tear or one single drop of human blood." The result was the existing constitution of the United States. The great statesman who framed that constitution had this problem to solve (the same which I have endeavoured to solve): to divide the powers of government between the States and the Union, so as to reserve to the States self-government in their internal affairs, and at the same time to invest the Union with the general government of the whole nation. The men who framed that constitution were deeply read and firmly believed in the constitutional law of England; and they modelled their new constitution after their ideas of the old one. They invested the Union with all the executive prerogatives of the Crown, almost copying the language of Blackstone; and thus gave to the Union all the imperial powers which I propose to reserve to the Crown. They deprived the States of certain powers which are almost identical with the restrictions which I propose to put upon the powers of the colonial parliaments. In order to prevent the Union from encroaching upon the powers of the States, and in order to prevent the States from curtailing the powers of the Union, they established a supreme court, and a judicial system similar to that which I propose for the colonies.

The most difficult and important questions which have been brought before the supreme court of the United States, have been questions with regard to the powers of Congress, and with regard to the powers which Congress possesses, concurrently with the States, of laying on taxes. Now, similar questions cannot arise under my colonial constitution, because I do not propose to put any legal

limit to the powers of the Imperial Parliament. The constitutional questions which can arise under my colonial constitution appear, from the experience of the United States, to be of rare occurrence, and easily decided. Now, as I have already stated, every one who has studied the subject acknowledges that as far as the division of the powers of government is concerned, the constitution of the United States has worked well for the last seventy years. Therefore I am entitled to infer that my constitution for the colonies, which, as far as the division of the powers of government is concerned, is similar in principle and machinery to that of the United States, would also work well.

Sir, it seems to me that there is a striking analogy between the system of government of the United States, and what ought to be the system of government of our colonial empire. For the United States is a system of States clustered round a central Republic. Our colonial empire ought to be a system of colonies clustered round the hereditary monarchy of England. The hereditary monarchy monarchy should possess all the powers of government with the exception of that of taxation, which the central Republic possesses. If it possessed less, the Empire would cease to be one body politic; if it continue to possess more, the colonies will be discontented at the want of self-government, and on the first occasion would imitate their brethren in America. To prevent such an event, I propose that the Colonial Office shall cease to interfere with the management of the local affairs of these colonies, and that they shall possess the greatest amount of self-government that is not inconsistent with the

unity and well-being of the British Empire. With this object in view, I submit to the consideration of the House the measures to which I have referred. I do so with diffidence as to the details of these measures, but with confidence that they are founded upon the true principles of colonial policy. I thereask the House to recommend this Bill, and to consider these measures in detail.

CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY SIR WILLIAM MOLESWORTH FOR NEW SOUTH WALES, AND, WITH THE REQUISITE ALTERATIONS, FOR ALL THE OTHER AUSTRALIAN COLONIES AND NEW ZEALAND.

Classification of Clauses.

I. Parliament.

II. Governor.

III. Legislative
Council.

IV. House of
Assembly.

ANALYSIS.

Subject Matter of Clauses.

1. Constitution of Parliament.

2. How appointed and paid.

3. Manner of supplying vacancies in office.

4. Governor to be removed on the Address of two

thirds of both Houses.

5. Governor to forward Addresses.

6. Waste Land to be disposed of according to Acts of the Colonial Parliament.

7. Assent of Governor to Bills.

8. Governor to call together and prorogue Houses, and to dissolve House of Assembly.

9. Parliament to be called together once in every

year.

10. Governor to appoint to civil offices.

11. Governor to grant reprieves and pardons.

12. Instructions to Governor.

13. Constitution of Legislative Council.

14. Qualification of Members of Legislative Council. 15. Succession of Members of Legislative Council. 16. Constitution of House of Assembly.

17. Qualification of Members of House of Assembly. 18, Duration of House of Assembly.

Classification of Clauses.

V. Both Houses.

ANALYSIS-continued.

Subject Matter of Clauses.

19. Qualification of electors of both Houses.
20. Writs and conduct of elections.

21. Writ to be issued by Governor on vacancy
occurring.

22. Oath of Allegiance.

23. Power of each House over its own Members.

24. Each House to Elect its Speaker and determine the rules of its proceedings.

25. Revenue Bills.

26. Reservation of Imperial powers.

27. Reserved powers may be vested in the Governor by letters patent.

VI. Limits of Im-28. Restrictions on the power of the Parliament of New South Wales.

perial and

Colonial
Powers.

29. Original jurisdiction of the Queen in Council.

30. Appellate jurisdiction of the Queen in Council.

31. Alterations in Act how to be made.

32. General legislative power of Parliament of New South Wales.

1. And be it Enacted, That the Legislature of the said colony of New South Wales shall consist of a Governor, and subject to any alteration to be made by the Parliament of New South Wales, of two Houses, to be called respectively the "Legislative Council" and "House of Assembly" of New South Wales; and such Governor and two Houses together shall be called the Parliament of New South Wales.

2. And be it Enacted, That the Governor shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Great Britain and Ireland, and shall receive his salary from the Treasury of the United Kingdom; and the supreme executive power in the colony shall be vested in such Governor.

3. And be it Enacted, That, subject to any alteration to be made by the Parliament of New South Wales, during any vacancy of the office of Governor, the Speaker of the Legislative Council, or, if there be then no Speaker of the Legislative Council, the Speaker of the House of Assembly, or, if there be then no Speaker of the House of Assembly, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the said colony, shall exercise such office; and whenever the Speaker of the House of Legislative Council or of the House of Assembly shall so exercise the said

office, his duties as Speaker shall be suspended, and the Legislative Council or House of Assembly (as the case may require) shall fill the vacancy until his duties as Governor

cease.

4. And be it Enacted, That if at any time an address passed by two-thirds of the whole number of the members of each House of Parliament of New South Wales be presented to Her Majesty, praying for the removal of any Governor from his office, such Governor shall thereupon be removed, and another appointed in his place.

5. And be it Enacted, That the Governor shall, without delay, forward to Her Majesty's principal Secretary of State, for presentation to Her Majesty, all addresses passed by a majority of either of the two Houses of the Parliament of New South Wales.

6. And be it Enacted, That the Governor shall dispose of the waste lands of the colony, including minerals of every description, and all fines, forfeitures, and other royalties, according to any Acts which the Parliament of New South Wales may pass for the purpose, preserving to the persons entitled thereto the benefit of all grants of land, and of all contracts for grants of land, made or entered into previously to the passing of any Act affecting such land.

7. And be it Enacted, That no Bill shall become law without the assent of the Governor, and that he shall, before the close of the Session, declare his assent to or dissent from every Bill presented to him.

8. And be it Enacted, That the Governor shall have power, from time to time, to call together the said Houses of Parliament, to fix their place of meeting, and to prorogue them; and shall also have power to dissolve the House of Assembly when he may think expedient.

9. And be it Enacted, That, subject to any alteration to be made by the Parliament of New South Wales, the Governor shall hold a Session of the said Parliament once in every year, the first of such Sessions to be holden at some time not later than [ months after the proclamation of this Act in the colony.

10. And be it Enacted, That, subject to any alteration to be made by the Parliament of New South Wales, the Governor shall appoint to all civil offices in the said colony.