The pupillus had also an action against | The tutela of women who were puberes was a peculiar Roman institution, founded on the maxim that a woman could do nothing without the auctoritas of a tutor. But there was this difference between the tutela of pupilli and of women who were puberes in the case of pupilli the tutor both did the necessary acts, particularly when the pupillus was infans, and gave his auctoritas; in the case of women who were puberes, the tutor only gave his auctoritas. The Vestal virgins, in virtue of their office, were exempted from tutela. Both libertinae and ingenuae were exempted from it by acquiring the Jus Liberorum, which was conferred by the Lex Julia et Papia Poppaea on women who had a certain number of children. The tutela of a woman was terminated by a marriage by which she came in manum viri; and also by other means. A woman had no right of action against her tutor as such, for he did not do any act in the administration of her property: he only gave to her acts their legal validity by his auctoritas. The subject of the Roman tutela is one of considerable extent, and in the case of women it involves some difficult conside rations. TWELVE TABLES. [ROMAN LAW.] TYRANT. The words tyrant and tyranny come respectively from the Greek tyrannos, tyrannis (rúpavvos, Tupavvis) through the Latin. The earliest use of the word tyrannus is perhaps in the Homeric hymn to Ares (Mars). It is used by Herodotus and Thucydides, to signify a person who possessed sovereign power and owed it to usurpation, or who derived it from a person who had obtained such power by usurpation, and who maintained it by force. Pisistratus, who usurped the supreme power at Athens, B.C. 560, was succeeded in it by his eldest son Hippias. A Greek tyrant who obtained sovereign power was a monarch in the proper sense of that term. [MONARCH.] If he acquired a power which was somewhat less than sovereign, he was not monarch; but in either case he would perhaps be called tyrannus and accordingly the word does not ex press with accuracy the degree of politi cal power, but it rather expresses the mode of acquisition, or refers to its ori ginally illegal origin. The word, as used by the older Greek writers, did not carry with it any notion of blame: it simply denoted a person possessed of such poli tical power as above mentioned, whether he used it well or ill. Many so-called tyrants were popular, and were men of letters, and patrons of literature and art. They might appropriately be called kings or princes in the modern acceptation of those terms, except perhaps that the uncertainty of their tenure of power and the want of a recognised hereditary succes sion in the tyranny, or a regular mode of succeeding to it, would render the appli cation of any modern name inappropriate. In some passages in Herodotus (iii. 8, &c.; vi. 23, &c.; vii. 165) the words mo narch and tyrant are used as synonymes to express an individual who possessed sovereign power; and in one instance at least, vi. 23, 24) he calls the same person king (Bartheus) and monarch (uouvapxos Aristotle (Polit. iii. 7), after stating the a polity or government must either be in the hands of one or of a few, or of the many, adds that we are accustomed to call a monarchy which has regard to the interests of all members of the state & kingship (Baoλela); and that a monarchy which has regard only to the interests of the monarch is a tyranny. the case of Miltiades, who became tyrant of the Thracian Chersonesus, Nepos (Miltiad.) remarks that " all persons are con sidered and called tyranni who enjoy last ing power in a state which has once been free." This definition seems to express pretty clearly the old Greek notion of yrant, but it leaves out of consideration | tyrant might be called tyrant on account of his cruelty. It seems as if Seneca was trying to distinguish the popular use of tyrant in his time from its earlier historical signification. Trebellius Pollio has written the History of the Thirty Tyrants' who sprung up in the Roman empire in the time of Gallienus and Valerian. These so-called tyrants were not more tyrannical, in the modern sense of the term, than many Roman emperors. he mode in which the power was acquired. Nepos remarks that Miltiades was called "Tyrannus sed justus," "tyant, but tyrant in constitutional form" not just), for he had been elected by the people. Accordingly, he says in another place, he had the dignity or rank of king without the name. This is consistent with Herodotus (vi. 36), who says that the people made Miltiades tyrant (Túpavvov κατεστήσαντο). Few of the Greek tyrannies lasted long, and the conduct of those who held this power was generally such as to attach in the course of time an odious signification to the word tyrant; but it does not exactly appear when this change in the signification of the word was introduced. Many of the old Greek tyrannies were abolished in part by the influence of Sparta, the constitution of which was hostile both to monarchy and democracy. But we read of tyrannies so called among the Greeks in the time of Philip and Demosthenes. It was, according to the expression of Isocrates, one of the great merits of Evagoras, tyrant of Cyprus, that he raised himself from a private station to the rank of tyrant (rúpavvos), which he expresses in another place as the acquisition of a kingship. (Evag. Encom., c. 25, 26.) The Roman writers often use tyrannus as simply equivalent to king, especially the poets. Cicero couples dominus and tyrannus, thereby intending to use tyrannus in a bad sense, which was perhaps the more common acceptation of the word among the Romans in his time. Seneca seems to refer to the original sense of tyrannus when he says, "A tyrant is to be distinguished from a king (rex) by his conduct, and not by the name: for Dionysius the elder (who was called a tyrant) was a better man than many kings; and Lucius Sulla may be appropriately called a tyrant, for he only ceased from slaughter when he had no more enemies to kill." (Facciol., Lex., "Tyrannus.") According to this, a man might be called tyrant without being a cruel governor, for there were instances of persons so called who had used their power with moderation; and yet a man who had not the title of VOL. II. The use of the modern words tyrant, tyranny, tyrannical, has been as vague as that of most other political terms. The term tyrant is properly limited to the government of one man who is sovereign, and the popular application of the term expresses disapprobation of his conduct. Aristotle's definition of tyranny would apply well enough to a modern tyrant: he is a sovereign who looks only to his own interest, or what he considers his own interest; and cares not what he does in order to accomplish his objects. But if he were a wise sovereign, and administered the state solely with a view to his real interest, that would be found in the main to coincide with the interest of the people, and he would not be called a tyrant, though perhaps he would come within Aristotle's definition. But Aristotle's language, though apparently precise, is not so; and he means by a tyrant administering the state for his own interest, that he also administers it to the detriment of the people. As the mass judge of things by their results, a sovereign would now be called tyrannical whose administration should render his people unhappy; at least he would run great risk of having this odious epithet applied to him, whatever was the goodness of his intentions, if he failed to satisfy the people. The word tyrannical is now often applied to acts of governments which are not monarchies; but this is an improper use of the word. We may say that the laws enacted by the sovereign power in Great Britain are sometimes impolitic, unwise, or injurious to the state generally; they may also be sometimes called oppressive; but they cannot with propriety be called tyrannical, though such an expression may be and often is used in the vulgar sense of characterising a law which for some rea 31 son the person who uses the term does not | tion, to which, however, they must in like. U. UDAL TENURE. The Norwegian term 'Udal,' or 'odel,' appears to be the same as the German 'adel,' or 'noble.' Tenure is an improper name as applied to Udal land, for the land so called in Norway is not held by any tenure, but is free from all services. There is neither superior nor vassal, nor any of the consequences of such feudal relation as exists in many countries in Europe. (Laing's Norway, p. 205.) UMPIRE. [ARBITRATION.] this respect bear some certain proportion When the price of the public funds high, the interest upon exchequer bill will be low; and if the funds should fal in price so as to afford a much more pro fitable investment than exchequer bil the rate of interest upon these must be raised in order to prevent their payment into the exchequer in discharge of duties: a thing which would embarrass the fina cial operations of government. When first issued in the reign of William Ill, the interest borne by exchequer bills was 5d. per 100l. per diem, being at the rate of 7. 128. 1d. per cent. per annum. h the same reign the interest was after wards lowered to 4d. per 1007. per diem, or 6l. 18. 8d. per cent. per annum; and is the following reign the rate was still far ther reduced to 2d. per diem, or 31.08. 10. per cent. per annum. During the greate part of the war from 1793 to 1814, the fixed at 34d. per cent. per diem, or 5l. 68. 54d. per cent. per annum. Sine the last-mentioned year the rate has bee progressively reduced to 24d., 2d., al 14d. per 100l. per diem, at which last rate they were in the market at the tim of the derangement of the currency which was experienced in the beginning of 1837. Under these circumstances, was considered important as far as pos sible to relieve the Bank of England, by which establishment a very large propor tion of these securities were then held, and to place it in the most favourable po sition for affording relief to the commer cial classes; and accordingly the rate of interest upon exchequer bills was raised t 24d. per cent. per diem. The last exche quer bills which were issued (in June, 1846) bore interest at 1d. per 100l. per day. UNDERWRITER. [SHIPS, p. 706.] UNFUNDED DEBT. Exchequer bills form the principal part of the unfunded public debt. These bills are issued under the authority of parliament for sums varying from 100l. to 1000l., and bear interest. They were first is-rate of interest upon these securities was sued in the reign of William III.; and although their amount has since varied greatly at different times, the convenience which they afford to individuals and their advantage to the public have been such as to cause their constant issue. Their convenience to individuals arises from the circumstance of their passing from hand to hand without the necessity of making a formal transfer, of their bearing interest, and of their not being subject to such violent fluctuations as sometimes occur in the prices of the funded debt. This comparative steadiness in value is caused by the option periodically given to the holders to be paid their amount at par, or to exchange them for new bills to which the same advantage is extended; besides this, when a certain limited period has elapsed from the date of their first issue, they may be paid to the government at In periods of commercial pressure, par in discharge of duties and taxes. The advances have been made to merchants amount of premium that may have been upon the security of goods, by the issue of paid at the time of purchase is conse- exchequer bills. A more permanent o quently all that the holder of an exche- casion for their issue, apart from the inquer bill risks in return for the interest mediate wants of the government, has which accrues during the time that it re- been the desire of aiding individuals mains in his possession. The advantage to private associations in the prosecution f the public consists in the lower rate of in- works of public utility, such as canais terest which they carry compared with roads, &c. In these cases the rate of 2the permanent or funded debt of the na-terest charged to the borrowers is some what greater than that borne by the bills, and the difference has been applied to defray the expense of management on the part of the public. either expressly withdrawn from the States, or delegated to the General government. Both the General and State govern The amount of exchequer bills "out-ments are essentially democratic. In both standing and unprovided for" at the end of each of the under-mentioned years was as follows: PAPAL.] UNION, IRELAND, SCOTLAND. [COMMONS, HOUSE OF, pp. 584, 590; PARLIAMENT, p. 455.] UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA, Government of. The United States, at the time of the formation of the General or Federal government in 1787, as well as at the time of their separation from Great Britain, 1776, consisted of thirteen distinct political communities, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. The number is now increased to twenty-seven by the successive additions of the following States: Vermont, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Indiana, Mississippi, Illinois, Alabama, Maine, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan, and Florida. In the year 1845 Texas was admitted into the Union as a State and member thereof. They formed a Federal Government for defence from foreign aggression, and tranquillity at home; to encourage and protect commerce; and for a few objects of internal legislation in which uniformity among the States was desirable, and an obvious and direct common interest existed. To the separate States was left the legislation which concerns the law of property, the punishment of offences, the administration of justice, and the exercise of all powers over the territory and the citizens except the few which have been it is assumed that the interest of the majority is the proper end of government, and that the wishes of the majority truly indicate that interest. By the written instrument called the Constitution of the United States, the power of the General government is divided into three branches; the legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative power is vested in two Houses. One, called the House of Representatives, is chosen every second year by those whom the laws of each State make legal voters. The number of representatives is not fixed, but has gradually increased from 65, in 1789, when the constitution went into operation, to 224 and two delegates. The two delegates are for the territories of Wisconsin and Iowa respectively. The representatives must be apportioned among the States according to their population, deducting twofifths of the slaves in the estimate; and for the purpose of correcting the inequality of distribution arising from the vari ations in the relative numbers of the States, a census of the inhabitants is to be taken every ten years, at which time a new apportionment takes place, and a new ratio of population to each representative may be then also adopted, or the former one be continued. The act of Congress of 1842 declares that there shall be "one representative for every 70,680 persons in each State, and one additional representative for each State, having a fraction greater than one moiety of the said ratio, computed according to the rule prescribed by the constitution of the United States." The Senate consists of two members from each State, chosen by its legislature, and consequently the whole number is now 54. One-third of the members is elected every second year, so that each member holds his seat for six years. In both houses the members are re-eligible. All acts of legislation require the concurrence of both Houses, which constitute the Congress of the United States. They have the power of levying taxes of every kind for all national objects pursuant to the powers given them by the constitution; of regulating commerce, foreign and domestic; of coining money; fixing the standard of weights and measures; establishing post-offices and post roads; prescribing a uniform rule of naturalization, and a uniform bankrupt law; creating and supporting an army and navy; of declaring war; defining and punishing treason, piracy, counterfeiting, and other offences arising under the constitution and acts of Congress; exercising exclusive legislation in the district of Columbia in which Washington, the seat of the General Government, is situated, and in forts, arsenals, dockyards, and all the territories belonging to the General Government; and the power of admitting new States into the Union. The Congress is, by the same instrument, prohibited from laying any tax upon exports; from giving a preference to the ports of one State over those of another; from laying any direct tax except according to the number of inhabitants in each State who are represented in Congress; from suspending the writ of habeas corpus, except in case of rebellion or invasion; from passing any bill of attainder or er post facto law; from granting, or permitting to be granted, any title of nobility; or from passing any law to restrict the freedom of religion, of speech, or the press. Congress must assemble at least once in every year, which of late has been on the first Monday in December. The members of both Houses receive eight dollars for each day's attendance on Congress, and also for every 20 miles which they must travel to the seat of Government at Washington, and in their return home. The powers of this body to give special encouragement to manufactures, to make roads and canals, to establish banks and other corporations, and to exercise some other legislative functions, are contested points in the construction of the federal constitution; and these questions often furnish the real or ostensible grounds of dispute between political parties. Under the power to give special en | couragement to manufactures, the Cor gress has passed acts which lay d and imposts on the importation of fore commodities, and these duties and posts have been laid not merely for purposes of revenue, but for the pro tion of domestic manufactures. s. duties for the protection of domes: manufactures are described in the c nance of the Carolina Convention abou fourteen years ago) as "bounties a classes and individuals engaged in pas ticular employments at the expense 2: to the injury and oppression of oc classes and individuals." The obje the Carolina Convention was to m the revenue laws of the United States and the verb nullify gave birth to new word Nullification. Those v maintained this doctrine maintained t a State, which is a member of the Feder Union, can nullify certain acts of = General Government. The general d trine of nullification was laid down the following terms: "A State has a right in her sovereign capacity in C vention to declare an unconstitutional ar of Congress to be null and void; such declaration is obligatory on citizens and conclusive against the Gese ral Government; which would have right to enforce its construction of a powers against that of the State." T doctrine of Nullification was much cussed at the time in the United States The objections to it, and the difficulty rather impossibility of the process wh the nullifiers of Carolina proposed $7 the purpose of getting rid of the revea laws of the United States, are shown an article in the North American Revie on Nullification (vol. 36, Jan. 1853) The executive power is vested in 1 President, who is commander-in-chief at the army and navy, collects and disburses the revenue according to law, and ma treaties with foreign nations, but in the exercise of the treaty-making power, the concurrence of two-thirds of the senators present is required. He nominates and, with the advice and consent of the Senate. appoints ambassadors, other public m nisters, and consuls, and judges of the Supreme court, and other inferior officers. He has also a qualified negative on the |