how we become thus "pleased;" whether by the force of Natural, or of Moral, Necessity; or by having that mood of mind created within us, without notice and in an instant, by a miraculous interposition of God; or whether it be by the overmastering action of Mesmerism, Biology, or other wholly foreign power, such as a real demoniac possession, &c.; if we only will as we please, after being thus made "pleased" to do so, it is all free, and our highest idea of freedom is fully satisfied! Nobody practically believes this.

We have not thought it needful to verify our representation of this scheme by quoting the language of its advocates. For their views and arguments are familiar to those who have taken much pains to look into the matter. It is sufficient to refer to such current authors as Edwards, Alexander, Day, Upham, whose treatises are used as textbooks, in our schools. Some later writers of the same class, however, appear nearly or quite to have worn off the shell of the doctrine, and to have got a glimpse through, into its real contents, so at least as to surmize what it is likely to prove, the serpent egg of Fatalism, instead of what it had been taken for.

If the points which we have just examined, in the Doctrine of Necessity, are really such as we think we have shown them to be; if the distinction, sometimes apparently claimed and again apparently denied, between Moral Necessity and Natural Necessity, is unfounded; if the term itself truly expresses the principle assumed; if the limit set to our intuitive idea of freedom is unreal; if these things are so, no one will doubt that the doctrine, when consistently evolved, is pure Fatalism, with all its abhorrent conclusions. And, on the other hand, if the distinction of two kinds of necessity is well-founded, then the doctrine can never be so much as formed, we mean legitimately. In the former case, it ends in monstrous abortion; in the latter case in non-conception. At all events, if we may judge from the obvious tendency of psychological and metaphysical inquiries, for the last quarter of a century, the so called Doctrine of Necessity is on its way towards the doom already pronounced upon

Fatalism. For ourselves, we confess that we see no escape for it, at least in its present form.

Should any one still ask, "But what shall we do with the strong arguments by which it is supported?" the answer must be shaped to such reply as may be given to another question, namely,-By which, what is supported? the scheme usually called, by way of distinction, the Doctrine of Necessity? If so, the proper answer is, We ought, first of all, to see whether that doctrine inevitably resolves itself into Fatalism. If it does not, or if it can be legitimately modified so that it shall not, there may, then, be no valid objection to it, and, in that case, there may be really sound arguments for it. But if it does, if it can be proved only by assuming principles and methods that inevitably prove Fatalism, do we need any directions how to dispose of its arguments which thus end in absurdity? The absurdity itself disposes of them in as conclusive a way as possible. Is it reasonable to ask, as if we were in doubt, What shall we do with the strong arguments that make two and two to be five? A more particular answer, however, may be given, by observing, that Fatalism is constructed out of the Law of Cause and Effect; or rather out of a peculiar notion respecting the nature of that Law.19 Now, we have no clearer intuition that there is such a Law, in any part of the universe, as Cause and Effect, than we have that there are such qualities and relations as

19 Fatalism is founded on the notion that there is, strictly speaking, but one cause in the universe, namely, either the Divine Will, or else a Law of mechanical causation lying behind the Divine Will and wholly actuating it. In either case, it supposes that this sole cause, which so ever it be, works in such an exclusive manner throughout all existence, as alone to produce every fact that occurs, in mind as well as in matter; admitting no other agent, or depository of power; but itself exerting all the agency and all the power, that exist. If there be any such thing, properly speaking, as a secondary or created cause, that does itself act as a cause, it opens a leakage fatal to the strength of the Fatalistic argument.

In the answer, however, which we give above, we content ourselves with taking the Law of Cause and Effect in general, without entering into the more exact analysis of the case. The analysis would, indeed, add force to the argument, if it did not complicate it. But we do not think it necessary, since it is plain that our intuitive knowledge of the existence of such a Law as Cause and Effect in any part of the universe, is no clearer nor more certain than our intuitive knowledge of our personality, and of moral qualities.

Virtue and Sin, Merit and Demerit, Responsibility, Personality, and Freedom. Both intuitions stand on equal authority; the one can not disprove the other, to say nothing. of the mere inferences from them. To make one part of our primary intuitive knowledge falsify another part of our primary intuitive knowledge, is the extreme of irrationality. We may not be able to follow the two out to the point where they logically coalesce. But, in that case, we must do as we do in all other cases of the kind; we must accept both parts of such primary knowledge, and, at the same time, let our common-sense restrain us from inferring a system, out of the one, that will contradict, not only our inferences from the other, but also the other primary knowledge itself. He is a very narrow thinker indeed, who has not, in his experience, met with many truths, of which he found himself unable to complete the circle, so as to systemize them harmoniously with other known truths. The two may be perfectly accordant, so far as they lie in his primary intuitions, where God placed them; but when one attempts to project them out into a complete system, his ignorance with respect to their compass, limits, and modifications, may involve his work in confusion. For example, there is the truth, that we live, move, and have our being, in God; and there is also the truth that we are still distinct personalities, instead of being parts of God,-who will develope both of these, systemati cally, and yet keep them in unison? There are the essential relations of the Infinite to the Finite,-who will pretend to trace out, systematically, any of the truths, which we cannot but recognize, with respect to these? If we are judicious, we shall not hold ourselves under obligation, in such cases, to reduce the truths to a system, since we know, beforehand, that we are incompetent to reach the point where they really systemize.

It should be observed, that this incompetency of ours is not confined to grave questions. An ingenious man proves to me, by geometrical demonstration, the most logi cal of all demonstrations, that one point may move in a right line toward another point, with the velocity of lightning, and not reach it in all eternity, though the points are not three inches apart; and I can pick no flaw in the structure of his demonstration. What shall I do? treat the conclu

sion gravely as a veritable fact? No; I shall think, perhaps, that the man is ingenious, and that his "demonstration is a capital puzzle; and that is all the thought which I shall give to the matter. Another man "proves " to me, by a strict process of logic, that if Deity is an infinite being, there can not be another being in existence; for, argues he, another being would be so much added to infinity, making the absurd amount = infinite being, plus finite being. Ergo, either there is no finite being in the universe, or else there is no infinite being? What shall I do, now? Advise him to choose a fitter theme, on which to construct his puzzles,-if he have no other vocation.

III. Perhaps there is scarcely a harder trial for the human mind, when in a certain mood, than to abstain from a factitious omniscience, which may always be manufactured at will. Our real knowledge meets at length with mystery at every point in its horizon. And wherever it is thus baffled, the temptation is great to contemn the delay of patient, sober inquiry; and greater still, to spurn all suspense after a few efforts at discovery have yielded us no insight. Then, impatient and headstrong, we clear the barrier at a leap, and plunge into the abyss, with a brave resolution to construct at least a dialectical system, which shall supply the want of knowledge, and open a way for speculation through the vast unknown. Like the ancient track through Chaos, the way is only buoyed up by "the surging smoke, amidst the noise of endless wars." While it seems to last, nobody thinks of venturing any substance upon it heavier than abstract speculations; and when the smoke and noise subside, the way itself has disappeared, having never had an existence in matter of fact.

What if we should conclude to let the unknown remain unbridged, till it shall become known? What if we should content ourselves, for the present, to abide by the knowledge, which the Scriptures, as well as our moral and religious nature, give us, that we can do contrary to the will of God, that we are responsible for our conduct, that we are deserving or blame-worthy, and are really virtuous or sinful; and, at the same time, that God disposes of the results of our agency, and can influence our course, and

our disposition, without violating our personality. This is the truth which every man recognizes, howsoever he may speculate; it is the truth on which every religious man acts. And it is enough, for all practical and doctrinal purposes; though it does not answer the demand for a factitious omniscience, nor a desire for the irresponsibility of Fatalism.

H. B. 2d.

ART. XXV.

Universalism Revealed in the Four Gospels.

The Doctrine of Endless Punishment for the Sins of this Life, Unchristian and Unreasonable. Two Discourses, delivered in Hollis Street Church. By Rev. Thomas Starr King. Published by Request. Boston: Crosby, Nichols and Company. 1858.

It is a task of a delicate nature for the writer of this article to attempt a review of the two sermons before him. Such have been the past relations between the reviewer and the author of the sermons, that nothing but a deep sense of duty could have led the former to undertake the task. It is possible Mr. King may suppose that he has done a favor to the denomination of Universalists by preaching and publishing these two sermons. If so, we differ totally from him in that opinion. Were certain of the positions assumed by him in the sermons to become generally received, then farewell to the blessed doctrine we have long defended; farewell to the prosperity of the class of Christians to whom we belong; farewell to the dear and cherished hopes of the thousands who are looking to our churches and pastors for all the consolations they need in life and in death. If Universalists can not show that certain of the statements made by Mr. King are incorrect, they may as well abandon their glorious theory, however dear to them.

The particular points in the sermons we refer to will come out as we proceed. There are one or two that