the United States, by consent of the legis lature of the State, and used for the public governmental purpose of maintaining thereon locks and dams for the improvement of the navigation of a river, and the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe and punish criminal offenses committed thereon; and the fact that the legislative consent was granted after the purchase is immaterial so far as relates to offenses committed thereafter. U. S. v. Tucker (D. C. 1903), 122 Fed. 518.

The exclusive jurisdiction of the United States to prescribe and punish criminal offenses committed on land or in a "place" occupied for governmental purposes may be derived either from article 1, section 8, of the Constitution, where the place was purchased by consent of the State legislature, or from an express cession of such jurisdiction by the legislature. Id.

Where both the acts of Congress and the State make a defined act an offense, the commission of the act may be an offense against each, and punishable by each. Sligh r. Kirkwood (Fla. 1913), 61 So. 185.

Where a State cedes to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over land purchased as a site for a public building, "for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of this State," the State has no jurisdiction for the punishment of crimes committed on the purchased land, but only the right to execute criminal process there for the violation of the laws of the State committed elsewhere within the State. State v. Mack (1897), 23 Nev. 359, 47 Pac. 763, 62 Am. St. Rep. 811.

Where an assault was committed on land purchased by the United States with the consent of the State of New Jersey, and jurisdiction of the State over such lands was vested in the United States by an act of the legislature and thereafter Congress passed an act for the punishment of such offense, it was the exercise of power conferred by Constitution, article 1, section 8, and is exclusive, and the State courts have no jurisdiction to try or punish such offense. State v. Morris (N. J. 1908), 68 A. 1103.

In 1869, San Juan Island, on the northwestern coast, was held in joint military occupancy by Great Britain and the United States. Held, that an offense committed there was not committed at a place within the "sole and exclusive jurisdiction" of the United States, within the crimes acts of 1790, and that the territorial court had jurisdiction. Watts v. U. S. (1870). 1 Wash. T. 288: Same v. Territory (1872), 1 Wash. T. 409.

Question of law or fact.-Whether a homicide committed within the boundaries of a State constitutes an offense against the laws of the United States, of which a Federal

court has jurisdiction, depends on two questions: First, whether there has been such a cession by the State to the United States of the territory upon which the act alleged to constitute the crime was committed as to render such territory a "place or district of country under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States," within R. S., section 5339, which is a question of law for the court; and second, if such cession was made, whether the act was committed within the territory so ceded, which is a question of fact, to be submitted to the jury. U. S. v. Lewis (C. C. 1901), 111 Fed. 630.

High seas and other waters within admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.-Under act 1790, chapter 9, section 8, providing for the punishment of murder, etc., committed upon the high seas, or any river, haven, basin, or bay, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State," it is not the offense, but the bay, etc., in which it is committed, that must be out of the jurisdiction of a State. U. S. r. Bevans (1818), 16 U. S. (3 Wheat. 336, 4 L. Ed. 404.

R. S. section 5372, does not confer on the Federal courts jurisdiction of a murder committed in the waters of a State where the tide ebbs and flows. Id.

The United States has no jurisdiction of the crime of manslaughter, committed on board an American ship in a tidal river within a foreign state. U. S. v. Wiltberger (1820), 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37.

Under act April 30, 1790, providing for punishment of murder or robbery on the high seas, out of the jurisdiction of any State, United States courts have jurisdiction of such offenses, though they are not committed on board a vessel belonging to eitizens of the United States, where the vessel did not belong to subjects of any foreign state. U. S. v. Holmes (1820), 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 412. 5 L. Ed. 122.

It makes no difference on the question of jurisdiction whether a crime committed on the high seas is committed on board a vessel or in the water. Id.

The courts of the United States had Jurisdiction of murder or robbery committed on a vessel in possession of persons acknowledging obedience to no government or flag and acting in defiance of law, and a murder or robbery committed on the high seas may be cognizable by the courts of the United States, though committed on board a vessel not belonging to citizens of the United States, as if she had no national character, but was possessed and held by pirates or persons not lawfully sailing under the flag of any foreign nation. Id.

Where a murder or robbery is committed on board a foreign vessel by a citizen of

the United States or on board a vessel of the United States by a foreigner, or by a citizen or foreigner on board a piratical vessel, the offense is cognizable by the courts of the United States. Id.

An offense committed on board of a piratical vessel, or in the sea, as by throwing decedent overboard, or drowning him, or shooting him, or in the sea, though not thrown overboard, is within the jurisdiction of the United States. Id.

One who, on a vessel owned by citizens of the United States. committed on the high seas the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, and who was put in irous for safe-keeping, and who, on the arrival of the vessel at the lower quarantine in the eastern district of New York, was delivered to officers of the State of New York, and who was by them carried into the southern district and there delivered to the marshal of the United States for that district, to whom a warrant to apprehend and bring him to justice was first issued, was triable in the southern district. U. S. v. Arwo, (1873), 19 Wall. 486, 490, 22 L. Ed. 67.

A murder committed on board a ship lying in the harbor of Honolulu is cognizable in the district court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii, under R. S. section 5339, as committed in a haven or arm of the sea within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and "out of the jurisdiction of any particular State." Wynne v. U. S. (1910), 30 Sup. Ct. 447, 449, 217 U. S. 234, 54 L. Ed. 748.

There is nothing in the Hawaiian organic act of Apr. 30, 1900 (31 Stat. 141) which expressly or impliedly deprives the Federal courts of their jurisdiction under R. S. section 5339, to punish a murder committed on board a ship lying in the harbor of Honolulu. Id.

The waters inclosed between the shore and the Government breakwaters in Lake Erie at the port of Buffalo, without as well as within the line designated on the Government chart as Buffalo harbor line," constitute a "haven" and not "high seas," and an assault with a dangerous weapon committed on a vessel belonging to the United States or citizens thereof anchored in such waters is within the State, and not the Federal, jurisdiction. Ex parte O'Hare (1910), 179 Fed. 662, 103 C. C. A. 220, reversing order (D. C. 1909), 171 Fed. 290.

To give the Federal courts jurisdiction over a murder, as having been committed on the high seas, the death, as well as the mortal stroke, must have happened on the high seas. U. S. v. McGill (C. C. 1806), Fed. Cas. No. 15,676.

"High seas," within act Apr. 30, 1790, chapter 9, section 8, means any waters on

the sea coast which are without the bounda ries of low-water mark. U. S. v. Ross (C. C. 1813), Fed. Cas. No. 16,196.

The part of the sea below low-water mark, and not within the body of any country, is the "high seas" within the act of 1789, sec. 9. The Abby (C. C. 1818), Fed. Cas. No. 14; Gedney v. L'Amistad (D. C. 1840), Fed. Cas. No. 5,294a; Johnson r. Twenty-one Bales, etc. (C. C. 1814), Fed. Cas. No. 7,417; The Martha Anne (D. C. 1843), Fed. Cas. No. 9,146; Thackarey v. The Farmer of Salem (D. C. 1835), Fed. Cas. No. 13,852; U. S. v. The Julia Lawrence (D. C. 1871), Fed. Cas. No. 15,502.

A vessel lying on the sea outside o. the bar of a harbor of the United States within 3 miles of the shore, is on the high seas. U. S. v. Smith (C. C. 1816), Fed. Cas. No. 16,337.

An offense committed in a bay which is entirely landlocked and inclosed by reefs is not committed on the high seas, within act March 26, 1804, chapter 40. C. S. v. Robinson (C. C. 1826), Fed. Cas. No. 16,176. The words "high seas," in act 1825, chapter 276, section 22, mean the uninclosed waters of the ocean on the sea coast, outside of the fauces terræ. U. S. v. Grush (C. C. 1829), Fed. Cas. No. 15.268, overruling U. S. v. Bevans (C. C. 1816), Fed. Cas. No. 14,589.

Where such arm of the sea, creek, haven, etc., is so narrow that a person standing on one shore can reasonably discern and distinctly see by the naked eye what is doing on the opposite shore, the waters are within the body of a county. Id.

State courts have exclusive jurisdiction of offenses committed on arms of the sea, creeks, havens, basins, and bays within the ebb and flow of the tide within the body of a county. Id.

Act 1790, chapter 9, section 8, as well as act 1820, chapter 113 applies to all mur ders and robberies committed on board of or upon American ships on the high seas. U. S. v. Gibert (C. C. 1834), Fed. Cas. No. 15,204.

In the case of a homicide by shooting, the place where the shot takes effect, and not that from which it is fired, determines the jurisdiction of the offense, and where a shot from an American vessel in a foreign harbor kills a person on board of a foreign vessel lying in such harbor, the jurisdiction of the offense belongs to the foreign gov ernment, and not to the courts of the United States, under act 1790, chapter 36, section 12. U. S. v. Davis (C. C. 1837), Fed. Cas. No. 14.932.

To render a vessel American, so as to punish offenses on board of her, it is enough to show that she sailed from and to an American port, and was apparently owned

and controlled by citizens of the United States. U. S. v. Peterson (C. C. 1846), Fed. Cas. No. 16,037.

The term "high seas " is used in the acts of Congress in its popular and natural sense. U. S. v. Wilson (C. C. 1856), Fed. Cas. No. 16,731.

A vessel lying in a harbor, fastened to the shore by cables, and communicating with the land by her boats, and not within any inclosed dock, or at any pier or wharf, is on the " high seas," outside of low-water mark on the coast. U. S. v. Seagrist (C. C. 1860), Fed. Cas. No. 16,245.

An offense commenced to be committed on board an American vessel lying at the time in a river which is an arm of the sea on the coast of Africa, and continued uninterruptedly to a point in the Atlantic Ocean several miles from our shores. is within the jurisdiction of the Federal circuit court. U. S. v. Gordon (C. C. 1861), Fed. Cas. No. 15,231.

The Federal courts have no jurisdiction of the crime of larceny under act 1790, section 16, committed in a place where the jurisdiction of the United States is concurrent with that of a State. U. S. v. Tierney (C. C. 1864), Fed. Cas. No. 16,517.

The United States courts have jurisdiction to try charges of crime committed on board any vessel belonging in whole or in part to the United States, or any citizen thereof, at any point on the high seas, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State. U. S. v. Beyer (C. C. 1887), 31 Fed. 35.

The words " upon the high seas, or in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State," used in R. S., section 5346, are limited to the high seas, and to the waters connected immediately with them. Ex parte Byers (D. C. 1887), 32 Fed. 404.

An offense committed on board a vessel on the high seas is an offense against the sovereignty of the nation to which it belongs, but, when a private ship enters a foreign jurisdiction, it becomes, with all on board, in the absence of previous stipulations to the contrary, subject to municipal laws of such country. People v. Tyler (1859), 7 Mich. 161, 74 Am. Dec. 703.

Every vessel on the high seas is for jurisdiction purposes a part of the territory of the nation to which it belongs, and an offense committed on board of it is an offense against the sovereignty of that nation. Id.

Stealing of fish from pound erected by American citizens held offense punishable

under laws of United States, though the pound was on the high seas. Miller v U. S. (C. C. A. 1917); certiorari denied, 245 U. S. 660.

Islands. Guano Islands act Aug. 18, 1856, section 6 (R. S. 5576), providing that all crimes committed on such islands shall be deemed to have been committed on the high seas on board a merchant ship belonging to the United States, and shall be punished according to the laws relating to offenses committed in such places, which laws are extended to such islands for that purpose, does not extend the admiralty jurisdiction over land, but simply extends the operation of the statutes relating to crimes and punishments to the islands which may have been determined by the President to appertain to the United States. Jones v. U. S. (1890), 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691; Smith v. Same (1890), 137 U. S. 224, 11 Sup. Ct. 88, 34 L. Ed. 700.

The criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the United States extends to the island of Navassa, and an indictment for murder committed there may be tried in the district into which the offender is first brought, as provided by R. S., section 730, in cases of offenses committed on the high seas, or elsewhere, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State or district. Id.

Ships of war.-An offense committed on a United States naval vessel while lying in the channel of the harbor of Boston, outside of low-water mark, is committed upon the "high seas," and is within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. U. S. v. Bevans (C. C. 1816), Fed. Cas. No. 14,589.

A murder committed on board a warship in Boston harbor held not cognizable in the circuit court. U. S. v. Bevans (1818), 3 Wheat, 336, 386, 4 L. Ed. 404.

The words "within any fort, arsenal, dockyard, magazine, or any other place refer to objects in their nature, fixed and territorial, and do not extend to a ship of war. Id.

The proper Federal court has jurisdiction of a murder committed on board a Government naval vessel lying at a dock within a tract the jurisdiction of which has been ceded by a State to the United States for the purposes of a navy yard and a naval hospital, though the tract has not been purchased by the United States. U. S. v. Carter (C. C. 1897), 84 Fed. 622.

A battleship, the property of the United States, lying in waters wholly within the jurisdiction of the United States, is a 'place" under the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, within the meaning of subdivision 1 of R. S., section 5339. Id.

Congress has not, by the crimes acts of 1825 and 1835 (4 Stat. 115, 775), given to the civil courts any jurisdiction over the

crime of murder, when committed on board a United States ship of war, and triable before a court-martial under the Navy Regu lations. U. S. v. Mackenzie (D. C.), Fed. Cas. No. 18,313.

Great Lakes and connecting waters.-The courts of the United States have jurisdiction, under R. S., section 5346, of an assault with a dangerous weapon committed on a vessel belonging to a citizen of the United States, in the Detroit River, out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and within the territorial limits of the Dominion of Canada. U. S. v. Rodgers (1893), 150 U. S. 249, 14 Sup. Ct. 109, 37 L. Ed. 1071, disapproving People v. Tyler (1859), 7 Mich, 161, 74 Am. Dec. 703.

The open waters of the Great Lakes are "high seas," within the meaning of R. S., section 5346; U. S. v. Rodgers (1893), 150 U. S. 249, 14 Sup. Ct. 109, 37 L. Ed. 1071, overruling In re Miller (D. C. 1867), Fed. Cas. No. 9,558, and Ex parte Byers (D. C. 1887), 32 Fed. 404.

The limitation to the jurisdiction, by the qualification in R. S. section 5346, that the offenses punishable are committed on vessels in any arm of the sea, or in any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, "without the jurisdiction of any particular State," does not apply to vessels on the "high seas" of the lakes, but only to vessels on the waters designated as connecting with them. So far as vessels on those seas are concerned, there is no limitation named to the authority of the United States. U. S. r. Rodgers (1893), 14 Sup. Ct. 109, 114, 150 U. S. 249, 37 L. Ed. 1071.

The fact that, by treaty between the United States and Great Britain, the boundary line between the two countries is run through the center of the Great Lakes, does not change their character as seas, or impair in any respect the jurisdiction of the United States over vessels of its own citizens navigating those waters, and persons on board. Id.

Under act September 4, 1890, extending the criminal jurisdiction of the Federal courts to offenses committed upon any vessel registered or enrolled under the laws of the United States, and being on a voyage upon the waters of any of the Great Lakes, "or any of the waters connecting any of the said lakes," such courts have no jurisdiction of a larceny committed upon a steam barge while lying in the Menominee River, a tributary of Lake Michigan, half a mile from its mouth. U. S. v. Rogers (D. C. 1891), 46 Fed. 1.

The United States courts have no common-law jurisdiction in criminal matters, and can only take such jurisdiction as is given them by statute; and the fact that, though the larceny was committed within

the limits of a State, the stolen property was not discovered in defendant's possession until the vessel was upon Lake Michigan, will not aid their jurisdiction. Id.

Manslaughter, committed by a mortal blow given on the river St. Clair, beyond the boundary line between the United States. and the Province of Canada, and within a county in said Province, from which blow death ensued upon land, is not within the crimes act Mar. 3, 1857, and the circuit court of the United States has no jurisdiction of the same. Tyler v. People (1860), 8 Mich. 320.

Military posts, forts, or reservations.-In a cession to the United States by the State of land for a military post, a reservation of concurrent jurisdiction' to serve State' civil and criminal process in the ceded place does not defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the ceded place, and the State courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed therein. Steele v. Halligan (D. C. 1916), 229 Fed. 1011; U. S. v. Travers (C. C. 1814), Fed. Cas. No. 16,537; Same v. Meagher (C. C. 1888), 37 Fed. 875; U. S. v. Knapp (D. C. 1849), Fed. Cas. No. 15,538; Lasher v. State (1891), 30 Tex. App. 387, 17 S. W. 1084, 28 Am. St. Rep. 922.

The circuit court had jurisdiction over the offense of murder committed within a fort purchased by the United States by the consent of the State legislature (act 1790, c. 9, secs. 3, 7), although in the cession the State reserved the right to execute its civil and criminal processes in such places. U. S. v. Cornell (C. C. 1820), Fed. Cas. No. 14,868.

Under a cession of jurisdiction in places purchased by the United States "for forts or fortifications," the Federal courts have no jurisdiction to punish a crime committed upon land purchased and used for the purposes of an arsenal only. U. S. v. Hopkins (C. C. 1839), Fed. Cas. No. 15,387a.

The acceptance by Congress of the cession by a State of exclusive jurisdiction over territory in a military reservation which existed before the State was created is not necessary to vest such jurisdiction in the United States, under Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8. Ex parte Hebard (C. C. 1877), Fed. Cas. No. 6,312.

Offenses committed upon lands purchased by the United States for the erection of forts, with the consent of the legislature of a State, and of which jurisdiction bas been ceded to the United States, are within the jurisdiction of the Federal courts. Kelly v. U. S. (C. C. 1885), 27 Fed. 616.

In a cession to the United States by the State of land for a military post, a reservation of concurrent jurisdiction" to serve State civil and criminal process in

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the ceded place does not defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States over the ceded place, and the State courts have no jurisdiction of crimes committed therein. U. S. v. Meagher (C. C. 1888), 37 Fed. 875. After the cession by a State to the United States of its jurisdiction over land used as a military reservation, upon condition that such jurisdiction shall continue only so long as the United States shall own and occupy the reservation; that the State shall have the right, within the reservation, to serve civil process, and to execute criminal process against persons charged with crime committed within the State; and that roads may be opened and kept in repair within the reservation, while the municipal laws of the State governing property and property rights continue in force in the ceded territory, except so far as in conflict with the laws and regulations of the United States applying thereto, the criminal laws of the State cease to be of force therein, and laws regulating the sale of intoxicating liquors cease to be operative, both as in conflict with the regulation of the United States governing military reservations and as penal in character; hence officers acting under authority of the State have no jurisdiction over the ceded territory in matters of alleged criminal violation of State liquor laws committed in such territory. In re Ladd (C. C. 1896), 74 Fed. 31.

Within the meaning of this section the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over the entire military reservation of Fort Leavenworth. Id.

The proper Federal court has jurisdiction of a murder commited on board a Government naval vessel lying at a dock within a tract the jurisdiction of which has been ceded by a State to the United States for the purpose of a navy yard and a naval hospital, though the tract has not been purchased by the United States. U. S. v. Carter (C. C. 1897), 84 Fed. 622.

To give a Federal court jurisdiction to try a person for a criminal offense, on the ground that it was committed within a fort or military reservation, such fort or reservation must have been established by law, as contemplated by Constitution, article 1, section 8, either by purchase with the consent of the legislature of the State or by reservation of public lands therefor by compact with the State at the time of its admission, and exclusive jurisdiction over the same must have been reserved to the United States, either by express words or by necessary implication. U. S. v. Tully (C. C. 1905), 140 Fed. 899.

The navy yard" includes contiguous waters necessary to float vessels of the Navy while at the navy yard. Ex parte Tatem (D. C. 1877), Fed. Cas. No. 13,759.

Under Constitution, article 1, section 8, clause 17, giving the Congress power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over all places pur

chased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings," such power extends to land purchased by the United States, by consent of the legis lature of the State, and used for the public governmental purpose of maintaining thereon locks and dams for the improvement of the navigation of a river, and the United States has exclusive jurisdiction to prescribe and punish criminal offenses committed thereon; and the fact that the legislative consent was granted after the purchase is immaterial so far as relates to offenses committed thereafter. U. S. v. Tucker (D. C. 1903), 122 Fed. 518.

The exclusive jurisdiction of the United States to prescribe and punish criminal offenses committed on land or in a "place occupied for governmental purposes may be derived either from article 1, section 8. of the Constitution, where the place was purchased by consent of the State legislature, or from an express cession of such jurisdiction by the legislature. Id.

Constitution, article 2, section 8, clause 17, declaring that Congress may exercise exclusive legislation over all territory pur chased by the Government with consent of the State in which the same may be for the erection of forts and other needful buildings, does not preclude the exercise of jurisdiction by the State of Kansas over criminal offenses committed on the military res ervation at Fort Leavenworth, for the reason that such reservation was not parchased with the consent of the State or for the erection of forts and other buildings, but was purchased before the forma tion of the State as a part of the territory of Louisiana, and for the further reason that no attempt was made by Congress in the act admitting the State to the Union to reserve control by exacting guaranties or otherwise against exercising jurisdiction. Clay v. State (1866), 4 Kans. 49.

Where a mortal wound is unlawfully inflicted in a fort of the United States, and the victim dies out of the fort, the State courts have no jurisdiction, although the State statute should profess to give jurisdiction. State v. Kelly (1884), 76 Me. 331, 49 Am. Rep. 620.

Where the United States holds land by purchase, with the consent of the State, as a military post, the Federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of offenses committed thereon, including any part of the grant outside of the garrison wall and fence, though