive thought to the part national defense plays in the protection of its property, nor to the wisdom of the government's giving the same careful attention to this activity that it gives to the tariff or some other tax which directly and immediately affects business interests.

To quote George W. Hinman, an expert financial writer: "The business meaning of national defense just now is that it is the chief bulwark behind which the greatest aggregation of national wealth and welfare ever known is sheltered and assured. The American people have 360 billions in property, 75 billions gross income, 14 or 15 billions net income to be safeguarded from those who have no such wealth but long to share in it." And further: "A few years ago, American business had only one tenth of the world's trade. To-day, American business has nearly one sixth. A few years ago, American business sold the world only about two billions of

goods a year. To-day, American business sells the world some four and a half billions."

Insurance of all kinds is recognized as an essential part of business. All business depends on a continuation of national security. Why, then, is it not the first business of every business man to insist on adequate insurance for national security, or, in other words, adequate national defense?

Carefully planned preparation carried out through a long period of peace insures the minimum expenditure for the maximum result when war comes. Because of our persistent failure to learn the lesson of our military history, each of our wars has cost us far more than the sum total of such preparation in peace, plus the cost of the following war.

War has always found us unprepared, with the result that we try by lavish and wasteful expenditures to do overnight what can only be done by careful planning over a long period of time. Every business man understands what a complex problem it would be to feed, clothe, shelter, protect the health, and maintain order among the 850,000 people of, say, St. Louis. He knows that an organization equal to this task can only be built up by an expenditure consistent with efficiency, and after careful planning over a protracted length of time. He knows that the necessary personnel must be expertly chosen from those whose previous experience guarantees their capabilities. If in addition to this it becomes necessary to move these 850,000 people over considerable distances and through earthquake, storm, and flood, how much time would the busi

ness man need to plan to do it effectively and without enormous waste of money?

Yet he apparently is willing to wait until the last moment to try to raise armies several times the size of St. Louis's population; feed, clothe, shelter, preserve health, maintain order, and move under the storm of battle to attack an enemy which threatens the very existence of everything he believes in and holds dear.

Such last-minute attempts have always proved enormously and unnecessarily expensive, as the most cursory examination of our military history will show.

In our Revolutionary War, we raised and more or less paid, clothed, and fed nearly 400,000 men. Yet the total effective force in the field at any time never exceeded 60,000, and generally was nearer 30,000. If Washington's advice had been followed, and an effective force of 50,000 properly disciplined, equipped, and trained troops been continuously maintained, there is little doubt that we should have won the war in half the time it took.

During the war of 1812-15, a total of 500,000 men was called out at various times. It is doubtful if any force at any time in any one place approximated 25,000 men and officers. A properly maintained, equipped, disciplined, and trained force of 50,000 men and officers not only would have achieved such military results as we won in this war, but would have saved us the defeats which made up the greater part of the land operations.

For the Mexican War, we had in the service a total of 104,000 men and

officers. General Taylor in his northern force never had more than 7000. General Scott in his campaign to Mexico City never had more than 14,000, including 3000 sick and the troops guarding his line of communications. After his last brilliant series of battles he entered Mexico City with but 6000 troops. A properly equipped, trained, disciplined, and maintained force totaling 30,000 would have been ample.

For the Civil War, the figures are not so easily arrived at. Without going into voluminous detail and analysis, it can be safely said that the North brought into the service approximately three times as many men as would have been necessary had the determination existed from the first to raise immediately and maintain continuously a properly trained, disciplined, and equipped army of 400,000 to 500,000. There can be no doubt that the South was enabled to hold out as long as it did because it uninterruptedly maintained the original regiments called into service, instead of allowing the experienced regiments to dwindle away to be replaced by new ones, as was the case with the North.

As a matter of fact, had the Regular Army in 1861 consisted of 50,000 officers and men, Fort Sumter would have been promptly relieved, Richmond and other important places. occupied, and the war promptly ended. All units of the Regulars, regardless of the part of the country where they were stationed, remained loyal to the Union. Though no oath. of allegiance to the federal government was required, as is the case today, more than half the Regular officers of Southern birth did not resign

their commissions but stayed with their units and fought in the Union Army throughout the war.

During the early years of the World War, we had continuously before our eyes the costliness and the deleterious effect of Britain's failure to prepare. Yet we waited until war was upon us before we did anything. How much How much shorter would the war have been, and how much less would we be paying in taxes to-day, if we had made plans so that within six months we could have placed 2,000,000 men in the face of the enemy, instead of waiting, and then frantically spending during the eighteen months it took us so to do!


If the United States Chamber of Commerce and other business organizations are really interested in introducing business methods into government, here is a most fertile field, in which convincing figures are readily available.

Haste breeds waste. Inefficiency is inevitably costly. Haste and inefficiency have hitherto characterized

our wars.

All this is aside from the risk of ultimate defeat. There is no guarantee, because we have hitherto won our wars, despite our unpreparedness, that we shall always be victorious. No country would furnish richer pickings in the way of indemnities than the United States.

The propaganda against the execution of the various programs for adequate national defense, coupled with the indifference of the business man, have given the politician, anxious to make a record for tax cutting if he can do it without treading on the toes of voters, an excellent opportunity, except for one thing. Until the Na

tional Defense Act brought the National Guard into the Army and created the Organized Reserve, the needs of national defense went unvoiced. This because the whole spirit and tradition of the Regular Services are properly against mixing in politics. Regardless of what they may think or know, the views of the president must govern. Thus, until the National Defense Act created civilian components in the Army, politicians in and out of Congress were free to use the Army and Navy as political footballs without fear of


The introduction of these components has changed all this. The National Guard and Reserve officer, unlike the Regular, does not devote his entire life to the military service. Therefore his career does not advance or decline with national defense. He is primarily a civilian. Adequate as against inadequate national defense cannot give such a man any benefit over his neighbors, not in the military service. Inadequate national defense brings to him the same danger as to his neighbors, plus the personal inescapable danger from entering combat unprepared and from leading untrained and badly equipped troops. Of the approximately 100,000 National Guard and Reserve Officers to-day, the majority, through personal experience in battle, know the terrible toll unpreparedness exacts. These men know that it is both their right and their duty to call the attention of their representatives in Congress to the shameful neglect of our defense, particularly when a definite standard is set by such a law as the National Defense Act.

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