white tramps. These Indians will eat diseased meat with avidity, and gormandize beyond expression; yet they will suffer more privation than is thought possible. One of the fruitful causes of their poverty is their religion, for they have a religion of their own, separate and distinct from those given them by the emissaries of Rome or the American Indian agents.

The Indian enjoys fiestas, each one lasting a week. He has a fiesta for the dead occasionally. Every family prepares an image and dresses it in the finest material that can be had, and, with much manufactured weeping, casts it into a fire. Around this ornamental fagot stand groups of Indians badly in need of raiment. The various saint days of the Catholic Church are observed, as taught by the pious padres to their fathers over fifty years ago. Lastly come the Mexican fiestas, frequented by the Mexican merchants with baskets

of fruit. Beneath the innocent fruit is contraband liquor; the result of this class of fiestas being a lot of drunken Indians immured in the calaboose. Thirteen fiestas are held in one year, all in the line of idleness and debauchery, which just suits the descendant of the California aborigine.

Thus, despite the hundred and fifty years of cultivation that the Californian Indian has enjoyed, the only improvement in his condition visible to the naked eye is the wearing of civilized clothing, although it must be remembered that had he not been clothed he would now, in multiplied thousands and in the enjoyment of perfect animal liberty, be roaming the barren mesas of southern California, where we vainly seek him; for before the advance of civilization the vast hosts of the native Californians have long been gathered to their fathers. E. H. RYDALL.

LOS ANGELES, CAL.

F

EW places in the United States, and perhaps no others in the South, possess so many attractive and interesting features as Chattanooga, in southeastern Tennessee, close to the Georgia and Alabama State lines. The city is beautifully situated at the junction of the valley of the Tennessee River, which extends between the mountains in a southwesterly direction from Knoxville, and the Chattanooga Valley, which stretches to the south into Georgia. This latter valley has an average elevation of 1,000 feet above the level of the sea, and is about five miles in width, from the river on the west to Missionary Ridge on the east, and from ten to twelve miles in length before it is broken by the Pigeon Mountains in Georgia, which are east of and parallel with Lookout Mountain. Beyond the river on the north is the Walden Ridge, which is the southern limit of the Cumberland Mountains; on the east, with an average elevation of 500

ninsula known as "Moccasin Bend," from its close resemblance in shape to the Indian moccasin,- the foot being about two miles across at the ankle, and six miles from heel to toe. Immediately west of the river rise the several parallel ridges of the Raccoon Mountains; while on the south a bold and rocky promontory, Lookout Mountain, stands like a sentinel guarding the city and valley. This mountain is eighty-five miles, long, extending from the river opposite Moccasin Bend through Georgia and into Alabama. Its height averages 2,200 feet, though it ends both in Tennessee and in Alabama in bold, rocky, and precipitous peaks, whose highest points are nearly 2,500 feet above sea level. As one approaches the mountain from Chattanooga the rise is abrupt and steep from the river to a height of about 900 feet above the valley. Here a plateau is reached some 800 feet wide, and extending around the end of the mountain, which has become famous

"No pen has, or ever will adequately picture the sublime and imposing view to be had from Point Rock, the jutting promontory of massive stone which fairly overhangs the valley of the Tennessee River. If the day be clear one may discern the highlands and mountains of seven different States, those in Tennessee, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Alabama being relatively near, and those of Virginia and Kentucky in hazy outline against the northern horizon. The lover of the grand in nature never tires of Lookout Mountain. It is one of the Almighty's masterpieces, and a worthy companion to Niagara, the Yosemite, the Yellowstone Park, and the Cañons of Colorado.»

And the eminent historian, George Bancroft, who visited the mountain when eighty-seven years of age, exclaimed, while standing on Point Rock, "In all my travels I have never seen any scene to exceed this in sublime grandeur."

The only passes through the great Appalachian system of mountains, south of Virginia, available for railroad communication between the southern and northwestern States, converge at Chattanooga, as the spokes converge toward the hub of a wheel. Consequently the city is rapidly becoming a great commercial centre, and during the Civil War was a point of the greatest strategic importance. These mountains formed a natural wall about the States of North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and protected from easy invasion that rich agricultural region from which the supplies for the Confederate armies had to be drawn. To the north only was the country open, and in Virginia Lee with his great army stood on guard during the entire war. Hence it was a matter of supreme importance to the Southern cause that this mountain wall should not be pierced, and that Chattanooga should be held at all hazards, as it was the key to the whole situation. It was not until the mountains had been crossed, and the States within these barriers invaded and their productiveness destroyed by Sherman's army on its march to the sea, that the Confederacy collapsed, although the great battles of Vicksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and Chattanooga-all fought in 1863- sealed its fate.

Three large armies were in the field during the early part of 1863, two of which

were operating in the West. Gen. Grant was conducting the series of movements which resulted (July 4, 1863) in the fall of Vicksburg and the destruction of the Confederate power in the Mississippi Valley. In middle Tennessee the Army of the Cumberland, under Gen. Rosecrans, after the bloody drawn battle of Stone's River (Jan. 1, 1863), had settled down for a long period of inactivity in and about Murfreesborough, while the opposing army, under Gen. Bragg, had moved farther east, with headquarters at Shelbyville, where he awaited any movement of Rosecrans's army toward east Tennessee.

It is impossible for one to study the history of this period without a feeling of amazement at the manner in which some of the campaigns were conducted, and the terrible loss of life that resulted from the inactivity and blunders of many commanders. The necessity of concentrating authority, and working along well-devised lines toward one great end, had not yet been appreciated. Politics, "pulls," and favoritism too often advanced the incompetent and sidetracked the abler general; while personal vanity and contemptible jealousies frequently controlled the actions of officers in high positions. The general direction

of affairs was in the hands of Gen. Halleck, in Washington, by whom orders for important movements as well as details were issued, although his knowledge of conditions existing in the field must often have been faulty and always of an imperfect nature. Many of the best plans of field officers were frustrated by his failure or inability to grasp the situation.

In the early part of the year Grant had repeatedly requested Halleck to order Rosecrans to move on Bragg, so that the latter might not detach any portion of his force to aid the beleaguered garrison of Vicksburg. But Rosecrans maintained that the better policy was to remain in a threatening attitude in front of the enemy until Vicksburg had fallen. Toward the end of June, however, he was constrained to move, and by a series of masterly manœuvres, covering the period from June 23 to July 7, he forced Bragg to retreat from his strong position west of the mountains and to fall back upon Chattanooga. In the meantime Burnside, with the Army of the Ohio, which had been in Kentucky, advanced across the mountains to the valley of east Tennessee, with a view to forc

ing Buckner out of Knoxville. This movement was entirely successful, as upon the approach of the Union army Buckner retired toward Bragg, and Burnside entered Knoxville. From this point he could offer protection to the left of Rosecrans's army, and was in position to make it difficult for Lee to send reënforcements to Bragg from the Army of Virginia, as the only available route was through Knoxville and down the valley of the Tennessee.

On August 16 Rosecrans began the advance which was to result in forcing Bragg out of Chattanooga, and in bringing on the great battle of Chickamauga. In this attempt he displayed the same mastery of strategy which had characterized his previous operations. Bragg expected that the attack would be made upon his right by way of the Tennessee Valley, where Rosecrans would have the assistance of the Army of the Ohio. He also regarded the mountains to the south as a practically insurmountable obstacle to an attack from that quarter. Confident that Bragg would take this view of the situation, Rosecrans sent Crittenden, with the left wing of his army, up the west side of the river to make a demonstration on Bragg's right, and so to confirm the latter in his belief that this was to be the real point of attack, while with the rest of his army, under Thomas and McCook, he hastened to Bridgeport, about thirty miles southwest of Chattanooga, where the army safely crossed the river, and was soon over the Raccoon Mountains and in Lookout Valley, on the west side of Lookout Mountain. From this valley there were but three roads or passes by which an army could cross Lookout Mountain to get into Chattanooga Valley, -respectively two, twenty-six, and fortytwo miles south of Chattanooga. Unless Bragg defended these passes he must evacuate the city, as the possession of the two most distant routes would control the valley and give the Union army access to his line of supplies, and enable it to cut off all chances of retreat.

Owing to Crittenden's movement on his right, Bragg had failed to pay any atten

tion to these two passes, though he had carefully guarded the one nearest the city; and while a show of force was made to the north, Thomas crossed Lookout by the middle, and McCook by the lower pass. When Bragg learned of this he hastily moved out of Chattanooga, and on the 9th of Sep

SUNSET ROCK, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN

tember Crittenden, with the left wing of the Union army, occupied the city. Up to this point Rosecrans's movements had been brilliant and faultless; but his army was now dangerously divided, -the right and left wings being nearly fifty miles apart, with the centre about midway between, while they were in a thickly wooded and mountainous region, of which they had a very imperfect knowledge, and where there were few and very poor roads. Unfortunately, too, Rosecrans was misled by despatches from Halleck into the belief that Bragg was in rapid retreat, and that his objective point was Dalton, in Georgia; whereas he had only withdrawn to La Fayette, about twenty miles south of Chattanooga and east of the Pigeon Mountains, on the other side of which was Thomas

and his army. Happily for the Union

army, Bragg had been advised that Longstreet, with reënforcements from Lee's army, was near at hand, so that he delayed attacking the Union army in detail until Longstreet should have arrived, although he quickly learned of the isolated condition of its parts; and, facing about, he marched north to a position on Chickamauga Creek, about sixteen miles from Chattanooga. Bragg has been severely blamed for his inaction at this time. As one of the best military critics, Col. Dodge, says:

"Rosecrans had got his right wing separated from his centre by three marches, and these through a long and dangerous defile. His left was equally distant from the centre. Thomas

could not go to either wing without endangering the other. He must wait for each to rally on him. If Bragg could but overwhelm Thomas singly, he could at once turn on Crittenden with good assurance of crushing him, and still have ample time to retrace his steps and cut McCook off from retreat across the river. To have done this would have stamped Bragg as the equal of Lee. But Bragg did not act, and Rosecrans escaped from his peril.»

The next few days were anxious ones for Rosecrans, who realized his critical situation, and worked day and night to get his scattered forces together; and his army was not really united until the morning of the 19th, when Bragg's army began the attack. It was well known in Washington that Lee had sent Longstreet with 12,000 men to reënforce Bragg, and Halleck had informed Rosecrans of the fact. The latter made repeated requests for aid, to which no attention was paid, notwithstanding ten weeks had passed since the fall of Vicksburg, and Grant, with a well seasoned and now thoroughly refreshed army of 75,000 men, was lying idle in the Mississippi Valley. The only effort made to reënforce the army before Bragg was an order given to Burnside, who had about 13,000 men at Knoxville, a little over a hundred miles away, to go to the assistance of Rosecrans, which Burnside took the responsibility of ignoring. The Century Company, in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," has made an exhaustive and detailed statement of the forces engaged at Chickamauga, compiled from the official returns of both armies on file in the War Department, showing that the total effective force of the Union army was 56,965 men, and that of the Confederate army, 71,551.

About eight miles southeast of Chattanooga is the first break in Missionary

Ridge, known as Rossville Gap, through which the main road to La Fayette and the interior of Georgia passes into the upper end of Chickamauga Valley. This valley lies to the east of Missionary Ridge, and between it and Chickamauga Creek, which bounds it on the east and south, and is from eight to ten miles in length (north to south), and about six miles wide. While waiting for Longstreet's arrival, Bragg had taken a position on the lower side of the creek; and in the meantime Rosecrans had been able to manœuvre his scattered forces into a good position at the southerly end of the valley, between the enemy and Chattanooga, which he must now defend. The surface of the valley is very uneven and wooded, and there are several welldefined though low ridges. Thomas was placed in command of the Union left, and given the larger part of the force, as he must cover the La Fayette road, the possession of which was to be the immediate cause of the battle. On the morning of the 19th the Confederate army crossed the creek and began a desperate assault cn Thomas, clearly showing, during the early part of the day, Bragg's plan of action. But Thomas had anticipated his movements and firmly held his ground. The whole first day was passed in the most determined attacks on the Union left, Bragg sending division after division against it, while Rosecrans as persistently reënforced Thomas. The fighting was of the closest and most stubborn character, and the day ended with but little advantage for either side.

During the night both armies made careful preparations for the desperate battle it was realized must be fought the next day, Sunday, the 20th. Thomas made a retrograde movement to secure a better position, and more effectually to cover the coveted road. The order of divisions from left to right, designated by their commanders, was Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, Davis, Sheridan, the first six making the left wing under Thomas, and the last two the right, under McCook, while Crittenden held the two divisions of Wood and Van Cleve in reserve. Three brigades of Granger's corps were also in reserve at Rossville, about four miles from the extreme left. The Confederate right was commanded by Polk, and the left by Longstreet, who had reported to Bragg during the night. About 8.30 in the morning Polk opened