CONSIDERATIONS ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NATIVE

ARMY OF INDIA, BY AN INDIAN officer.

NUMEROUS and alarming as our failures have been in India, during the last twenty-two years, none can be compared with that which recently occurred at Ramoo. In vain may we look for skill, enterprise, conduct, and, (shall it be said ?) courage. It is, perhaps, unfair to judge from such imperfect accounts as have hitherto appeared before the public; but the fatal result of that disaster forces itself upon us under the most mortifying and melancholy reflections.

Who is the enemy in whose presence we have thus lowered our military fame? In enterprise and gallantry they have not yet shown themselves superior to ordinary Asiatic troops, though they have in other respects. Can it be believed, that 1200 or 1300 men, under British officers, with two field-pieces, would allow themselves to be approached by trenches, in a plain, for three days, and eventually, when the enemy had got within twelve yards, retreat in open day without making an offensive attempt? Here was no fort, no stockade, to offer in excuse, or screen our fast-fading renown from the public eye; and this too in the meridian of our power, after wars recently terminated, proclaiming us invincible, and apparently without an enemy capable of encountering us in the field.'

Let the melancholy result prove beneficial, by convincing those on whom responsibility rests, of the extreme fragility of our Eastern empireof the uninterrupted vigilance, energy and talent, requisite for its preservation-of how much depends upon the established character, higb, dignified, moral tone, and expansive views of the Governor Generaland of the extreme danger of vesting such an empire in the hands of any but the most able and experienced statesmen. An empire depending so much, if not entirely, on the " thread of opinion," ought surely to have

1 In justice to the memory of those who fell on that unfortunate occasion, and to the general character of the Bengal army, as well as that portion of it immediately engaged, we think it proper to state that we have now before us a letter of an officer intimately acquainted with that affair, although not personally an actor in it; and from the detailed account he gives, it appears that this disgrace to British arms was attributable, in the first place, to a reinforcement having been promised, which ought to have arrived early on the 16th of May, but which was not sent as promised, although its expectation had made the force hold out; and, secondly, to the faithlessness of the Mugs and provincial troops, which composed part of the force who actually abandoned their post to the enemy; owing to which the regu rs were completely surrounded by the enemy on the morning of the 17th, one day after the reinforcement ought to have come up. Besides, by this time, most of the officers as well as many of the men were wounded; many were in the sick-list; and the whole were worn out and exhausted by four days' continual fighting, as well as thinned and dispirited by the wholesale desertion of the Provincials, while the enemy was hourly increasing; so that to hold out longer without the promised reinforcement, or even to retreat, became impossible. Capt. Noton enjoyed a high character among his brethren in arms, as an expert and gallant officer; nor do those military men, best acquainted with the affair, believe that any blame whatever attached to him or the officers and regular troops who were with him on that melancholy occasion. Yet there was and must have been a fault somewhere; but no inquiry has been yet instituted, and no example made to remove this stain from the British arms.-Ed.

that opinion well supported at the fountain head. Let this (though strong in fact) be weak in general estimation, and we are already selfsubdued, whilst our enemies increase proportionally, not only numerically but (what is more dangerous) in confidence. It is much to be feared that neither the Court of Directors nor his Majesty's Government are duly impressed with the great importance of those considerations, and that they repose too much upon the almost miraculous escapes we have had hitherto, in the least to attend seriously to warnings of disaster, perhaps repeated, oftener unrealized heretofore than they will be hereafter. Our Eastern empire is now, as it were, so overgrown as to territory, population and states, and so very feebly supported with troops, that it may justly be likened to a bubble ready to burst into nonentity at the touch.

1

The European troops, however gallant and efficient, however capable of exciting, leading, and infusing confidence into the mass of the Native army, it must be allowed are much too small a body to resist a general rising without its cordial aid. It is from the general feeling of the country we have to apprehend ruin, and so long as this does not extend to the army, there is little cause for alarm, provided the latter be duly augmented and attended to. It should ever be kept in view, that India has always been revolutionary, and accustomed to yield nearly with indifference to the predominating power of the day; that (whatever some persons may think of the permanency of British rule) the public mind is in reality fully predisposed for change, from an innate instinctive impression of its taking place sooner or later; that though our superiority over preceding governments be admitted, its stability on such ground is merely comparative; that whilst any measures tending to irritate the inhabitants against us must prove injurious in proportion to their extent, yet our utmost and even successful care towards gaining their affections. can only yield us passive indifference, and not always this in critical times, for the population have no feelings in common with us; and though they would probably regret eventually the fall of our dominion, yet experience of suffering is required in many parts of the country to enable a contrast to be forined in the first instance, and reaction of feeling, therefore, could not be expected till too late for effectual purposes; but, above all, let it never be forgotten that the Native army is composed of the inhabitants of the conquered country, and therefore cannot have too much attention constantly directed towards its feelings, affections, and morals.

That it has been upon the decline for many years must be obvious to many. It no longer evinces that decided superiority in action, nor are its ordinary duties of escort, camp and cantonment, performed with punctuality, vigilance, and spirit.

Slovenliness, indifference, and, in very many cases, carelessness to a criminal degree, characterize the common routine-want of energy, and confident successful gallantry in presence of the enemy.

The materiel of the troops is the same, but the morale is injured to an extent truly alarming and destructive to our Eastern empire.

For the performance of ordinary duties, we need only advert to the numerous recorded instances of treasure-escorts being successfully

1 An invasion by an European power is not taken into account here, though it becomes more probable daily, and should be kept in view.

attacked-of prisoners effecting their escape-of sepoys on duty being actually concerned in theft and robbery.

Conduct against an enemy seldom partakes of brilliancy-often of shameful backwardness. The former is lauded in romantic terms; the latter seldom reported, but either varnished over or thanked in general terms, from the generous feeling which victory inspires. But the day approaches fast, if it be not already arrived, when success is to be attained only by the full exertion of the mental and physical powers of all ranks. It may be doubted whether the deterioration alluded to is positive, or only comparative; whether it may not be the improvement of the enemy, aided by the gradual removal of the delusion which time and events cannot fail to have materially dispelled, of our being invincible under all circumstances, however inferior in number and position. Allowing it to be comparative, it is, perhaps, the more dangerous, and improvement is the more to be desired; but the evil, in fact, partakes of both.

The enemy are improved, and will continue to improve, in military knowledge-in knowledge of our weakness and of their own strength, whilst we must continue to fall off, unless suitable measures be adopted to renovate the system.

In considering existing evils, it may be advantageous first to advert to the Native soldier, and, secondly, to the European officers as a distinct body.

Of various causes tending to the deterioration of the Native army, the diminution of their officers' authority and influence may be brought forward as a primary one. Whether from a feeling of jealousy towards officers, or of kindness towards the men, is not necessary to surmise, but the fact is indisputable, that for about the last twenty years the power of the former has been gradually curtailed, till at length rendered nearly passive; possessing not the authority to effect good, or materially to check evil, they are disgusted and rendered indifferent to their immediate charge, and the great interest of the service at large.

It would be superfluous to enter into a minute detail of facts in elucidation of the above. Let a few suffice:

1. The use of the rattan has been (very properly) discouraged, and forbidden on all occasions.

2. A commanding officer cannot discharge a man unless convicted of theft.

3. He cannot carry the sentence of a court martial into effect if it exceed 300 lashes, without previous reference to the Commander-in-Chief. 4. He cannot carry a sentence into execution without previous reference to the Commander-in-Chief, if the court should recommend the prisoner to be discharged the service.

5. In recommending for promotion, he is tied down to seniority; or obliged to detail reasons for deviation opposite each individual's name.3 6. Although no prohibitory order exists, yet neither the regulation nor custom of the service vests him with the discretionary power (all his Majesty's officers hold) of reducing non-commissioned officers to the ranks.“

Who is generally in Calcutta, so distant from many stations, that an answer cannot be received to a reference in less than five weeks!

s Consequently promotion is demanded pertinaciously as a right, not for good conduct, &c. &c., but because "first on the roll."

4 A most serious evil where there is so much petty escort duty,

Other points might be adverted to, but these are probably sufficient to show what little power remains for the maintenance of an energetic spirited discharge of duty in cantonments and camp. Surely it is far short of adequacy to so important an end-the main end of every army. But insufficiency is not the only, nor perhaps the chief objection: what do such restrictions intimate to officers? That they are tyrannically and cruelly disposed towards their men; that they have not capacity for command; that turpid partiality overcomes a sense of duty; or, that they are a set of traitors, ready to turn against their government and country, and therefore divested of that authority and influence over their men, indispensable to a due discharge of a soldier's primary functions. Admitting them for a moment to be such, or worse if possible, is not the remedy applied nearly as bad as the supposed evil it is intended to guard against, viz. the subversion of Government? The cause, indeed, is changed, but is not the fatal result equally if not more sure? It is true, a set of supposed bad men are weakened, but are not those the men from whom support is to be derived in the hour of peril; by whom chiefly the country must be lost or saved, as previously rendered weak or powerful? To say that some did or would abuse their authority, only leads to a question of--whether we can ever expect entire good from any measures, however wise, unalloyed by some evil? But might not the evil be materially checked by a proper attention to character on the part of the Adjutant-General, and not by generalizing, shackle the whole, and by restraining the bad from wickedness, prevent the upright, zealous, and able from effecting good?

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Officers may be considered the nerve, the invigorating spirit, the very soul of Native troops. British soldiers are the most undaunted, courageous, and persevering perhaps in the world, yet their officers are not only more numerous, but possess more authority than those of the Native army. Is not this strangely inconsistent? To what erroneous principle is it traceable? Is it a well known error, allowed to continue, from consideration of the expense involved in its remedy, combined with the apprehension entertained of the officers before referred to? Or are Native troops so much more spirited than our own gallant countrymen, as to require fewer animating leaders? Or is it, that the former already perform all that can reasonably be looked for, and that an augmented proportion of officers are therefore superfluous? Admitting, as a matter of necessity, that the numbers cannot be increased, should not the paucity be compensated by increasing their power, influence, energies, and all moral qualities, instead of curtailing, undermining, and depressing them, as has been the constant endeavour of the last fifteen or twenty years? Surely this appears indisputable, and it is practically proved by the state of the army—a state of inanimate, decrepid, slumbering, torpid indifference.

The second cause is of the most alarmning nature, because of its long secret working, but it may be in some measure traceable to the first.

Of the several and increasing instances of shameful backwardness on the part of Native troops many must be fully aware; but perhaps they may be somewhat at a loss to account for them. They are chiefly ascribable to misconduct being seldom noticed.

In the generous flow of feeling which success inspires, all are thanked

• Aided by Brigadiers and General Officers, commanding stations and divisions.

in general terms: many very deservedly so, but there are others to whom disgrace would be more appropriate. To such procedure, officers are influenced by many feelings and considerations, viz.

1. It is not always known in the proper quarter till too late, and even then only by vague rumour.

2. Reporting misconduct is invidious and repugnant.

3. By natural (but unreasonable) feeling it comes home as a reflection upon commanding officers themselves.

4. Each thinks the particular instance of little consequence, as no immediate evil arose, without considering the influence of every such occurrence upon the service at large.

Thus every time a corps gees into action it deteriorates more and more. It is not only found possible to be backward with impunity, but that such is stamped as gallantry! Bravery is relative: is it wonderful that really brave men should exchange their own ideas of it (attended with so much danger) for ours, (as often brought home to them,) admitting of comparative security? The most gallant will not meet shot if it can be avoidęd with honour, without the loss of rank or reputation. Our Native troops, finding this to be the case, with little exception, are reduced to the alarming state already adverted to.

It may be a matter of astonishment that officers should be blind to this; or seeing, not check or bring it forward themselves; but it is easily accounted for. Reasons for not bringing it forward have already been given; and to check or remedy, they possess not the power. Were officers treated with honourable confidence, and vested with proper discretionary authority, they would apply remedies on the spot; or, without apprehension of inculpating themselves, submit the case for redress to superior power. Scarcely an action takes place that does not call for reward and punishment. The latter, however, should be mild, limited, but steadily applied, chiefly to the commissioned and non-commissioned. Whole troops or companies should never be discharged. There must be some amongst them not meriting punishment, and nothing operates so banefully as its infliction undeserved. Besides, we ourselves, not the troops, are to blame for admitting such habits to gain ground, and thereby actually deceiving the men as to what is required. How unjust then to inflict upon them what in reality we deserve. Such evils cannot be eradicated at once, but gradually as opportunity offers.

It may be thought that the curtailment of officers' power is a great advantage to the men, by ensuring to them more justice, and less arbitrary conduct. Such may be the case to them individually, and in peace to the service; but how does it operate in war? in action? A sepoy fights not for " cause, or country;" and though he prefers British service because the best, he would not merely, in support of that preference, uninfluenced by other considerations, sacrifice his life. He must be considered a mercenary, and a mercenary with less stimulating motive than any in Europe. Self-interest must be taken in the most abstracted sense for the law of his conduct; and so long as this can be secured by a lukewarm discharge of duty, it would evince but little wisdom to expect more from him. The authority and influence of which officers have been divested, centre now ostensibly in the Commander-in-Chief, but virtually in the Adjutant-General, and consequently the effects must