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THERE are few subjects in politics on which people seem to find it so difficult to make up their minds as the position and prospects of Austria. said that when the Emperor Napoleon, shortly after the battle of Königgrätz, was asked whether he would take the opportunity of breaking the rising power of Prussia by throwing his sword into the opposite scale, he exclaimed, “Je ne peux pas m'allier avec un cadavre!" and few at that time would have ventured to deny that if Austria was not already dead, she would, at all events, die very soon. But Austria was not so dead as she seemed to be; and when, a little later, it appeared that the discontent in the Empire was not sufficiently strong to break out into insurrection, and that neither Russia nor Prussia was prepared to effect the partition of her prostrate neighbour, it was admitted that those who had predicted the fall of Austria had been too hasty, and that there was some chance for her yet. Then came the appointment of Baron Beust to the ministry, the reconciliation with Hungary, and the liberal constitution, and the new minister was loudly proclaimed in pamphlets and leading articles the saviour and regenerator of his adopted country. But this enthusiasm has been short-lived, as, indeed, might have been expected from the indiscreet zeal of Baron Beust's friends and admirers in

the press. When people are told, in every variety of key, that Austria is now the freest country in the world, and the guardian of peace in Europe, they are apt to suspect that such pains would not be taken to bid for foreign sympathy if things went satisfactorily at home. And now we are witnessing another change. Baron Beust has made a clever speech, in which he declares that "peace and roconciliation" are the pillars of his policy; and immediately the tide of our public confidence began to rise as

rapidly as it had fallen before. Perhaps, after all, these repeated vacillations of opinion are hardly surprising; for, what with the one-sided statements of newspaper correspondents, who are naturally prejudiced in favour of a government from which they derive their best information, and the equally biassed diatribes of Baron Beust's political adversaries, it is very difficult to arrive at the real truth about the present condition of Austria. In this article an attempt will be made, by setting in a clear light the real aims of Baron Beust's policy, his good and bad qualities as a politician, the difficulties with which he has to contend, the successes he has achieved, and the mistakes he has committed, to furnish the materials for more accurate and impartial notions on the subject than have hitherto prevailed.

The achievements of Baron Beust in the internal policy of Austria may be reduced to two measures, each of immense importance for the future of the Empire: the arrangement with Hungary, and the new constitution for the other Austrian territories. Since 1849, Hungary had been the standing difficulty of successive Austrian Governments, paralysing their action abroad, and weakening their authority at home. The great idea of Austrian statesmen after the close of the Hungarian revolution, was to treat Hungary as part and parcel of the Austrian state, on the principle that by making war against Austria, Hungary had forfeited all the privileges she had obtained in virtue of past contracts between the two countries; and that, having been conquered, Austria had a right to place her on the same footing as the other provinces she had obtained by conquest.

This is the so-called "Verwirkungstheorie" (forfeiture-theory), which was first started by Count Stadion in 1849, with the famous sentence, "Hungary

has ceased to exist," in a leader in the official journal of Vienna. Such a theory was certainly not calculated to conciliate the Hungarians, whose defeat only added new strength to their opposition, by proving that Austria could not conquer them alone. The assistance given by Russia on this occasion in the name of despotic principles was indeed a fatal boon to Austria. It roused the hostility of the Hungarians, without diminishing their power; and it prevented the Government from adopting the only means of appeasing them, for, after Austria had been saved by the Emperor Nicholas, the introduction of a liberal régime became impossible. The Hungarians were thus not only insulted in their dearest patriotic feelings by the denial of their national existence, but they were deprived of the parliamentary institutions which they had enjoyed for centuries. Moreover, they had a full share in the grievances of the other Austrian territories. Agriculture was neglected, the finances were so mismanaged that the country was on the verge of bankruptcy, the Concordat was made the law in all religious matters, and bureaucracy-always the curse of Austria-became all-powerful. The unfortunate campaign of 1859 closed this miserable epoch of delusions and blunders. Austria, taught by the loss of her richest provinces, began to see her weakness, and made overtures to Hungary for a reconciliation. The negotiation was not very successful, and ended in Austria making certain concessions without Hungary abandoning any of her claims. This one-sided arrangement, contained in the imperial decree known as the "October Diploma," enabled Hungary, as well as the other Austrian territories, to have a diet of her own; but still retained her on the footing of an Austrian province, her diet having a deliberative voice only, which it employed, like the other diets, in abusing the Government and clamouring for liberal institutions. Such an arrangement could not last long, and it was overthrown in the following year by the "February Patent," of which

Herr von Schmerling was the author. This statesman at once abolished the federal organization introduced by the "October Diploma," creating in its stead a central Reichsrath at Vienna, the members of which were to be nominated by election from all the territories of the Empire, Hungary included. The Hungarians of course refused to recognise this scheme, and held entirely aloof from the new Reichsrath; while Herr von Schmerling, with his contemptuous phrase, "We can wait" (wir können warten), only widened the breach between them and the Government. It soon became evident that the longer Austria waited, the harder the task of reconciliation would become. Herr von Schmerling was succeeded by Count Belcredi, the further working of the February Constitution was suspended, and the negotiations with Hungary were resumed, until they were again suddenly broken off by the war with Prussia.

The policy of delay and irresolution above described produced its natural effect on so intelligent and high-spirited a people as the Hungarians. Simultaneously with the distrust towards Austria caused by the frequent deceptions they had suffered, there grew up among them a consciousness of power which, acting on their strong patriotic instincts, soon widened the sphere of their national aims. The rights given them by the Pragmatic Sanction were now no longer the ultimate object of their aspirations. They looked forward. to nothing less than absolute independence, though their traditional loyalty still led them to preserve the dynastic link which connects them with Austria. Nor was this ambition confined to a single section of the people. With that wonderful unanimity which is the chief source of her political greatness, all classes in Hungary, animated with the same strong national feeling, submitted to the direction of their leaders; and the latter-men of no extraordinary talent, but possessing in a high degree that practical wisdom and power of adapting themselves to circumstances, which is often more useful in the di

rectors of a nation's destinies than the brilliant qualities of genius-developed the new national policy with admirable patience and skill. Their hopes were all but realized by the crushing defeat of Austria at Königgrätz, which, as Count Bismarck had predicted, practically transferred the centre of gravity of the Empire from Vienna to Pesth. But Hungary was still not strong enough to overcome the opposition of the other nationalities, and especially of the German element. Active, industrious, intelligent, and far more cultivated than the other nationalities of the Empire, but volatile and shallow, apt to be doctrinaire, and full of the encroaching spirit of their civilization, the Germans would not acknowledge themselves beaten, and claimed to retain their position as rulers of the destinies of Austria. Their pretensions, though utterly incompatible with the new situation created by the events of 1866, could not be entirely disregarded, for the Germans still formed the connecting link between the heterogeneous elements of which the Empire was composed; and, if their threat of secession had been executed (of which there seemed at that time some prospect), the very existence of Austria would have been placed in the greatest danger. Of the other races, all hoped to profit by the calamities of the state, and some clamoured for concessions which it would have been simply suicidal in the Government to grant. The Poles, so often accused of political incapacity and extravagance, gave an example of calmness and moderation which many of the other nationalities would have done well to follow. They advocated a federal re-organization of Austria, combined with as much self-government for each of the principal nationalities as might be found compatible with the integrity of the Empire. The Czechs, on the other hand, burning to throw off the detested German yoke, and to give free course to their national aspirations, demanded the establishment of a distinct Bohemian kingdom and the coronation of the Emperor Francis Joseph as their king.

Thus all these races were more or less opposed, not only to the pretensions of Hungary, but to those of each other.

Such was the position of affairs when Baron Beust was summoned to Vienna to re-establish the tottering fortunes of Austria. In many respects the new minister was well fitted for the task. Supple, adroit, full of resource, undaunted by obstacles, with an extraordinary power of work, a winning manner, and an imperturbable temper, Baron Beust seemed just the man to reconcile opponents, and smooth away difficulties. To these useful qualities were added political talents of a high order, a singular acuteness in taking in all the points of a difficult position, rapidity and firmness in action, and remarkable freedom from political bias. Though he is a Saxon by birth and family, and has occupied important positions in the government of his country for upwards of thirty years, he has completely renounced his former nationality, and now proclaims himself an Austrian. "The man," he said, at a sitting of the ministerial council last year, "whom the Emperor has placed in this position -whom several Austrian towns have admitted to an honorary citizenshipwhom a Bohemian Chamber of Commerce has sent to the Bohemian diet, and whom that diet has honoured with a seat in the Reichsrath-has, I think, a claim to be regarded not as a resident foreigner, but as an Austrian citizen.” Unfortunately Baron Beust is as little influenced by political principle as by political sentiment. He is fond of intrigue, unscrupulous in his choice of means, and delights, above all things, in over-reaching an opponent. In the course of an interesting conversation with Herr Kolisch, described in a German illustrated paper,1 the minister is reported to have expressed especial admiration for the "cheek" (toupet) of Count Cavour. "The Count," he said, "gives me the impression of a

1 Die Gartenlaube, 1868, No. 22. Portions of the article above quoted are translated in a life of Baron Beust published in the Examiner of July 11.

man at a race, who, instead of running in the prescribed course, breaks the line against all rules, runs straight across, and arrives at the goal before the others. The weakness and help lessness of their opponents were of great use to the Italians." That Baron Beust does his utmost to sink all considerations both of political principle and personal feeling in pursuing the objects of his policy, must be evident to all who have studied his career in Austria. The man who led the reaction in Saxony in 1849 (however strongly he may deny it now) is the Liberal, almost Radical Minister of Austria in 1868. There is one phase of Baron Beust's political action, however, which he cannot forget, and to which he still clings with undiminished attachment. What he did as the obscure minister of a small German state, might well be allowed to pass into oblivion without regret; but it is not in human nature to wipe out from the mind all traces of such an event in a statesman's life as the period when Baron Beust, acting as the acknowledged representative of the German National movement in 1864, defied Lord Russell and Count Bismarck, and was hailed by his admiring and grateful countrymen as their champion and leader. All this remains distinctly graven on the minister's mind, and its influence is clearly perceptible in his policy. That he has the interests of Austria sincerely at heart no one can doubt but all his plans and efforts with this object are vitiated by the foolish dream of restoring the empire to its old supremacy in Germany, and inducing the Germans to cluster round a liberal Austria rather than a military Prussia.

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The objection that Baron Beust is too much a diplomatist for a minister might have some force if he were employed in a state with a settled organization and a united people. But in Austria the talents of the diplomatist are just now more required than those of the administrator. The duties of Baron Beust are to a great extent those of a diplomatic envoy; he is constantly enNo. 107.-VOL. XVIII.

gaged in negotiations with nationalities which practically look upon each other, and the Government which he represents, as foreigners, and he occupies himself but little with the details of internal administration. At the same time, it cannot be denied that his love of finesse, and of gaining small dialectical victories by taking advantage of points immaterial to the question at issue, is unworthy of a statesman in such an important position, and often detracts from the weight which would otherwise attach to his representations. A good instance of this may be found in the despatch on the taxing of the foreign bondholders, in which, instead of frankly and simply giving the reasons which made the measure necessary, he only added to the natural discontent of the English creditors of Austria on finding themselves mulcted of a large percentage of their interest, by arguing that this discontent was unreasonable, because, if they had wanted an investment without risk, they should have bought consols instead of Austrian stock.

The spirit in which Baron Beust approached the great question of Austrian re-organization was practical and statesmanlike. He saw at once, with his usual perspicacity, that the first thing to be done was to settle the position of Hungary, and, casting aside for the moment his German aspirations, he set about this extremely delicate and difficult task with singular energy and tact. It is certain that if Austria had not been utterly prostrate and helpless, the opposition of the proudest and most bigoted aristocracy in the world to a foreigner and a Protestant would have made success impossible; but, on the other hand, the same reason which enabled him to defeat the resistance of the Austrian nobility increased the pretensions of the Hungarians. It has already been observed, that Hungary wished for a "personal" union-that is to say, for a distinct administration, treasury, and army of her own, ruled by the Emperor of Austria as King of Hungary. The demand was, perhaps, not unreasonable, and it is daily becoming

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more evident that it will have to be conceded sooner or later; but in 1866 such a concession must infallibly have led to a disruption of the monarchy, as the other nationalities, the German especially, were violently opposed to it. It was necessary, therefore, to effect a compromise; and here Baron Beust's diplomatic abilities were of the highest value. To the Hungarian leaders he pointed out that Hungary could not stand alone; that her interests were bound up with those of Austria; that neither the Emperor nor the people of the other Austrian territories could consent to such a diminution of the power and greatness of the monarchy as would be involved in the grant of complete independence to Hungary; but that they were ready to concede to the Hungarians the power of governing themselves in all matters which were not of imperial interest.

To the Germans he showed that circumstances had made a policy of coercion in Hungary impossible; that the Hungarians were now daily becoming more excited and intractable; that a revolution in Hungary at this crisis would be the death blow of Austria; and he promised, if they would consent to the establishment of a dualism, to introduce a constitution for the other half of the Empire on so liberal a basis that the Germans, as the most cultivated element, and the chief representatives of the liberal party in the Reichsrath, would still retain their predominance in the government at Vienna. The Slavonian races, with their wild demands and Panslavist tendencies, were more difficult to pacify; but here, too, the minister succeeded, by gaining to his side the Poles,-whose moderate aspirations were satisfied by the promise of a wide autocracy for Galicia and a Polish minister in the new cabinet,-in securing for his project a clear majority in the Reichsrath.

By this skilful management, though nothing like a permanent settlement was achieved, and much discontent still remained, the minister provided for the most pressing want of Austria-a definite system of government. So long as

anarchy continued, and Hungary was hostile, the Empire was in imminent danger both from within and without; Baron Beust caused the anarchy to cease, and procured a reconciliation with Hungary. The end may in this case be said to have justified the means; for, after all, the integrity of the monarchy was of far greater importance to the various nationalities than the share they were each to take in its government. Even to be ruled by Germans in Austria would have been a preferable fate for the Poles than to be annexed to Russia, or for the Czechs than to be annexed to Prussia. The simple truth is that the minister, being unable to satisfy all the nationalities, appeased the most powerful of them. This was undoubtedly a great triumph, though Baron Beust's efforts to curry favour in Germany, by sacrificing to the German element the interests of the other Austrian nationalities, have since made it a barren one.

The main points of the arrangement concluded with Hungary are easily stated. The liberal laws sanctioned by the Emperor Ferdinand in 1849 were restored, a separate Hungarian ministry was appointed, and the Hungarian diet received full legislative powers on all subjects but finance, war, and foreign affairs, which, being regarded as imperial, were to be dealt with by a delegation composed of members of the representative assemblies of both halves of the monarchy. This was the groundwork of what is known as the system of dualism. It was accepted by the Germans and Hungarians as a principle, agreed to by the Poles as a pis-aller, and violently opposed by the other nationalities. The opinions of the malcontent provinces were unmistakably expressed at their local diets; but Baron Beust, with that disregard for political principle which is one of his worst faults as a statesman, refused to recognise their resolutions, and summoned new elections, in which every engine at the command of the Government was used to procure the return of the official candidates. The only result of this step was to embitter the opposition without materially dimin