The Declaratory Statute of 1766, with the proviso agreed to in 1778, that it shall not be construed to sanction taxation for revenue purposes, is still to be regarded as embodying the constitutional assertion of the supreme authority which is exercisable by the Imperial Parliament over all the Queen's dominions, notwithstanding that they may be in possession of Local Legislatures with powers for local self-govern

ment.

So long as these statutes remain, every British dependency-even the Dominion of Canada and the Commonwealth of Australia-is, theoretically, on no higher grade than a county or parish of England under exemption from payment of taxes for the support of the State Government of Great Britain. Theoretically the power of Great Britain over Canada and Australia is unconditional and unlimited except in the matter of taxation, and it is due only to its grace and favor that it does not reduce both these enormous States to a condition of absolute subjection. Under such a theory, every dependency must, out of self-respect, refuse to contribute to support the power of the dominant State over them.

The power which Great Britain has actually exercised in the British Empire for more than half a century has been a power of disposition, and not a power of legislation; yet rather than admit this to be the fact, the British Government to-day professes itself to be in favor of a union, at some future time, between Great Britain and its self-governing Colonies, in which necessarily England will sink to a level with all the rest the of, members of the Union, and all the affairs of the Federal State thus formed will be managed by a common Parliament. Only in this way does even Mr. Chamberlain see any hope of obtaining any contribution towards the expense of the Imperial defence and welfare. In the speech from which the above extract is taken he said:

It may be that the time has come, and if not I believe it will come, when the Colonies will desire to substitute for the slight relationship which at present exists a true partnership, and in that case they will want their share in the management of the Empire which we like to think is as much theirs as it is ours. But, of course, with the privilege of management and control will also come the obligation and the responsibility. There will come some form of contribution toward the expense for objects which we shall have in common.

The reason for the insistence upon the theory that the power of Great Britain over its dependencies is the power of legislation is, undoubtedly, that the British Government fears, as it has always feared, that an admission that it was not would involve an admission that the British Parliament had no power in the Empire. If, however, the British Empire were recognized as a Federal Empire, this would necessarily imply that the State of Great Britain was the Protector and Disposer of the Empire, and that it might act through any instrumentality of its Government that it saw fit, and hence through the Parliament. While it is undoubtedly true that a great body like the British Parliament, in which the Lower House is composed of the elected representatives of the people of Great Britain, is, by its nature, unfitted for the steady and constant adjudication of the delicate questions which arise in the course of the relation between Great Britain and its dependencies, there exists, on occasions, the necessity for submitting certain great questions in the administration of the Empire to a tribunal for final settlement; and on such occasions of emergency the British Parliament and the people of Great Britain must undoubtedly settle the question and, if necessary, support their decision by force and arms.

Admiral Sir John Colomb in his article entitled "A Survey of Existing Conditions," printed in the volume

of essays entitled Britannic Confederation, to which reference has already been made, said:

Nominally the Parliament of the United Kingdom, as well as the Crown, retains supreme authority over the Parliaments of self-governing Colonies. Practically, the power of Parliament is a reserve force, to be called out of abeyance only in great emergencies.

Lord Chancellor Norton (formerly Baron Adderley), in an article entitled "How Not to Retain the Colonies," in the Nineteenth Century for July, 1879, said:

There is no dispute as to the entire control which all selfgoverning British Colonial communities have over matters of their own internal and local concern. The Imperial Parliament would never think of interfering in exclusively Colonial legislation, nor could the Sovereign constitutionally withhold the royal assent from responsible Ministers possessing the confidence of the Parliament passing such measures.

The legislative authority of the Imperial Parliament is in theory transcendent, and extends over Colonies and all dominions of the Sovereign; but in Colonies under government responsible to their own representative Legislatures, it is practically never directly exerted at all. If it were, it would reduce constitutional government, recognized and established in a Colony, to a fiction, sham, and delusion, fraught with mischief alike to the bastard Colony, and to the Mother Country so degrading herself abroad. There are, however, subjects of legislation which cannot be considered of exclusive interest to any Colony, affecting the interests of the whole Empire; or based on universal principles, which may be looked on as a sort of common law or even jus gentium; or comprised within great Imperial statutes and decisions, which would be violated by contrary legislation in the Colony.

In the second edition of Alpheus Todd's Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, it is said:

The Colonial possessions of the British Crown, howsoever acquired and whatever may be their political constitution, are subject at all periods of their existence to the legislative control of the Imperial Parliament. But in practice, especially in the case of Colonies enjoying representative institutions and responsible government, the Mother Country, in deference to the principle of self-government, has conceded the largest possible measure of local independence, and practically exerts its supreme authority only in cases of necessity, or when Imperial interests are at stake.

If the British Empire were to be formally recognized by the British Government as a Federal Empire, and the power of the State of Great Britain hence recognized as a power of disposition, the present position of the British Parliament in the Empire would not be altered, and the actual administration of the affairs of the Empire would be changed only in the single respect that the State of Great Britain could then claim the right to adjudicate, by an expert tribunal, along with all other questions, the amount and manner of the contributions of the dependencies to the Imperial defence and welfare, and the dependencies could with dignity and propriety contribute according to such dispositions.

Nothing stands in the way of such a recognition except two statutes repudiated by the United States of America, when they were Colonies of Great Britain, as violations of the Constitution of the British Empire.

There is evident, in the most recent thought in England, a tendency to renounce the old theory of the unconditional and unlimited power of Great Britain over its dependencies, and to substitute for it the theory embodied in the American Constitution, that the Imperial power is conditional and limited and essentially a trust or agency to be performed by the Imperial State for the benefit of its dependent States. Mr. Spencer Wilkinson

(the collaborator of Sir Charles Dilke in their recent work on Imperial Defence) says, in his book entitled The Nation's Awakening, published in 1896, which Sir Charles Dilke approves in his recent book, The British Empire:

The title of Empire and the quality of a British possession or dependency give to the work of Great Britain in India a certain amount of ambiguity. There is about a government

of this kind a tinge of vain-glory which lends itself to the unamiable pride of race. The perfect type of the kind of work which is carried on in India is to be seen in Egypt, where a similar task has been undertaken without any outward show. The British administrators in Egypt are true rulers because they are truly the servants of the Egyptians. Englishmen whose pride in their country consists in the pleasure which they derive from the excellence of the work done by the nation care little for names and titles. They do not want to call Egypt a British possession or even a British protectorate, and are content that the work done for that country should be such as commands the approval of impartial judges. . . . Lord Cromer and his assistants are the representatives of the noblest work that has ever been undertaken by any nation, and in carrying on that work, they personify the spirit of the British Empire.

The conception which we have formed of empire, that it consists in services rendered to the races over whom it is extended, is inconsistent with a desire for a monopoly. England may justly insist, as far as her opportunities offer, that no European nation shall found an Empire for the exclusive benefit of its own subjects. We may be content that France in her Colonies shall spread the spirit of French institutions; that Russia shall Russify the inhabitants of the Steppes of Central Asia, and that the German Colonies in Africa shall be administered according to German traditions and in accordance with German ideas. But we may fairly demand the general recognition of the canon which we have set up for ourselves, that a community capable of self-government shall regulate its affairs without restriction