It appears that Stewart served as an enlisted man in the Regular Army from October 29, 1851, to November 21, 1861, was promoted to be second lieutenant in the Army November 22, 1861, to first lieutenant July 3, 1863, to captain November 22, 1866, and was placed on the retired list March 20, 1879. Upon such service the court decided as a conclusion of law, and gave judgment accordingly, that claimant was entitled to recover the difference of longevity pay and allowances beginning November 22, 1861 (over ten years' service as an enlisted man at that time), and ending June 17, 1878. The decision of the court is in full as follows "This case, having been heard by the Court of Claims, the court, upon the evidence, makes the following: (6 FINDINGS OF FACT. "I. James Stewart, a citizen of the United States, enlisted October 29, 1851, in the Fourth U. S. Artillery; reenlisted August 29, 1856; reenlisted July 1, 1861; was promoted to second lieutenant, November 22, 1861; was promoted to first lieutenant, July 3, 1863; and served as such until November 22, 1866, when he accepted an appointment as captain of Eighteenth U. S. Infantry. He was retired as captain, U. S. Army, March 20, 1879. "II. The following is a statement of the claimant's account. for longevity pay, exclusive of any and all sums heretofore paid him therefor: From November 22, 1861, to August 31, 1862, 283 days, at 60 cents per day- From September 1. 1862, to June 30, 1864, 669 days, at 60 $169.80 389.36 484.50 From November 22, 1866, to July 14, 1870, inclusive, 1,331 days, at 60 cents per day ($798.60 less 5 per cent tax, $39.93) From July 15, 1870, to July 31, 1870, 16 days, difference between $165 per month and $199.65 per month (less 5 per cent tax, 92 cents). 20.52 758. 67 17.56 From August 1, 1870, to October 28, 1871, inclusive, 14 months and 28 days, at $34.65 per month. 517. 44 From October 29, 1871, to November 22, 1871, inclusive, 23 days, at $45 per month... 34.50 From November 22, 1876, to June 17, 1878, inclusive, 18 months and 26 days, at $10.35 per month_ Total amount unpaid___. From November 22, 1871, to November 21, 1876, 5 years, at $362 per year. 1, 710. 00 195. 27 4, 297.62 66 CONCLUSION OF LAW. Upon the foregoing findings of fact the court decides as a conclusion of law under special act of February 19, 1897, that the claimant recover judgment against the United States in the sum of four thousand two hundred and ninety-seven dollars and sixty-two cents ($4,297.62)." This office recommended an appeal of the case to the Supreme Court (see indorsement of May 4, 1899, 12 Letters, 328), but no appeal was taken. (See also case of James Davison v. The United States, 43 Ct. Cls., 308.) I think the decision of the Court of Claims in the Stewart case is decisive of the question that service as an enlisted man in the Regular Army is service in the Army within the meaning of the act of July 5, 1838, supra, and that such service both before and after the passage of the act of June 18, 1878, supra, should be counted in computing the services of commissioned officers (exclusive of general officers) of the Army for the purpose of longevity pay and allowances. Said decision overrules and sets aside the decision of the accounting officers to the effect that service as an enlisted man in the Regular Army is not service in the Army within the meaning of the act of July 5, 1838, and should not be considered in determining the basis for the payment of the additional ration as authorized by the said act of July 5, 1838. I am of opinion that Major Collins's service as an enlisted man in the Regular Army from July 9, 1846, to May 19, 1847, should be taken into consideration in determining claimant's rights to the additional longevity ration after he became a commissioned officer. The decision of the Second Comptroller of July 24, 1838, is overruled, as is also so much of the decision in 15 Comp. Dec., 220, as conflicts with this decision. The time officer served as an enlisted man was ten months and eleven days. Allowing such service to be credited for longevity purposes under the above act of July 5, 1838, the officer's first longevity increase accrued May 19, 1852; the second May 19, 1857; the third May 19, 1862; and the fourth May 19, 1867. The records show that officer was paid the first longevity increase from March 29, 1853; the second from March 29, 1858; the third from March 29, 1863; and the fourth from March 29, 1868. There is, therefore, due an additional ration from May 19, 1852, to March 28, 1853; from May 19, 1857, to March 28, 1858; from May 19, 1862, to March 28, 1863; and from May 19, 1867, to March 28, 1868. Credits: Statement of account. One additional ration from May 19, 1852, to March 28, $62.80 94. 20 94. 20 35.00 73.50 7.40 367.10 Debits: Tax: 3 per cent on $62.70; 5 per cent on $108.50_. $7.30 1.15 Servant's pay overpaid August, 1861. . 06 Servant's pay overpaid July, 1862– 94 Deduct for half-pay status from October 26 to No- 1.00 10.45 Balance due___. 356.65 Upon a revision of the above-described account I find a difference in favor of claimant of $356.65. REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES IN SERVING "JOHN DOE" WARRANTS BY UNITED STATES MARSHALS, "John Doe" warrants issued by United States commissioners are not valid or legal writs, as no true name or description of any particular person to be arrested is given therein, and office deputies are not entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in endeavoring to serve same. Decision by Comptroller Tracewell June 30, 1910. P. M. Long, United States marshal, northern district of Alabama, appealed May 31, 1910, from the action of the Auditor for the State and other Departments in the settlement of his account under the appropriation "Salaries, fees, and expenses of marshals, United States courts," for the quarter ended September 30, 1909, wherein the Auditor, per certificate No. 2647 (F. O.), April 18, 1910, disallowed certain items charged in the vouchers of office deputies Willis, Arnold, Coker, Fulgham, Root, and Smith, aggregating $97.13. The items represent traveling expenses incurred by said office deputies in endeavoring to serve what are described as "John Doe" warrants in internal-revenue cases where the endeavor to arrest was unsuccessful or "fruitless," as stated by the marshal. The Auditor disallowed these items on the ground that the office deputies while absent from their official stations endeavoring to serve these so-called warrants were not absent on official business within the meaning of the act of February 19, 1909 (35 Stat., 640), amending section 10 of the act of May 28, 1896 (29 Stat., 182), which amended act reads as follows: "When any of such office deputies is engaged in the service of any writ, process, subpoena, or other order of the court, or when necessarily absent from the place of his regular employment on official business, he shall be allowed his actual traveling expenses only, and his necessary and actual expenses for lodging and subsistence, not to exceed three dollars per day, and the necessary actual expenses in transporting prisoners, including necessary guard hire. * * The action of the Auditor is based upon a conclusion reached by him that these so-called "John Doe " warrants were not valid or legal writs because they did not contain any correct or true name or description of any particular person to be arrested, and cites in support of his conclusion the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of West v. Cabell (153 U. S., 78). The marshal explains that these "John Doe" warrants are generally issued upon complaints of deputy collectors of internal revenue, which complaints are based upon anonymous letters, or other representations, alleging that certain persons, whose names are unknown, are at the time engaged in operating illicit or "moonshine" distilleries in violation of the internal-revenue laws. Upon the receipt of such "warrants" the office deputies mentioned joined raiding parties headed by the deputy collector and, upon finding the illicit "still," assisted in destroying same, but in all of the cases now before me the persons engaged in operating these stills made good their escape and none of them were arrested. The expenses disallowed by the Auditor were all incurred by the office deputies while on these raids. I agree with the Auditor in his conclusion that these socalled "John Doe " warrants are not valid writs under authority of which a person not named or described therein may be legally arrested by a deputy marshal, and I think the decision of the Supreme Court cited by the Auditor amply justifies such conclusion. (See also United States v. Doe, 127 Fed Rep., 982, and Cox v. Durham, 128 id., 870.) In the case of West v. Cabell, supra, Justice Gray, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, inter alia: "By the common law a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with crime must truly name him or describe him sufficiently to identify him. If it does not, the officer making the arrest is liable to an action for false imprisonment; and if, in attempting to make the arrest, the officer is killed, this is only manslaughter in the person whose liberty is invaded. * * * "The principle of the common law by which warrants of arrest, in cases criminal or civil, must specifically name or describe the person to be arrested, has been affirmed in the American constitutions; and by the great weight of authority in this country a warrant that does not do so will not justify the officer making the arrest. (Commonwealth v. Crotty, 10 Allen, 403.) * * * "In Commonwealth v. Crotty, for instance, in which Morris Crotty and others were indicted and convicted for a riot in resisting the arrest of Crotty upon a warrant commanding the arrest of John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown,' the conviction was set aside by the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts upon the grounds that the warrant was insufficient, illegal, and void, because it did not contain Crotty's name, nor any description or designation by which he could be known and identified as the person against whom it was issued, and was in effect a general warrant, upon which any other person might as well have been arrested, as being included in the description; and that the warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he attempted to serve it; he acted without warrant and was a trespasser; the defendant whom he sought to arrest |