sentiments; and we rejoice in all the good that Calvinism has done. Let discussion continue, then, and let it be free; only let it be conducted in the spirit of love, "always with grace, seasoned with salt." Let our Calvinistic brethren, and all, indeed, who differ from us in opinion, see that we are not mere theological gladiators, fighting for victory, and delighting in the discomfiture and disgrace of our opponents. Let them see, that, if we dissent from their views, it is because our convictions compel us to do so; that, with them, we hold to the essentials of Christianity;-we believe in God, in Christ, in duty, and destiny; and though interpreting these doctrines differently from what they do, we do not deny their vital efficiency, or their saving importance, neither would we crucify Jesus afresh, or put him to open shame. We would stand on our convictions; yet we would respect the honest convictions of others; and we would labor in our own way to build up the kingdom of God on earth. What is good in all creeds, will continue to flourish; what is bad, will eventually disappear. The sacredness of truth will be recognized by all; and the sacredness of conscience in interpreting truth. And all loyal hearts, loyal to God, loyal to Christ, and loyal to duty,-will join together as Christian brethren, in initiating the triumphs of the Gospel of Christ. They may differ on some points; they will agree on more. They will not look back regretfully to the past, and ask what this or that man believed, what this or that council decreed,-who was orthodox, or who was heterodox; but, realizing that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; that his religion is a living power, not a dead letter, they will labor in this spirit for the upbuilding of holiness, and virtue will go out of them for the healing of the nations. VOL. XVI. 12 J. S. B. ART. X. Necessity versus Liberty. We have placed the term Necessity at the head of this article, because it is in current use, as indicating the doctrine that stands opposed to the idea of the Liberty or Freedom of the Will. We wish to say however, once for all, that we use this term always under protest, as having no business in theology, and as being too indefinite to be employed in accurate philosophical discourse. Leibnitz and Whateley deprecate its use; and Stuart Mill justly says: "The application of so improper a term to the doctrine of cause and effect, in the matter of human character, seems to me one of the most signal instances in philosophy of the abuse of terms, and its practical consequences one of the most striking examples of the power of language over associations. The subject will never be generally understood until that objectionable term is dropped." The real question at issue between the advocates of liberty and their opponents is always, at bottom, simply, whether or not the law of cause and effect holds good, and is efficient in its application to the human mind? If it does, then of course the canses that act in the domain of mind, will be different in themselves and the mode of their operation from those that act in the domain of matter. The term " Necessity" seems well calculated to conceal this, the real question, by introducing the idea of a blind force, which ignores the difference between mechanics and dynamics, mind and matter, atheism and theism, and by which causes drag their effects after them, as by a chain of adamant. We make the will of an infinitely wise and all benevolent God, the nexus between cause and effect. The methods of expressing that Will, differ, in the world of mind and the world of matter, though in both, the will is efficient, and in this view "divine sovereignty" or "divine efficiency" expresses our meaning, while Necessity does not. Hence our protest against the term. The sharp contest between the antagonist doctrines of Liberty and Necessity, has been the intellectual "conflict of ages; and yet, singularly enough, it is true to-day, that the man who enters upon an examination of the doctrine of Liberty, will find himself embarrassed in the outset with the question of the precise thing that he has for his subject. Liberty, what is it? Where does it reside? Wherein does it consist? Is it in the sphere of outward action, or in that of the intellectual activities? Does it pertain to the soul itself, or to a single faculty of the soul, namely the Will? If the latter, what is the Will? A result, or a commencement? An effect, or a cause, without an antecedent? These are questions, in relation to which the advocates of Liberty are by no means agreed. To the best of our knowledge, there is not even a conventional ground upon which they can unite. This is not at all surprising, for the truth is, the deepest and most profound thinkers place Liberty beyond the compass of human thought. Sir William Hamilton says: "How the Will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible. We are unable to conceive an absolute commencement; we cannot therefore conceive a free volition. A determination by motive cannot to our understanding escape from Necessitation. How therefore, I repeat, moral liberty is possible in man or God, we are utterly unable speculatively to understand."1 Reid says: "To conceive the possibility of this inconceivable act (choosing against motive), we must conceive of some cause by which the man is determined to exert it. We thus in thought never escape Necessity. . . . Is the person an original undetermined cause of the determination of his own will? If he be not, then he is not a free agent. If he be, then it is impossible to conceive the possibility of this. . . . We cannot compass, in thought, an undetermined cause, the fundamental hypothesis of the scheme of Liberty. The doctrine of moral Liberty cannot be made conceiveable, for we can only conceive the determined and the relative."2 Neither of the above authors considers the fact that the doctrine is inconceivable, as proof that it is not true, for we are obliged to admit many inconceivable things. But surely, the doctrine being placed beyond the compass of thought, its advocates 1 See Philosophy, Sir William Hamilton, p. 507, 8, 9. may be excused for any amount of mist and confusion that there may be in their treatment of the subject. But the point to which we call attention is, the fundamental hypothesis necessary to the doctrine of Liberty, in any and all its forms and phases; namely, an absolute commencement, a cause that is not an effect. It is plain enough that, if any thing is an effect of a pre-existing and adequate cause, then it cannot be otherwise than as it is. If the volitions of the Will are caused by motives, or by any thing else, they are not free. A free act is an act which, being a cause, is not an effect. To conceive this, we must exempt some things from the law of cause and effect, and make them causes without being effects, or something coming from nothing. This we cannot do by reason of mental incompetence, and yet, on that basis alone Liberty must rest. The learned and profound author of an article of recent date, seems to have understood this perfectly. Hence he says, "The doctrine of philosophical fatalism (Necessity), stands on the position, that the human mind is subject to the universal law of cause and effect." 3 Of course, the doctrine of Liberty stands on the opposite position, that the human mind is not subject to the universal law,-law of cause and effect. The exceptions to this law are in the volitions of the Will. They are not caused by any thing, but they are causes, without an antecedent. This is the true issue. How it is met is reserved for further inquiry. At present, we remark, in passing, that, so far as we know, M. Cousin is the only author who has looked it full in the face; and we wish further to advertise the reader in advance, that all attempts at argumentation, however ingeniously contrived or skilfully conducted, which fall short of the position of a cause which is not an effect, a beginning without an antecedent, must fall short of Liberty. That position we have shown by the testimony of Hamilton and Reid, is beyond the compass of thought, and therefore logically impossible. It remains then, that Liberty shall be propounded as a simple fact of consciousness, and on that basis all reasonings, pro or con, are excluded, except on the ground of the mendacity of consciousness, which Hamilton admits may be proved, if its facts are immediately, or in their legiti 3 Quarterly, October, 1858, p. 347. mate consequences, self-contradicting. Without reference to the latter alternative, it is sufficient to say that, with Hartley, Priestly, Belsham and others, we utterly deny that Liberty is a fact of consciousness. On the contrary, the clear and unmistakable testimony of consciousness is, that, for each and every voluntary act, there is a motive and a cause. We cannot, if we would, either in consciousness or in thought, project ourselves out of the dominion of the law of cause and effect. But do not let us be deceived by the illusion that the doctrine of Liberty itself is changed by this change in the mode of its defence. Liberty, though asserted as a fact of consciousness, is the same inconceivable and impossible thing in our thought, involving the idea of a beginning without an antecedent, which though a man admit, he cannot think. Let there be no dodging this issue, no attempt to build up the doctrine of Liberty on the ruins of Necessity, by calling the latter ugly names, and the application of the reductio ad absurdum. Let it stand on its own foundation, or stand not at all; for though the doctrine of Necessity were annihilated, Liberty would still be the same impossible thought, involving the idea of a beginning without an antecedentsomething from nothing. Nor let us be deceived by the shallow expedient of attempting to avoid, or conceal, the difficulty by conceding the validity of the law of cause and effect, in some things, and restricting Liberty merely to those acts of which moral qualities can be predicated. Neither reason nor consciousness knows any difference in our voluntary acts, as to their causality or non-causality, and the theory that compels us to discriminate between them, in this regard, is sheer assumption, without a particle of proof. We must either leave the law of cause and effect in full force, or we must abolish it entirely in the sphere of our mental activities. We proceed to notice some of the many forms and phases in which this doctrine of Liberty is held. I. The first is that which confines it to the sphere of outward action. Edwards defines Liberty, or freedom, to be, "The power, opportunity, or advantage, one has to do as he pleases; or, in other words, being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing or conducting in any respect as he wills. To this extent the great champion of 4 Edwards on the Will, Part i. sec. 5. |