merchant shipping was taken from commerce at a blow and devoted to the service of the army.

All parts of a national life act and react on one another. Shipping works for and in co-operation with all other forms of industry-whether for production or for transport. In the past our small armies were in part raised by the press till after the middle of the eighteenth century. Then we had recourse to indirect means of compulsion. But the press was used only to a limited extent for the army, and the indirect compulsion was restricted by so many exemptions, some intended to guard the comfort of the directing classes, others designed to protect industry, that the burden fell almost wholly on the agricultural labourers, then a much larger proportion of the whole people than they are to-day. That there was much in all this that was inequitable, much which was unwise, much which was not truly profitable-all these are tenable propositions. Yet it amounted to a consistent national policy, and one which consciously aimed at keeping our shipping and our industry so safeguarded that they would not only escape being diminished, but could grow. Our merchant shipping doubled during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars in spite of a never-ending loss inflicted by French or American cruisers and privateers.

It would be an impertinence to our readers to waste words in asking whether these are the conditions in which the present war has been conducted. We all know, and even boast that they are not. Half our merchant shipping, if not more, has been taken from trade for the service of the many armies. in the field, from Mesopotamia to Flanders. Therefore it has been as effectually taken from commerce as if every ship composing it had been sent to the bottom by German cruisers or submarines. On shore, partly by voluntary enlistment and partly by conscription, we have swept men away by the million from all industries, including the two which most directly touch our maritime life, shipbuilding and the transport of goods of every description to and from our ports. Let it be allowed that we had no choice; that we were bound in honour to do as we have done; and that we have wisely incurred present loss in order to secure the permanent good of the State. But these considerations in defence of the course we took do not alter the consequences of that course. When

we are asked to believe that there has been a 'breakdown' in the use of our fleet, we answer that such breakdown as there has been can be quite sufficiently accounted for by the entire change which has been made in a traditional national policy, of which the use we make of our Navy is, and always must be, only a part.

Was it then inevitable that we should have suffered all we have suffered, and should be subject to the suffering which is perhaps to come? We are not compelled to answer in the affirmative. On the contrary, it can be proved that the worst might well have been avoided by a very moderate exercise of foresight and firmness on the part of those who have been responsible for the government of this country. They knew from the first that a large part of our merchant shipping must be taken away from trade for the supply of armies. If they did not know that the portion so taken would be exposed to great risks, must be worn, damaged, deteriorated, and must be replaced, any competent authority would have enlightened them. They must have known that German submarines would be used as commerce destroyers, for they were so used early. They may be excused for not having foreseen the great extension which the Germans would give to the power, and consequently to the range of action, of these craft. Yet after the loss of the Cressy' and her consorts in September 1914, it was unpardonable not to realise what a horrible danger submarines were to be. After the sinking of the 'Lusitania' in May 1915, there was no shadow of an apology to be made for those who could not realise that our enemy would be restrained only by lack of means from fulfilling all the prophecies made by Sir Percy Scott just before the war began. Our ministers were informed; they were warned. They had all the experience of the past to guide them. They could not be ignorant that Germany had immense shipbuilding resources, and was well qualified to avail herself of them. They ought to have foreseen that there was no more pressing obligation imposed upon them than to take care that our shipbuilding industry should be left free, and in case of need should be helped, to construct such an amount of tonnage as could replace, or better still exceed, our losses.

What they did we know. It is easily stated. The word

Nothing is enough. In the breezy speech with which he favoured the House of Commons, on the 16th of August last, Mr. Lloyd George (it would be interesting to know whether he was equally cheerful when speaking at meetings when no reporters were present) could yet not help stating certain damning facts. Our output of tonnage, which was just over 1,900,000 in 1913, fell to 688,000 in 1915, and to 538,000 in 1916. In September of that year Mr. Balfour paid his visit to the Clyde yards. There, after confessing in his graceful way that he really knew nothing about matters which ought to be known to any man who comes forward to govern a great maritime State, he allowed, in a burst of confidence, that the Clyde yards ought really to be set to work not only for the Navy, but for the merchant shipping which the Navy has to protect. The old Spanish epigram puts the result neatly:

Vino su alteza
Y sacó su espada
Y no hizo nada.'

The minister came, made a speech, and nothing happened. In the first six months of this year we built 484,000 tons. What we lost any man can find out for himself, though the Admiralty will not allow the tonnage to be named, by taking the number of ships confessedly sunk and multiplying by the known average tonnage of British merchant shipsan easy thing to discover. Add the loss of neutrals (the Norwegians alone lost twenty-one vessels of over 43,000 tons taken together in August), and we can see why a whole harvest is being eaten by mice in Australia, and imports are diminishing till the Commonwealth and the States composing it, which draw so large a part of their revenues from customs dues, are threatened with deficits. But the causing cause has not been a breakdown of a traditional naval strategy. There has been a neglect of a traditional national policy. The submarines would have failed to diminish our merchant shipping as completely as did cruisers and privateers between 1793 and 1815 if we had built abreast, and better still ahead, of their destructions. We could have done so, and a heavy burden of responsibility lies on those who, having the power to act, failed to make sure that we did.

DAVID HANNAY.

THE ORDER OF THE HOSPITAL OF
ST. JOHN OF JERUSALEM

I. The Knights of Malta. By Col. WHITWORTH PORTER. 1858. 2. The Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem. By H. W. FINCHAM. Collingridge. 1915.

3. Malta and the Knights Hospitallers. By Rev. W. K. R. BEDFORD. 1894.

4. Rhodes of the Knights. By BARON DE BELABRE. Oxford. 1908.

T is singular that even at this moment, when the eightpointed White Cross of St. John on its black ground is seen everywhere beside the Red Cross of Geneva, few among the general public appear to realise that the Order of St. John of Jerusalem is the most ancient of nursing Orders; and that the St. John Ambulance Association of 1877, and the St. John Ambulance Brigade of 1887, which taught First Aid' to the wounded in times of peace, and have done such magnificent work since in times of war, are but the children of an Order older than the Crusades. For the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, commonly known as Knights Hospitallers, formed the first of those Orders of Chivalry founded in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, to be followed by the Knights Templars, the Teutonic Knights and others. These all disappeared in course of time. But the ancient Order of St. John of Jerusalem has lived on through many vicissitudes; until at this day its beneficent work for suffering humanity is on a scale far beyond all that could have been dreamt of, even ten years ago.

From the time that the Empress Helena founded the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, in the third century, pilgrimages to the Holy Land became more and more frequent. And as long as the Christian Emperors of Constantinople maintained their rule over Palestine, pilgrims were encouraged, and it is evident that some sort of hospital existed in Jerusalem for their benefit. Moreover when the power of Islam swept over the Holy Land, and the Byzantine Empire in Asia VOL. 226. NO. 462,

T

crumbled before it, the hospital and the pilgrimages were still tolerated, for the pilgrims brought considerable gain to the country. It must, however, be acknowledged that, during the many contests between the Caliphs of Bagdad and the Caliphs of Egypt for the sovereignty of the Holy Land, the unfortunate pilgrims were constantly plundered, and often murdered, by one or other faction of their so-called protectors.

A very considerable trade has always existed between Western Europe and the Levant. And some of these pilgrims 'combined the profits of commerce with their holier object, ' and those who were thus able to establish business relations 'with the rulers of the neighbouring provinces had it often in 'their power to befriend their less fortunate brethren.' (Porter, p. 8.) Among these pilgrim traders, the merchants of Amalfi obtained permission to build a hospital in Jerusalem for the use of sick and poor Latin pilgrims. The Mahommedan Governor of the city, under the orders of the Caliph Montaser Billah, assigned a site to these good men close to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre; and here they erected a church dedicated to the Virgin, called Santa Maria ad Latinos, to distinguish it from the other existing Greek churches-the church being served by Benedictine monks. This work was finished between A.D. 1014-1023, according to a charter given for the re-endowment of the church and monastery by Melek Muzaffer in 1023.* Furthermore, between this time and the capture of Jerusalem by the crusaders in 1099, two hospitals were built for pilgrims, one for men, the other for women. That for women was dedicated to St. Mary Magdalene. The other to St. John Eleemon or the Almoner. This name was changed laterthe date is uncertain-to St. John the Baptist. And as the establishment of the pious merchants of Amalfi grew and prospered, many pilgrims stayed on in Jerusalem, and without any religious profession they devoted themselves to the work of the hospitals.

'Grateful pilgrims on their return spread far and wide the reputation of the Jerusalem hospitals, so that contributions flowed in from every quarter, and their utility was greatly extended.

This charter and date were certified by Captain Conder, R.E., of the Palestine Exploration Fund. The usual date being given as A.D. 1048.