their separation. But the Episcopal Observer, it seems, abandons this ground, and gives the Reformers a very unfilial blow. According to this modern Protestant, the fact that a church has corrupted the word of God, and preaches not the pure word, but the impure word, is rather to its credit, and should be a motive for seeking or remaining in its communion, instead of a motive for separating from it. The only good ground of separation, if we accept his doctrine, would be the fact that the Church preaches the pure word of God, and commands explicit belief in the exact mind of the Spirit, as the condition of salvation. From such a church it must be one's duty to separate, because such a church derogates from the character of God, and injures the interests of religion. Perhaps it was on this ground, after all, that the Reformers separated from the communion of the Holy See, and on this ground that Protestants generally remain separate from that communion.

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But the Observer not only protests against the necessity of belief in the exact mind of the Spirit, but it contends that the exact mind of the Spirit cannot possibly be communicated to "Thoughts may be communicated," it says, "by a written or spoken language; but perfectly, entirely, unmistaka bly, by neither. To this rule the thoughts of God form no exception. When communicated to erring men, they come clothed under the guise of the erring representative, human language; and of necessity, therefore, are liable, in some of their shades, to be misconceived." So Almighty God himself cannot, if he will, teach us the exact truth, nor make to us a revelation of his will which we may believe without mixture of error ! The delegates to the late infidel convention, in the city of New York, will thank the writer in the Episcopal Observer for this, to them, precious concession, and, should they ever assemble again, they may propose to adopt his journal as one of their official organs. The truth as it is in God cannot be communicated to us; we can never receive what God is pleased to reveal, "perfectly, entirely, unmistakably"; but must always misconceive it to a greater or less extent, and substitute, for the mind of the Spirit, our own mind, for the word of God, our own words, or the words of the Devil! And yet, the Observer tells us, the revelation God has made us is so easy of comprehension, "that the wayfaring man, though a fool, shall not err therein." Nevertheless, Almighty God himself cannot make a revelation that can be perfectly received, that can be embraced without mistakes and misconceptions.

It is a convenience, sometimes, when we wish to secure the "pleasure" of refuting an opponent, to have short memories and flexible principles.

But, according to the Observer, we can never, even by the help of Almighty God, embrace the word of God in its purity and integrity; for, coming to us "clad in the defectible exterior of human language," it must, "by a law of necessity, be understood differently by different minds." We can never know precisely what it is God requires us to believe, and we never can believe what he requires us to believe, without mixing with it more or less of error and falsehood. Be it so. Will the Observer oblige us, then, by telling us how far we may combine with the word of God, or substitute for it, our own words, or those of the Devil, without danger to the soul? Will he tell us, on divine authority, where is the exact boundary, on one side of which mistakes and misconceptions, errors and falsehoods, are harmless, and on the other side of which they are destructive? Will he give us some rule by which we may always know whether we are on the right side or the wrong side? The rule is important, and we pray this Protestant theologian, who proposes to himself the very great pleasure of refuting us, to give us, out of the abundant pleasure he seems to have obtained, the slight pleasure of furnishing us this rule, so that we may not only know whether he really has refuted us, but also whether we have more or less error than we may with safety entertain.

But if we cannot receive the revelation of God without mistaking or misconceiving it, how is it possible for us to know whether we have the faith Almighty God requires of us or not? If we mistake on one point, why may we not on another? And if we are always liable to err, if even Almighty God cannot set us right, because he can speak to us only through human language, which is always and necessarily a distorting medium, where is faith, or even the possibility of faith? Faith is to believe without doubting, and is possible only where there is absolute certainty. But where there is a liability to err, nay, a necessity to mistake and misconceive, there is and can be no absolute certainty, but is and necessarily must be doubt, and, therefore, no faith. If the Observer is right in its doctrine, faith is impossible. It clearly shows, then, that, on its premises, faith, properly so called, is impossible, so called, is impossible, the very conclusion to which, we stated in advance, we intended to force it and all who reject the authority of the Catholic Church as the witness and expounder of God's word. Yet it claims "the pleasure" of having refuted us!

We can understand, now, why, in his synopsis of our argument, the writer in the Observer leaves out our definition of faith, and our position that what we are to believe is truth, not falsehood. If faith be to believe without doubting, it is not possible without absolute certainty, and absolute certainty is possible only in the case of absolute truth; and absolute truth he foresaw he was not likely to get, without going to Rome ; for, without going to Rome, he knew he could, at best, have only truth mixed with falsehood. To controvert our definition of faith, or to refute the arguments by which we sustained our position, that what we are to believe is "truth, not falsehood," was no easy matter, and not safe to be attempted; and yet he must have the pleasure of refuting us. But how? Why, in the true Protestant method, by ignoring our positions, since he could not overthrow them; the way in which, and the only way in which, Protestants ever have had or ever will have the pleasure of refuting Catholics.

The whole controversy between Catholics and Protestants turns on the questions here involved. Catholics say that Almighty God has made us a revelation, and commanded us to believe it, without doubting, in its integrity and genuine sense, as the condition sine qua non of salvation. Protestants also say God has made us a revelation, and commanded us to believe it without doubting, as the condition sine qua non of salvation, but, virtually, if not expressly, that he does not command us to believe it in its integrity and genuine sense, but only so much of it as commends itself to our own minds and hearts, and in the sense in which it pleases us to understand it. They are obliged to say this, or acknowledge the authority of the Catholic Church, and condemn themselves, as not having that faith without which they cannot be saved.

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The presumption, to say the least, is in favor of the Catholics; for we cannot reasonably suppose that the Holy Ghost reveals what he does not require us to believe, nor that he can consent_that_we should believe his word in any sense but his The Protestants are, then, presumptively in the wrong, and, consequently, the onus probandi rests on them. They can justify themselves only by producing, on divine authority, a specification of the portions of God's word they have the permission of the Holy Ghost to disbelieve or not believe, according to their own caprice; and also the permission of the Holy Ghost to believe his word in their own sense, rather than in his. God has made us a revelation; this they admit, as

well as we. He has commanded us to believe it; this they admit, as well as we. He has made belief of it a necessary condition of salvation; this they dare not deny. What, then, is the fair presumption from these premises? Is it not, that God commands belief in his revelation in its purity and integrity as the condition of salvation? Unquestionably. Then, unless you have his authority for saying that he neither requires you to believe all he has revealed, nor to believe what you do believe in its true sense, you are convicted of not having the faith he commands, unless you actually believe his whole revelation, and in its true sense.

Moreover, the ground on which you are to believe this revelation is the veracity of God alone. Now, this ground is sufficient ground of faith in all that God has revealed, and you can with no more propriety refuse to believe one portion of it than another. To refuse to believe this revelation is to make God a liar, and you make him a liar in refusing to believe one article, as much as you would in refusing to believe the whole. You must, then, believe the whole, or you make God, in your own mind, a liar; and are you prepared to maintain that he who charges God with falsehood, which is to blaspheme the Holy Ghost, is in the way of salvation?

So must you also believe the revelation in God's sense; for it is only in his sense that it is his word. If you put a meaning upon my words different from the meaning I put upon them, they cease to be my words, and become yours. So, when you put a meaning upon God's word different from the meaning he puts upon it, it ceases to be his word, and becomes your word, and you believe then the truth not as it is in God, but as it is in you. You must, then, believe the revelation in its true sense, or you do not believe the revelation Almighty God has made. Is it not remarkable that Protestants seem never to be aware of this?

Again, God commands faith in his revelation. But faith is to believe without doubting, and is, as we have seen, possible only on condition of infallible evidence, which leaves no room for doubt, but gives absolute certainty. The certainty of faith, though different in kind, must be equal in degree to the certainty of knowledge, or it is not faith. But this certainty is not possible in case of error or falsehood. Error or falsehood cannot be infallibly evidenced; for, if it could, it would not be error or falsehood, but truth. It follows, therefore, that the requisite degree of evidence to elicit faith is possible

only in the case of absolute truth. But the revelation of God, when misinterpreted, when taken not in its exact sense, is not absolute truth, and therefore cannot be so evidenced to the mind as to elicit faith. But we must have faith, or be eternally damned. Then you must take the revelation in its exact sense, or not be saved.

Do you reply, that faith, in this sense, is impossible, because it is impossible to have infallible certainty of the exact mind of the Spirit? This is a plain begging of the question. Impossible, on your ground, we admit; but not, therefore, necessarily, on every ground. Your objection merely proves that you cannot, as Protestants, elicit an act of faith, which is what we contend; but when you say therefore we cannot elicit faith at all, you assume that your ground is the true and only ground, which is what we deny, and what it is your business to prove. Because you cannot elicit faith, it does not follow that faith cannot be elicited. God has commanded it, as you yourselves dare not deny; but God cannot command what is impossible; therefore the faith is possible. Then the fact that it is not possible, on your ground, only proves that you are wrong, and out of the way of salvation.

One of the objections we brought against the Bible, as the witness to the fact of revelation, was, that, without an infallible authority, distinct from the Bible, it is impossible to prove the sufficiency of the Scriptures. We contended, for several reasons, which we gave, that they who take the Bible, as interpreted by private reason alone, for the only and sufficient rule of faith, are bound to prove that their rule is sufficient from the Sacred Scriptures themselves. But this they cannot do, for the Scriptures nowhere assert their own sufficiency. The Observer, with its Protestant logic, contends that they are not bound to prove the sufficiency of the Scriptures, but that we are bound to prove their insufficiency! But it nowhere takes up or replies to our objections, and nowhere shows on what principle we are bound to prove a negative. Doubtless, if we deny a proposition, we are bound to justify our denial by adducing a good reason for it; but in most cases it is sufficient to allege the fact that the affirmative proposition is not proved. Protestants assert the sufficiency of the Scriptures; it is their business to prove that sufficiency, and by divine authority, too,

a thing they never have done, and a thing they know perfectly well, if they know any thing of the subject, they never can do. By what right do they assume a position, without of