we are invariably to keep in view is, that we are abfolutely prohibited to gratify, in a fingle instance, our own interests, paffions, or inclinations, whenever they are in the remoteft degree repugnant to the general happiness; and, on the other hand, that it is incumbent upon us, by all poffible means, to promote the general welfare, and even to facrifice eafe, fame, fortune, and life itself, whenever they come in competition with those far fuperior confiderations to which Virtue exacts an abfolute and unreferved fubmiffion. But the virtue which Mr. H. means to recommend, is of a very different complexion-it is, indeed, but another word for pleasure: for according to his principles of calculation, it is fufficient to ftrike a balance here, and to give the preference to that mode of conduct which fhall be productive of the greatest fum of happiness to each individual in this world; for he is equally ready with Macbeth" to jump "the life to come." He is, it must be owned, well enough inclined to perfuade his readers, that the perfonal happiness of each individual coincides with the general happiness of mankind: but as this is a delicate point, he does not chufe to expatiate at large upon it; though a little to preferve appearances, as he cannot wholly avoid taking notice of the objection, he thinks it neceffary to give us a fort of anfwer, but one fo trifling, evafive, and unfatisfactory, as muft ferve to corroborate and enforce this formidable objection, instead of tending in any degree to alleviate the weight of

it.

..

it. "If," fays he, "a fenfible knave alledge, that though, as a general rule, it must be acknowledged, that honesty is the best policy; yet it is

a rule liable to many exceptions; and he must "be allowed to conduct himself with most wisdom, "who obferves the general rule, and takes ad"vantage of all the exceptions. If a man thinks "that this reafoning much requires an anfwer, it "will be a little difficult to find any which will to "him appear fatisfactory and convincing: if his "heart rebel not against fuch pernicious maxims, "if he feels no reluctance to the thoughts of vil"lainy or bafenefs, he has indeed loft a confider❝able motive to virtue, and we may expect that "his practice will be answerable to his fpecula"tions." Now I acknowledge, without a blufh, that I am one of those who think this reasoning very much requires an answer; and yet I hope heart rebels against fuch pernicious maxims as ftrongly as Mr. Hume's: but furely the proper queftion in this cafe is, not in what manner the feelings of men educated in ftrict habits of Virtue would prompt them to act? but, whether the objection is really well founded, and what influence a fyftem of morals liable to fuch an objection would produce upon the fum of human life and happinefs? Mr. H. seems to admit the objection to be, ftrictly speaking, unanfwerable; but endeavours to raise a feeble barrier in fupport of Virtue, by opposing to its attacks certain mental feelings and affociations which are known to be accidental,

my

variable,

variable, and factitious. "Thofe who are defti"tute of these feelings," fays he, "have un"doubtedly loft a confiderable motive to Virtue." This is too true;-but then, Sir, I maintain, that they stand the more in need of fome other motive lefs flexible in its nature, and more general in its operation ; but this the philosophy of Mr. Hume does not fupply. Upon his principles, Virtue muft depend upon Honour for her very existence. Honour is indeed "a facred tie, the noble mind's

66

diftinguishing perfection!" but if we imagine that mankind will ever be greatly or generally influenced by a principle fo refined and ideal, we indulge a groundlefs and romantic expectation. To banish the belief of a future state from a system of morality, would lead to confequences as dangerous and fatal as a total abolition of penal laws would produce in the framing, or new modelling, a plan of civil polity. And if a man presumed to hint his apprehenfions, that the interefts of Virtue might fuffer in confequence of fuch general abolition or exclufion, would it be deemed very fatisfactory for a moral philosopher, as he might please to stile himself, to stand up and fay, "That, in his opi

nion, the native charms of Virtue were fuch, "that the needed not the addition of legal fanc"tions; that if any perfons had been influenced

હ

by thofe fanctions, they had, indeed, lost a con"fiderable motive to Virtue, and we might expect "that their practice would correspond with their 66 fpeculations; but that men of ingenuous minds

“ had

"had an antipathy to vice too ftrong to be coun"terbalanced by any views of temporal advantage;

and if they were not responsible for their actions 66 to GoD or man, yet peace of mind, consciousness "of integrity, and a fatisfactory review of their own conduct, were circumftances very requifite "to happiness, and would be cherished and culti"vated by all who felt the importance of them*." Notwithstanding this fine harangue, I am inclined to think that the neceffity of reftoring these fanctions would foon become apparent, and even the philofopher himself be compelled to acknowledge the neceffity in this, as in many other cafes, of making "the lofty head of Speculation bow to "groveling Experience!"

The narrow limits of a flight Effay do not permit me to pursue this interesting investigation farther; but enough, I hope, has been faid to eftablish, upon a folid foundation, the following conclufions:

First, As it is a truth which cannot, fo it is a truth which needs not, to be concealed or palliated, that Virtue is not neceffarily productive of, or connected with, temporal Happinefs. "Dies deficiet," fays the Roman orator," fi velim numerare quibus bonis malè ❝evenerit :nec minus fi commemorem, quibus improbis "optimè." To maintain, with the learned Profeffor whom I have already quoted, that we are happy in exact proportion as we are virtuous, is, in other words, to affert, with the ancient Stoics, that Virtue

* Vide Hume's Effays, vol, ii. p. 350.

is

is the only good, i. e. the fole fource of our enjoyments;-an opinion fo contrary to fact and experience, that it is wonderful any man can seriously attempt to defend it. Are the pleasures we receive from the fenfes to be entirely left out of the account? Are the pleasures of imagination nothing? Or, do we derive no addition to our happiness from our literary and intellectual purfuits? If the moral fenfe is carefully cherished and cultivated, it is indeed the fource of a very fublime and exalted fpecies of enjoyment. On fome occafions, however, it is rather the fource of pain than pleasure; and the more virtuous a man is, the larger facrifices of private happiness he is disposed to make to the general good; fo that it may well admit of a doubt, if he has no future reward in profpect, whether, upon the whole, his happiness would be promoted by an undeviating perfeverance in a courfe of the most perfect Virtue to which a human being can attain. It should seem that Virtue of a lower standard, and mixed with a confiderable portion of alloy, is better calculated for the purpofes of this world merely. We fee it paffes every where current, and the acquifition of it is by no means difficult. To speak without a figure, I affert, that whatever we may suppose respecting a few fublimer fpirits, the bulk of mankind, I mean those who are destitute of the finer feelings of Virtue, would certainly, in many instances, add to their temporal happiness by deviating from the strict line of rectitude; and I affirm, that there is no motive of a moral nature,