The Significance of the Administration of Rutherford B. Hayes JOHN SPENCER BASSETT, Ph. D., LL. D. Two recent books have called attention to the significance of Hayes's administration, 1877-1881, both written by authors who defend President Hayes.* Professor Burgess, whose work embodies a series of lectures delivered at Kenyon College, where Hayes graduated in 1842, could hardly be expected to assume a critical attitude; but the warmth of his praise leaves little ground to think that he had any reservations in mind when he delivered his lectures. For example, nothing but sheer enthusiasm could have prompted him to describe the Hayes cabinet in the following words: "Taken all together, it was the strongest body of men, each best fitted for the place assigned to him, that ever sat around the counciltable of a President of the United States" (page 65). I find myself forced to read the following extract describing the whole administration with the same feeling of protest: "No wiser, sounder, and more successful presidential period has ever been experienced in this country" (page 146). It would be hard to write about Hayes with less of that spirit of reserved statement which is the glory of the true historian than is displayed in these two typical extracts from Professor Burgess's book. Mr. Williams's two volumes are offered to the public as an authoritative life of Hayes, and the second is surrendered almost entirely to the consideration of Hayes's administration. Conscientious industry and grasp of the subject characterize the treatment, although there is displayed little of the critical spirit. The author has had access to the papers in the possession of the Hayes family, and one of the most valuable features of his book is the frequent extracts given from Hayes's diary, a work which, it seems, would be well worth Burgess, John W., The Administration of President Hayes. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1916. Pp. xi, 150. New York: Williams, Charles Richard, The Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company; 2 volumes, 1914. Pp. xiv, 540; ix, 488. publishing in its entirety. While he makes us realize and admire the strong and simple character of President Hayes, he gives us, also, a reliable and ample, if undiscriminating, account of what Hayes did in the high office to which he was called. The most regrettable feature of the book is its failure to correlate the story of the administration with the general history of the times. Hayes's administration had an important relation to the development of American political history; but in Mr. Williams's otherwise excellent volumes this relation takes a purely incidental position. To point out some of the most important features of this relation is the purpose of this review. During the twelve years which ended early in 1877 political conditions passed from bad to worse with a steadiness that may well have reduced to despair the most optimistic patriot. Although the republican party embraced that element of the population in the North which ordinarily had most at heart the progress of good government, it also embraced the great capitalists, the strong business men who desired to exploit the government for their own interest, and the great mass of rural voters of the North to whom party allegiance was a matter of unquestioning faith. The party was well organized by leaders whose moral scruples were never keen. It was fortified by the glory it had acquired in other days as the defender of the union and by the fact that its opponents were forced to appear as defenders of the South, whom the people thought still desirous of thwarting the ideals of a righteous policy of emancipation. Its opponents were so much discredited by their association with the aspirations of the South that they were not a serious menace to any bad policy the republicans chose to adopt. The general result was that the worst element in the republican party did not hesitate to drive the party to the adoption of a course of selfishness for which not even the democrats in the most exalted days of Jacksonian power would have dared assume responsibility. Cynical indifference to public opinion, unblushing misuse of the patronage, and official vulgarity reigned in the party's councils and lowered the standard of public life in Washington until men who loved good government began to feel that it was useless to hope for reforms. It was Hayes's task to attack these evils in a steady effort to bring the party back to such a state of soundness as would make it representative of the better class of the people of the country. That he could make it absolutely pure was impossible, and there is good reason to believe that Hayes himself, reformer as he was, did not have delusions on that particular point. Four notable problems confronted him when he took the reins of government: the restoration of self-government in the South; the establishment of national finances on a sound basis; the promotion, as far as he was able, of civil service reform; and the reduction of the power of the group of selfwilled men who had given peculiar significance to the term "Grantism." The second we may dismiss with little discussion. Bringing the government back to a sound financial condition, both as to the resumption of specie payment and the refunding of the war debt at moderate interest, had been provided for by acts of congress before he became president; and for Hayes the chief obligation was to resist the pressure to undo what had been done. For such resistance he was more than adequate. It was not hard to see what ought to be done about the Southern problem. In three recently reconstructed states civil government still rested on military force. Any tyro could tell him that the situation was against the fundamental principles of republican government, and that, under the circumstances, the only thing to do was to withdraw the troops and let the Southerners assume the responsibility of preserving peace and enforcing justice in their own country. If they made mistakes the results would be for their own disadvantage, and if they violated the federal constitution they could be dealt with after the fact. The problem in this form was not difficult. It became hard in connection with the situation that was certain to arise in his own party as soon as the troops were withdrawn. The "carpet-bag governments" in the South were dear to the hearts of the regular republicans of the North. To destroy them at a blow would place him in antagonism with a large and strong element of his own party. The machinery of sectional preju dice, long in use in creating political capital in the North, would be turned against him and his friends. He would be especially vulnerable, since he held his office solely because it had been decided that the three Southern States concerned had gone republican. If he threw these states to the democrats, his opponents would say he invalidated his own election. It cannot be doubted that Hayes weighed well all these arguments and took his course with his eyes open to the consequences. Under the storm of abuse that the ousted carpetbaggers and their friends called down on him, he never faltered in his chosen course. In reforming the method employed in making appointments to office he was equally firm. His pre-election pledges in behalf of this reform were without qualification; and they were executed, as far as they could be executed under existing conditions. His merit in this respect lay, not so much in accepting civil service reform, as in standing by it. Any intelligent and well-meaning citizen who was not under the influence of shallow "practical" politics must realize that the old method of selecting civil servants was pernicious. Many thousands of people in the country had come to this conclusion, and Hayes was only one of them. Many presidents had realized it in their day, even the prosaic and essentially partizan Polk. Hayes was the first who deliberately and persistently tried to employ a system of merit in determining whom he should appoint to the administrative offices of lower grade. He found in existence a well defined system of party assessments, by which the offices were made to yield a large portion of the money necessary to run the election campaigns. The system fostered inefficiency in office, and it was, also, an offense to decency. He lost no time in issuing an order that campaign assessments should not be levied, and it is asserted that no official lost office through refusing to pay such an assessment. At the same time he ordered that federal officials should not take active part in party affairs. The offenses at which these orders were directed were so well rooted in the life of the times that his efforts did not remove them, but there is no doubt that the orders were issued in all sincerity. Hayes's fourth problem, the reduction of the power of the party machine, was the greatest that confronted him. It meant that he was called on to shift the centre of gravity in his party, and to do this it was necessary to put a new spirit of confidence in good government into the rank and file of the voters who ranged themselves under the party banner. He gave evidence of his purpose when he refused to allow Conkling, Blaine, Cameron, and "Zack" Chandler to help him in making up a cabinet. He undoubtedly realized that he was planting the seed of strong opposition to his administration, but he did not hesitate. His opponents lost no time in letting him know what he was to expect at their hands. Their first move was to postpone the confirmation of his cabinet, a step without precedent in our history. Their action brought such a strong protest from the public that they hastily withdrew from their position and the nominations were confirmed. Thus Hayes won the first round in the fight, but his victory did not meant that the opposition was routed. Although annoyed by the irritating criticisms that Blaine, Butler, "Bill" Chandler, and others made of his Southern policy, he moved on steadily in his pre-arranged course. He gave his next blow in New York, where he tried to reform the administration of the custom-house. The notorious abuses in that office flourished under the protection of Senator Conkling, who resented the removal of Arthur, the collector, and Cornell, the naval officer, at the port of New York. Conkling determined to prevent the appointment of successors to these ousted friends. He got the new nominations referred to the committee on commerce, of which he himself was chairman, and had the committee report against confirmation. Hayes did not become discouraged but stood by his colors. He made other nominations for the offices in question and when congress met in 1878 they were laid before the senate. Conkling tried the same game of delay and came at length to the bitterest opposition. Nevertheless, the tide was running against him. Hayes's steady insistence on reforms had reached the conscience of the people, and public opinion made itself felt in the senate. February 3, 1879, the long fight came to an end. Conkling rallied his forces in vain. His insistence on the efficacy of "senatorial courtesy" was ignored, and he came to |