resident Minister, and not as a Commissioner.*

But a change

of the national administration from the hands of the pacific Herrera to those of the warlike Paredes, which occurred in the interim, was a great obstacle to the success of his mission.

By a comparison of dates, however, it will be found that the American Minister was not finally rejected until after the gates of war were thrown open by the order to Gen. Taylor to take his position of offence on the east bank of the Rio Grande.

Mr. Slidell wrote home,† Dec. 27, 1845, that on the 21st of that month he had "received from Pena y Pena his promised reply, conveying the formal and unqualified refusal of the Mexican Government to receive me in the character for which I am commissioned." This letter was not received by the authorities at Washington, until Jan. 23, 1846, and, therefore, could not have been the basis of the order of Jan. 13th, ten days before, ordering Gen. Taylor to invade the disputed territory on the Rio Grande. Mr. Buchanan states explicitly in a letter to Mr. Slidell, of Jan. 28, 1846, that his despatches of the 27th and 29th of December were received on the 23d instant. ‡

But Herrera's power was overturned, and Paredes came to the head of affairs on Jan. 3, 1846. Still, there was hope even with the new warlike administration, of negotiating a treaty. On March 1st, Mr. Slidell, at Jalapa, had letters from the city of Mexico, which spoke "confidently of his reception," and gave information of it to the Department

* 30th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Executive Documents, No. 60: "The delay has arisen solely from certain difficulties occasioned by the nature of the credentials." See the Letter of Pena y Pena to Mr. Slidell, Dec. 16, 1845. See his letter also to the Mexican Council, Dec. 11, 1845.

† 30th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Executive Documents, No. 60, p. 32.

at Washington. Meanwhile, the Union, the official organ, had said, on Feb. 10, 1846, that letters had been received to the 14th of January from Mr. Slidell; that he had not then "been received by the Government in his official capacity; neither had they declined his reception."

On March 12th, Mr. Buchanan wrote to Mr. Slidell, “I am directed by the President to instruct you not to leave that Republic until you shall have made a formal demand to be received by the new government."*

On the 14th of January, Mr. Slidell had stated that his notes to Mr. Pena y Pena had "not yet been considered;" and he spoke of the new minister of foreign relations as one whom he knew at heart to be "decidedly favorable to an amicable adjustment of all questions pending between the two governments."+

And it was not till March 18th, ‡ more than two months after the virtual war-order of Jan. 13th, that the American Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary wrote home that he had received his decided rejection by the Paredes Government, and that he had demanded his passports. On that very day Gen. Taylor dated his despatch to the War Department,§ at "El Sauce, 119 miles from Corpus Christi," and, of course, thus far into a disputed territory, as much as that on the north-eastern boundary in debate a few years before, between England and the United States, or that portion between 49° and 54° 40′ on the Pacific slope, negotiated in 1845–6.

The warlike movements of the United States are seen by these letters to have been pushed forward independently of the reception or the rejection of Mr. Slidell. If the defeat of his mission was a real cause of war, and not a pretext, an afterthought, used to justify what had been already done,

* 30th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Executive Documents, No. 60, p. 64. † Ibid. p. 50. § Ibid. p. 123.

+ Ibid. p. 66.

the course of modesty would at least have dictated that the onset to arms should not be sounded until the Minister had been able to leave the country, and the Executive had time to lay the matter before Congress to decide the question of peace or war.

The Christian mode of proceeding cannot he better stated than in the words of Mr. Gallatin: "Yet, when Mexico refused to receive Mr. Slidell as an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, the United States should have remembered that we had been the aggressors; that we had committed an act acknowledged, as well by the practical law of nations as by common sense and common justice, to be tantamount to a declaration of war; and they should have waited with patience till the feelings excited by our own conduct had subsided."*

The conclusions are, therefore,

1. That the refusal to receive an Envoy is not, according to the law of nations, a just cause of war, until at least every rational appeal has been exhausted.

2. That the movements of the American army that led to the spilling of blood, were ordered without special reference to the mission in Mexico.

3. That, in case the refusal to receive Mr. Slidell were grave cause enough to involve two great nations in war, the question should have been submitted to the decision of the Congress of the United States, then in session, and authorized by the Constitution to decide precisely such questions.

The final and immediate reason assigned at the beginning of the war was, that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon the American soil." How amply this reason, when closely investigated, bears the character of a pretext, will be shown in detail in chapters seventh and eighth, to which we refer our readers on the question of boundary.

* Peace with Mexico, p. 5.

CHAPTER V.

PREPARATION OF WAR.

-we must

"No, Sir; if we would awaken the desire for peace in the bosom of England, if we would render America invincible in battle, prepare the heart of the nation for the defence of its rights and its honor, by honestly telling the people the real state of the facts, and by giving them the reason for the measures we adopt."— MR. ALLEN, in Senate of the U. S. Dec. 16, 1845.

It was reserved to our day to witness the change of the popular maxim, "in time of peace prepare for war," into another rule, of even more questionable morality, "in time of peace prepare war." But, from a careful examination of the documents relating to the Annexation of Texas, and its consequences, and of the leading newspapers of the time, and the means used to act upon the public mind before the war broke out, we cannot avoid the conclusion, that a conflict with Mexico was early anticipated, desired, and prepared for, by those who understood but too well how easily the war spirit could be kindled in the heart of the nation. The reasons assigned for the war were but pretences, covering ulterior designs, which it would not do at once to disclose; but which have, in due succession, all come out, and now stand in their naked deformity before the world: Conquest, Dismemberment, Annexation of new territories, the extension of Slavery, the domestic Slave Trade, and the Slave Power. A distinguished statesman, with equal truth and severity, characterized the war as a war of pretexts." What can prevent it from occupying that position on the pages of candid and impartial history?

66

To show that we speak not " without book" on this subject, let us investigate some of the means by which the ball was set in motion, and the pretences by which its crushing progress was justified after it began to roll.

From the moment that Texas was virtually annexed, in March, 1845, the clang of arms resounded through the West and South West. We have already seen that politicians of opposite parties declared the identity of annexation and war. But war did not immediately ensue; and, weak and distracted as Mexico was, there was no immediate likelihood of its occurrence. Time might heal the wound. A pacific administration was in power in that republic, and much was to be hoped from a conciliatory policy. Such were the views and feelings, now on record, of many of the friends of annexation, as well as of its determined opponents.

But other counsels prevailed. An endeavor seemed forthwith to be made, to irritate, rather than to tranquillize, our neighbors. The frontiers southward bristled with arms. In 1844, when the Treaty of Annexation was under consideration, assurances had been made to the Texan authorities, by the United States,* that, during the negotiation and settlement of difficulties, Texas should be defended by the naval and military forces of this republic, in case they conceived Mexico had any serious intention of invasion, and the pledges were redeemed.† But, in 1845, the tone began to change from defence to offence. As soon as the Joint Resolutions were accepted by the Texan Legislature, and before the measure of annexation could be perfected, steps were taken on the part of Texas to receive, and on the part of the United States to send troops, ostensibly to ward off

*Mr. Houston's speech in the U. S. Senate, Feb. 19, 1847. Also, his Letter to the Texas Banner, July 18, 1847.

† See Pres. Tyler's Message to the Senate, May 15, 1844, with the accompanying Documents, 28th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, 341, pp. 82 and following.