ernment of the modern State is independent of the expert branch, and vice versa, this is in fact never the case, but each exercises some supervision over the other. The expert branch, though having no legislative power, advises the popular branch concerning proposed changes to be made in the law and refuses to recognize such changes if after careful interpretation they conflict with the fundamental law which the people have made unchangeable by the Legislature. The popular branch controls the Executive by impeachment, and by refusing to supply money by taxation. Division of powers between the popular and the expert branch and mutual superintendence are equally interwoven in the Constitutions of modern States.

A State is a person, having a body and personality composed of specific lands and the populations inhabiting them. As respects these specific lands and populations, the power of the State is undoubtedly to be classified in the usual manner as legislative, judicial and executive. But the lands and populations which constitute the body and personality of the State are not the only lands and populations over which it may exercise power. It is a fact that the State may and does exercise power over lands and populations which are not, and cannot, in the nature of things, be a part of the body and personality of the State, and that it may be in a permanent relationship to these lands and populations of such a kind that it must exercise power over them permanently. External lands and populations may be recognized, by the State, as States foreign to itself, with which it may contract; and it may, therefore, recognize itself as under an implied contract by which it is obligated to the external populations which are permanently under its control. Under such express or implied contracts, the State may be obligated to render permanent services to these populations. Such services may be of any kind whatsoever, and do not necessarily involve the doing of acts which can be cer

tainly described as either legislative, judicial, or executive acts of the State. In the performance of such functions, the agents of the State are not changing the law of the State, nor interpreting it, nor executing it. They are wielding the power of the State as if the State were a person. They represent the State, as a political person, in the performance of services towards another State, as a political person. The acts of the State done in the performance of those services are all legislative, judicial or executive acts, but they are legislative, judicial or executive acts done not by the State for itself, but by the State for another State. As all agencies of the State belong either to the popular or the expert branch of the Government, the State, in performing such services, necessarily acts either through the popular or the expert branch exclusively, or through one superintended by the other.

All lands and populations subject to the power of a State, but not so related to it that they form by common consent an integral part of the body and personality of the State, which are called the dependencies of the State, are, therefore, capable of being viewed, in their relations to the State, in two different ways. They may be regarded as mere prolongations of the soil of the State, and its powers over them may be regarded as mere extensions of the legislative, judiciary and executive powers of the State. In this view, all inherent political personality of the dependencies is denied. They are not States, but mere extremities of the body and personality of the State, in which the heart-action of the State is less strong than at the centre. They may also be regarded as States distinct from and external to the State. In this view every dependent population within specific territorial limits determined by the natural circumstances and conditions is regarded as, by the nature of things, a State, whether it has the capacity to establish and the power to

maintain a distinct Government for itself as a State, or not. On this conception, it is evident that the theory that the power exercised is a mere prolongation or extension of the legislative, judicial, and executive power as it is exercised by the State within itself is not applicable. The State does not exercise its power directly upon the individual inhabitants of the dependencies. There is an intervening personality—a State

between the State and each individual inhabitant of the dependencies, and the State substitutes itself, by its own will or by contract express or implied, for this intervening personality, and exercises within the dependency the legislative, judicial, and executive power in substitution for this personality.

It is even possible to go so far in regarding dependencies as naturally States, as to regard the State as acting within the dependencies wholly by their permission. Such a permissive power is plainly different in character from the legislative, judicial, and executive powers which the State exercises within itself.

A State and its dependencies, in whatever light the latter are regarded, constitute, according to the accepted public law of the civilized world, an Empire. The old conception of an Empire as a Kingdom composed of Kingdoms, and of an Emperor as a King who rules over other Kings, is passing away, and in its stead has come the conception of the Empire as a State composed of distinct and often widely separated populations or States, of which a State is the Central Government or Emperor. The State so acting as the Central Government or Emperor-whatever may be its inner constitution, whether monarchical, oligarchical, republican, whether federal or unitary is called the Imperial State. (The study of the administration of dependencies is in fact, therefore, the study of the form and nature of the modern Empire.

The problem of the administration of dependencies in

volves, first of all, reaching a definite conclusion on the point whether dependencies are prolongations of the soil of the State, or whether they are, in the nature of things, within territorial limits determined by natural circumstances and conditions, States in permanent relationship with the State. Even if it be granted that they are States, it must be settled whether they are in a noncontractual or a contractual relationship, and if in a contractual relationship, whether under an implied or an express contract. If it shall be concluded that dependencies are essentially States in a permanent contractual (that is, federal) relationship with the State, the question will arise whether the power which the State exercises over its dependencies is in its essence strictly legislative, judicial, or executive, or a power distinct from, though inclusive of, all these powers, and whether the power can best be exercised by the popular or the expert branch of the Government of the State, and in what manner the one should act and the other superintend. If it shall be concluded that the administration of dependencies is a kind of governmental work which can be best performed through the expert branch of the Government under the superintendence of the popular branch, it will be necessary to consider the form which the instrumentalities of expert Government must take, in order to best fulfil the functions and obligations of the Imperial State.

This requires a study of the whole administration of dependencies by States from the time that the personality of States began to be recognized and it was possible to distinguish between the State and its dependencies,— that is, from the beginning of the seventeenth century. Starting at this point, it is necessary to select out of the multitude of acts and documents those which have, by the common consent of the successors of the actors of them, had an effect in formulating opinion concerning the relationship of the State to its dependencies and

concerning the character and extent of its power over them; and to study these acts and documents in the light of modern political science. [France and England furnish the earliest examples of States consciously recognizing themselves as legal and political persons, and as such entering into a permanent relationship with external dominions and countries and endeavoring to maintain the relationship unbroken. The experience and thought of these States, therefore, naturally demand first attention?