century, although, at that time, eftablished miftrefs of the feas, and Spain not poffeffed of any naval force to oppofe her. In addition to thefe circumstances, fo favourable to conqueft, England had alfo the fupport of a very powerful internal party, to which was added a very formidable and well-difciplined body of her own veteran troops, and yet the failed.

The diftance of thofe colonies on which Spain places her chief dependance, and whofe value might be expected to attract the avarice of other nations, has ever, hitherto, proved a fufficient fecurity to them. But the certain protection from permanent conqueft muft ever depend on the internal refources of thofe colonies themfelves, which are so far diftant. The united maritime power which Europe, at this inftant, poffeffes, would not be fufficient to guard poffeffions, fo difperfed and extensive, from the poffibility of infult or attack, by nations whofe territories are more compact, and whofe ftrength fhould even be inferior to them: but from all thofe, on a more enlarged fcale, deftined for the abfolute reduction of the country, Spain may, probably, reft fecure; as the profit of the fulleft fuccefs would fcarcely defray the expence of attack, and atone for the difficulty and rifk of attempting to hold, by the mere right of conqueft, a country of greater extent than moft European nations.

The convoy of her treasure being the only grand object that should attract the attention of Spain, when this is provided for, no other political confideration ought to excite in her any alarm, or betray her into any expence. All attempts to acquire greater confequence, as a maritime state,

a 4

have

have hitherto proved unfuccefsful, as they are opposed by the natural bent and genius of the people as well as the fituation of the country they inhabit.

The infignificance of Portugal, which obliges her to depend on the alliance of a foreign power for her protection, renders it unneceffary to make any remark on the neceffity of her maintaining, or the folly of her difregarding a naval confequence. This, however, not always having been her fituation, it will not, perhaps, be impertinent to obferve that we may trace in the fate of this nation the datum we firft wifhed to establish. "That those, on whom maritime power is not bestowed by nature, may, indeed, for a short period, dazzle and amaze the world by a tranfient view which vanishes almost with the first glimpse, but cannot impress mankind with an idea of their real greatness. One refembles the regular and fplendid carriage of the perfonage of real diftinction and fortune, the other that of the proud upstart, whofe fall is ridiculed before even his elevation, and temporary magnificence is generally known,"

Those who are unacquainted with the hiftory of Europe during the fifteenth, and part of the fixteenth centuries, certainly will be astonished to learn, that, during that period, the confequence of the Portuguese, as a naval power, eclipfed that of every ftate in Europe, Spain excepted. Du Perrier gives the following honourable account of their difcoveries, and of the celebrated decifion of Pope Alexander the Sixth, of a difpute between Portugal and her fifter kingdom, Spain, relative to the maritime right of each.

"John,

"John, king of Portugal, predeceffor to the Emanuels, then reigned, and caused the first difcoveries to be made in the ocean, wherefore the Portuguese thought themselves privileged to forbid the commerce of any other nations with those countries newly difcovered. After long contests both parties agreed to fubmit the difpute to the decifion of Pope Alexander the Sixth, each promifing to remain in peace till fuch time as judgement was paffed. The Pope, to decide this grand quarrel, published a brief, by which he divided the world into two halves, drawing a line which paffed over the islands of Cape de Verde, and from thence, proceeding for the space of 360 leagues weftward, penetrated the terra firma of America, a little diftant from the river Maragnon, which was to be confidered the boundary of the two rival powers, that is to say, that the Portuguese should have, for their share, all that was comprised within 180 degrees of longitude advancing to the east, and the Spaniards as many towards the west."

Such was the ease and impartiality with which his holiness partitioned out the world, and fuch the implicit obedience paid to his decree by these two powerful ftates, that they both declared themselves perfectly fatisfied with the decision!

Of the northern powers of Europe it is needlefs to fay much. Sweden, Ruffia, and Denmark, form, as it were, a fpecies of ftate fociety indepen dent of the rest of the world; their commerce, which confifts principally of raw commodities the produce of their countries, and which are common to all three, might be expected to have been the fource of more frequent differences than really have taken place between them. Their fituation with respect to other maritime powers renders any difpute

that what is properly called the dominion of the fea, of right belongs to Britain, is by taking care that the fhall always continue competent to the affertion and maintenance of it. With those which are called rival nations there never will be any argument fo forcible as the intrepidity of British feamen, and the mouths of their cannon.

As almost every country then has, by custom or prejudice, acquired a habit of carrying on war peculiar to itself, the excellence in that mode which they individually acquire, in confequence of this feparate ufage and purfuit, is by no means wonderful or extraordinary: and it would be as abfurd to expect an Heffian or an Hungarian should be an expert mariner, as to expect a British feaman fhould render excellent fervice as a light dragoon or an huffar.

The commerce of Britain having, through industry and indefatigable attention, attained an height capable of attracting the envy, at least, of foreign countries, no means ought to be left unattempted to cherish and preferve it; for though it may be a doubt among fceptics, and fpeculative reafoners, whether it be in reality a benefit or difadvantage to a country, or colony, newly erected, no perfon can be hardy enough to dispute the benefit it affords to a country with which it has progreffively rifen, and to whofe existence it has in a great measure become absolutely effential.

The wars in which Britain has been involved for the last fifty years, having been all primarily or fecondarily connected with this caufe, it is therefore become the duty of the present and every fucceeding generation, to prevent even the risk of infult, which may probably be prevented by timely precaution, and vigorous preparation.

When

When we compare the laffitude and inattention of antiquity with the care and vigour which has characterised the management of the naval empire of Britain for the laft century and half, we scarcely know how fufficiently to applaud the prudence and political wifdom which first gave material energy to this fyftem. It is a trite obfervation, that Providence frequently produces the greatest benefits by the bafeft and worft means; fo has it in the prefent cafe. From the time of the defeat of the Spanish Armada in the year 1588, the naval power of Britain flumbered in inactivity, till roufed fuddenly from its torpid ftate, it burft with fplendor the more dazzling, because unexpected, under the aufpices of that faction which, led by Cromwell, put one king to death, and drove another into exile.

Treafon and rebellion may fully bravery, and tarnish the moft glorious actions; but there ftill remains behind a degree of applaufe which even royalty cannot withhold from them. Cromwell, whofe hypocrify, aided by his intrepidity and ability, had enabled him to ufurp the power of a king, appeared willing to make the nation he had injured every compenfation in his power for the violence done to it, by raising it to a political confequence, to which it had been, till that time, a stranger. The navy of Britain carried terror and conqueft with it wherever it came; and the fame of its exploits overawed thofe nations who had not courage to wait the violence of its attack.

Such was the ftate and credit of the British naval power at the time Charles the Second recovered poffeffion of his throne. Under a fovereign fo addicted to pleasure as himself, the