Herr Von Levetzow, the President of the German Reichstag, writes:

"If, during the roll-call, it should happen that a member present on the floor does not respond to his name, he would undoubtedly be counted with the other members if noticed by the functionaries.»

Article 35 of the Rules of the Italian Senate prescribes that "all the members present are counted in making up a quorum."

That the foregoing powers (that of counting a quorum and that of refusing to put dilatory motions) are great powers I will not for a moment deny. But their justification, apart from precedent, is found in their practical utility as a remedy for a positive evil. The reasons which impelled the Speaker to adopt the above rules will be readily appreciated by a review of the conditions which existed prior to their adoption. Obstruction was carried so far in the Forty-fifth Congress that Garfield said;

"A minority of one third, even, has been able, under the rules of the House, to say to it, 'You may take up an appropriation bill and pass it. You may consider such things as we select, but you shall not consider any bill that we the minority do not consent to. This demand is intolerable, is revolutionary, and cannot be submitted to without dishonor.»

Miss Follet says:

"Until 1889 one man was able to prevent any transaction of business. Mr. Weaver kept the House engaged in roll-calls for eight days in his attempt to secure consideration of a bill organizing the Territory of Oklahoma.»

In 1889 Henry Cabot Lodge said in an article in the "North American Review":

"The American House of Representatives to-day is a complete travesty on republican government, on popular government, and upon government by the majority. The purpose of the rules is merely to facilitate the transaction of public business, but they have been so perverted that they serve only to stop public business. If a majority cannot be trusted to rule in this country, then we ought to try something else; but while we live under the majority system then the majority ought to have and must have a chance to act.»

As a further evidence of the wisdom of these rules we submit the fact that they have since been adopted by those who

most strenuously opposed their adoption in the Fifty-first Congress.

The fact is often cited that the Speaker of the House of Representatives possesses far more power than does the Speaker of the House of Commons. True, he does. But the latter is merely a moderator. Our Speaker is in many respects comparable to the Premier rather than to the Speaker of the House of Commons. Like the Premier he is the political leader of his party. He it is who coördinates and harmonizes the conflicting mass of material reported by the chairmen of the numerous committees. The House, or rather the majority party of the House, hold him responsible for the performance of this duty, for which there is no other provision in our system of legislation. Hence,

if we consider the Speaker as a moderator merely, and not as a political leader also, we fail to understand his position. The most successful Speakers - Clay, Randall, Blaine, Carlisle, and Reed have been preëminently party leaders.

Viewing the powers of the Speaker both as a moderator and as a political leader we cannot fail to see that he is an officer of great power,- in fact, he is the first man in our legislative system. But this power he has secured, not by laying violent hands on it; it has been granted him by the House in accordance with the dictates of experience and the logic of facts. It is therefore a product of natural evolution under the peculiar conditions and organization of the House. It cannot be understood in any other way. That his powers may at times be abused must, in a spirit of candor and fairness, be admitted. But he holds these powers at the will of the majority of the House and is responsible to it for their exercise. The real question, then, is whether abuses by one representing a majority are comparable to the abuse of power by filibusters, and the loss of time and lack of unity in legislation due to the clashing of rival committees and factions. Upon this question Mr. Bryce says:

"A governing assembly cannot suffer itself to be paralyzed; it must at whatever risk to its minority find some method of dispatching its business.»

AURORA, ILL.

EDWIN MAXEY.

T

HE discussions of international relations are again assuming the character of conjectures on the likelihood of permanent alliances and understandings, and the tendency is at present to interpret events in the light of an understanding between the three great Germanic nations - Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. Lord Salisbury, in his speech of November 16, dwelt especially upon the harmonious relations between these three Powers, and Mr. Chamberlain, in his Leicester speech, made much of the mutual good feeling among them, going so far as to suggest the possibility of a new triple alliance. Hence the formation of such an alliance is already confidently expected by many.

Of course there are several facts in recent history which give color to a view of this kind, but it will be well to avoid general terms, like "Anglo-Saxon Alliance,» and to analyze the real interests which at present could bind these three Powers together. The term << Anglo-Saxon Alliance" itself is open to serious criticism. If it stands for racial unity, it would be a misnomer, even if confined to the United States and Great Britain. It emphasizes a certain ethnical element in the composition of these two nations which is too easily exaggerated; and, moreover, ethnical relationships are not at present a sufficient basis for concerted political action. Bismarck, the greatest nationalist among modern statesmen, states that race alone is totally insufficient as a bond of political union. The use of the term in this signification lays it open to considerable ridicule if we think of the AngloSaxons of Mulberry Street, in New York, and of the Nineteenth Ward in Chicago.

Some writers have suggested that the term does not refer to race, but to institutions, an Anglo-Saxon alliance comprising the nations that believe in self-government,- government by the people for the people. But even this use of the term could not be carried out consistently, because in colonial affairs these three nations do not believe unequivocally in self-government, and if we should make local self-government the basis then Russia with its mir would also have a title to be considered an Anglo-Saxon nation. There

fore as a technical term this phrase is open to very considerable criticism. It cannot, however, be denied that it stands for a wave of popular feeling which believes that the nations of Great Britain and the United States (and possibly, also, Germany) should stand together in political affairs. At any rate it will be well to consider exactly what the basis of the present understanding between these nations is; what permanent interests they have in common; and what other interests are divergent and threaten, in the future, irritations and the discontinuance of friendly relations.

The real basis of the present alliance discussion may be sought in three or four branches of present politics. They are the Samoan question, which will probably soon be settled satisfactorily to the three Powers; the avowed neutrality of the German government in the Transvaal difficulty: the equal interests of the three Powers, as manufacturing and exporting nations. in the trade of China and in opposition to an exclusive exploitation policy such as is favored by France; and, finally, opposition to the undue extension of Russian sovereignty and dominion in Asia.

In discussing these questions we must always remember that it is at present to the interest of Great Britain to magnify any good understanding that may exist between it and a Continental Power. When, therefore, she proposed to allow Germany to retain the largest island of the Samoan group, her statesmen were very careful to let the world understand that this agreement meant a friendly approach between the two governments. Now, as a matter of fact, the Samoan group is exceedingly unimportant, except for purposes of a naval station, and the only good harbor there has been conceded to the United States. The trade is, and must always be, trifling. The question has been sentimentally exaggerated on account of the difficulties between the nations in the islands, and an undue value is laid upon their possession at present. When we consider that in connection with the proposed Samoan agreement England was to obtain valuable concessions in Africa and in Oceanica, it will be seen that the Germans would not gain very much by the settlement, although their sentimental

desires might be satisfied, the Samoan question, which had caused them so much diplomatic trouble, apparently having been decided in their favor; but it may come to be looked upon by the German people as a second Heligoland, where also sentimental considerations were used in order to make an exchange for very valuable territorial possessions in Africa. The Samoan question can therefore be considered of only very temporary importance, upon which no permanent understanding can be based.

The neutrality of Germany in the Transvaal war is dwelt upon as a mark of friendship for Great Britain. It may, however, be interpreted just as well in the light of the general desire for peace that pervades all European diplomacy at the present time. The European nations instinctively feel that in the development of China and other parts of the world they have a work that will require their undivided energies and will give them ample opportunity to employ all the power which they can muster. By a great international war at the present time this development would receive a serious set-back.

Russia

desires to develop Manchuria; Germany is interested in Asia Minor and the central portion of China; while France has her African possessions and Indo-China to keep her busy. The old jealousies of a limited continent like Europe have very largely been toned down, have lost their importance, and have given way to the broader world interests in which the nations are at present involved.

Commercially and industrially the three nations in question are engaged in the greatest rivalry that has ever existed. It is, however, a rivalry which leaves them certain interests in common at least at present these interests being represented by the policy of keeping the world open to exploitation and policed in such a manner as to make investment secure. Russia does not enter into this competition because her manufactures do not at present supply her home demand, and the manufactures of France are of a kind such as find a market rather in highly civilized countries than in backward regions. The vast trade of the semi-civilized portions of the world is therefore a great matter of interest for the three nations in question, and in the policy of keeping these regions open, and not allowing them to fall into the hands of a Power that would employ the exclusive policy, there is at

present the strongest ground of union between them. At first Germany did not realize the nature of these interests, or, at any rate, her action in China, being in concert with Russia and France, seemed to indicate that she was about to enter also upon an exclusive industrial exploitation; but seeing the difficulties that would meet a policy of this kind in the interior of China itself, and finding that a break-up of China would cause the very greatest distress and a revolution throughout the Orient, Germany has led the way among the Powers with whom she was formerly associated in Chinese politics toward a more liberal policy. It is, however, not to be thought that she is ready to enter in this matter into a hard and fast alliance with any Power, though her interests are the same. She watches her chances, and, as the foreign minister, Von Buelow, expressed it, "The passenger cannot fix the time for the starting of the train, but he must be ready when it does start." Germany is awaiting developments in the Orient, and is going to make use of every opportunity that is offered for the strengthening of her national interests.

It is very often alleged that there are deep interests of civilization which bind together the three nations we are speaking of, and which distinguish them from other nations of the world. Superficially considered, however, it is very difficult to discover any such unity. As a matter of fact, especially between England and Germany, there are very crass differences of opinion in the matter of social and political affairs. The English forms of education, of social life, of conduct, are very different from the German views on these subjects, and there is also much mutual misunderstanding between the people of the United States and those of Germany. There is, however, one characteristic that seems to mark them off, as far as their public life is concerned, from other nations. We might summarize this element in the words, "an insistence upon truthfulness and justice." The politics of the nations which we are considering are pervaded with the idea of doing absolute justice to the individual and giving men preferment according to their ability rather than according to favoritism. Public life is generally pure and the courts are incorruptible. It is this that distinguishes them very favorably from the southern Latin

nations. But a characteristic like this, deep-seated and important as it may be, is not sufficient ground upon which to found an actual political union and permanent alliance.

To summarize this matter, we find that there have happened certain events, and there are existing strong interests, which make a friendly understanding between the so-called Anglo-Saxon nations possi ble. In raising the plane of competition between nations they may work together for a long time to come. But to emphasize these matters, and to draw from them the conclusion that there is already in existence material for a permanent alliance, would be exaggerating the facts. We must consider the position of Germany as an independent nation with very definitely marked interests. In very many of the fields of modern international politics the attitude of. Germany is characteristic. Her attitude in the acquisition of territory, in trade extension, in commercial politics, is typical of the age; and so is her desire to stand alone, relying upon her own strength, cultivating the friendship of all strong nations, but not in any way binding herself so as not to be able in the future to follow out her own national interests.

It cannot be repeated too often that the day of alliances is over; that a nation of the first power must be able to stand alone; that it may have many affinities at any given time, according to the various interests that bind it to different nations. It is the spirit of international comity that is cultivated, but not the idea of permanent alliances and fixed groupings of States.

As we have already stated, the three Powers in question are the most prominent rivals commercially. For a time, under the policy of the "open door," they may have fields for exploitation in abundance, but ultimately the sharpness which this struggle has already tended to take on must be even increased. Germany is at present trading under a modus vivendi with Great Britain since the tariff agreements came to a close in 1898. She has at present no favorable commercial treaties with the United States. It is her purpose, when permanent treaties of a commercial nature are made, to obtain the most favorable terms, and consequently she will welcome at the present time any suggestions of friendliness on the part of her two

great rivals. An understanding in commercial matters between these three Powers is, of course, in the interests of civilization, because it counteracts the terribly strong influence of nationalism, which tends to set up exclusive spheres, and which would very soon involve the world in great struggles for territories and dominion. As long as the most powerful nations can keep the world equally open, the coming of these struggles will be put off indefinitely. If a motive for the friendship of the German government toward the United States and Great Britain is needed, it is found in the desire to make commercial relations stable and just to all parties concerned. Germany has, however, no intention at all of leaning upon another Power in a permanent alliance. The old Triple Alliance is practically of very little importance at the present time, as the nations of the second order are growing constantly less powerful.

How much Germany and the German government relies on itself is shown by the Imperial naval plans, according to which the navy is to be brought up to the standard of first-class efficiency within twenty years. If the German government actually contemplated a political alliance or coalition with Great Britain and the United States, plans of this kind would be utterly inexplicable, because they would be dividing the national strength, which ought to be confined to the upbuilding of the power of the army. In many other fields the insistence of Germany upon a policy of independent nationalism might be shown. The celebrated speech of Col. Schwartzhoff, at The Hague, was the most eloquent expression of powerful, self-conscious nationalism that modern diplomacy has to show. This idea of independence is apparent in minor matters, such as dress, the methods of social intercourse, modes of speech, and so on, in which the Germans strive to separate from the standard set by any other nation and follow their own models. Even the imperial moustache with its aspiring ends is a symptom of this tendency.

To this idea of nationalism is added the hope for world dominion in commerce, supported also by a vast colonial system. Germany has already great and constantly growing interests in Asia Minor and South America. Great Britain has shown a tendency to allow Germany to develop

Asiatic Turkey, and in Africa, too, the two Powers have worked peacefully side by side. The main cause of the strained relations that have so often existed between Great Britain and Germany has been commercial rivalry, German merchants constantly encroaching upon the domains held by British trade. It is in South America that the interests of the three Powers in question may clash soonest unless precautionary measures are taken. Many German writers already look to that continent as a favorable field for German territorial acquisition. According to consular reports a large portion of the South American trade has passed into German hands, while commerce with the United States has been stationary or has decreased. All these considerations will show that Germany is by no means ready to make any concessions to an alliance. Her diplomacy is marked by straightforward opinions. She does not conceal her aims of strengthening the nation and acquiring a great world commerce.. In order to succeed in this she must foster the

friendly relations of strong Powers, and no matter how much her interests may run counter to those of Great Britain and the United States her government is coolheaded enough not to rush into expressions of hostility such as are voiced by the German press, but to keep the even tenor of a peace policy which the present condition of the world dictates.

Everything that makes toward a better understanding between nations must be welcomed in the interest of civilization, and so we can look upon the present better understanding between the three leading nations of the world as a hopeful sign, but we must not allow ourselves to be led to the belief that a policy of permanent alliances and exclusive international relationships can flourish at the present time. National interests are too divergent, too intricate, to allow of such arbitrary grouping. As new problems arise new constellations will be formed, and out of the ever shifting rivalry of strong independent nations the progress of the world is being evolved. PAUL S. REINSCH.

MADISON, WIS.

C

ARBONIC acid gas, or "carbon dioxide," as it is known in the scientific world, was first noticed in 1520. It was investigated by Black before the middle of the eighteenth century, since which time there have been constant additions to our knowledge of it. Though in some way its use is a daily occurrence to everyone, its importance is not generally appreciated. Its scientific name is taken from its composition, which is one part of carbon, a solid substance, with two parts of oxygen gas, the union forming a compound gas. It is also known as "afterdamp" when found in coal mines as a result of the explosion of a gas called firedamp."

Carbonic acid gas is invisible, is heavier than air by one half, and has a pungent odor and slightly acid taste. The odor and taste are familiar in soda-water, champagne, beer, cider, and all fermented foods.

At ordinary temperatures water will dissolve about its own bulk of the gas. If the temperature of the water is lowered the amount that will be dissolved is increased. If pressure is used the amount of gas dissolved can be increased almost indefinitely.

In a pure state the gas cannot be respired, as it supports neither respiration nor combustion. It is always present in the atmosphere, but in minute quantities, the normal proportion being four parts in ten thousand. When the proportion is increased to a considerable extent, as sometimes happens, it endangers life. The causes of this increase are local. The gas escapes in large quantities from fissures of the earth in the neighborhood of volcanoes; "bubbling springs” owe their effervescence to its escaping from the earth through the water; and it is given off in the decay of animal and vegetable matter and in all processes of fermentation. The foaming of cider and beer, and the sparkling of champagne, spring water, and all effervescing drinks are due to its presence and escape from the liquid. When the gas has thus escaped the beverages become "flat." As mentioned above, the colder the liquid the more of the gas it will dissolve, and it is for this reason that very cold beer becomes "dead," as the gas, being dissolved in the liquid, does not readily escape and cause foaming.

The "rising" of bread is brought about