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minded, patriotic, and based on the purest motives, and that it set up a new standard in international custom, is beyond cavil. However carefully Huerta may have complied with the forms of the Mexican law, the fact remains that he came into power only through the betrayal and resulting death of his country's lawful chiefs. The other great nations, following the usual precedents in such cases, promptly recognized Huerta as the de-facto chief executive of Mexico; but the dictates of President Wilson's personal conscience forbade him that course, and he evidently saw no reason for yielding his official conscience to a different keeper. Only a very utilitarian statesman could seriously suggest that the Government of the United States, claiming its peculiar position of moral leadership in the Western Hemisphere, should have adopted the opposite course. President Wilson did not take this view, and for the high standard of morality and even for the disregard of mere expediency which he displayed he will be done full justice.

We find, therefore, that President Wilson, correctly voicing the natural feelings of the American people, had early in his administration made known in plain terms that he would not recognize Huerta, and that in so doing he had placed the American Government on a very high moral plane. All that remained, then, in order that this policy might be crowned with success in actual practice, was that Huerta also should see the light, repent of his misspent old age, and step regretfully, but gracefully, down from the presidential dais. Had he done so, this article, like many others, would not have been written, and the diplomats and statesmen of the whole world would be rubbing their eyes and marveling at the new force come suddenly into international relations. Critics of a cynical bent would be hushed, and the stricken Mexican people would, let us hope, be on the highroad to political regeneration.

But many weary months have dragged on since last March, each with its repulsive tale of murder, rapine, arson, and savagery. Each elapsed month has taken its toll of the growing irritation and, under the surface, official cynicism on the part of other nations whose subjects and their properties in Mexico are suffering

or in jeopardy. Each month has brought fresh discouragement to those interested in the prevention of human misery, and, last of all, is the truly sardonic fact that one Victoriano Huerta, styling himself President of Mexico, and a hundred times hailed in official bulletins at Washington as the pirate king "about to go," is still at the head of the Mexican Government and army, and in complete control of the capital and some outlying states and cities. He sits in his castle, a grim, apparently unshaken old usurper; he leers at his minister of foreign affairs, receives with all formality the accredited ministers of most other nations of the world, sends his despatches to his envoys at the capitals of Europe, warmly embraces the American chargé d'affaires at a public reception, and sends his compliments to the "great American people"; but the world is asked to believe that he must go. The moral edict has gone forth. Huerta himself doubtless knows that he cannot last forever. Whether it will be by the victory of the wine-cellar, by the hand of an assassin, by the shell or bullet of a besieging rebel army, or from so-called natural causes, it is of course true that sooner or later Huerta must go. Meanwhile, however, he continues to make sport of the situation, and if he himself is not enjoying it, certainly no one else is.

If anything further were needed to make clear the discordance between the United States and the other leading nations on this subject, it would be furnished by the recent spectacle of the British minister and the commander of the British fleet in Mexican waters lunching in state with "President Huerta" at the very time that President Wilson was officially characterizing him in his message to Congress

as a usurper.

This state of affairs, which would be amusing were it not so serious, cannot fail to evoke a question in the mind of the most confiding. President Wilson himself, with his undoubted faith in the compelling force of what has been termed a policy of "moral suasion," must at times ask himself whether, in this scheme of apparently perfect morality and unanswerable theory, some small, but vital, factor has not been overlooked. To think otherwise is to believe that President Wilson foresaw last March that, with the approach of

this Christmas, Huerta would still be preparing lettres-de-cachet for his enemies in and out of the Mexican legislature, that an international fleet would be assembled in Mexican waters, and that all the risks of serious complications between the United States and other nations which have been run during these long months were inevitable. If he did foresee this, his original policy must be recognized as one of great patience and sublime willingness to tread in dangerous places.

If he did not foresee the weary waiting of the last eight months, as it seems reasonable to suppose is the case, then the question again intrudes itself: Was not something lacking in the policy of moral suasion, at least in this instance?

I think that there was. Huerta evidently thought that there was, and though that affable usurper may be dead or cast into outer darkness by the time this article sees the light, the fact will always remain that the policy of saying, in effect, that "Huerta must go," without having any definite plan for actively accelerating his departure, however perfect in ethics or pure in motives, did not meet the practical situation which confronted President Wilson on March 4, 1913.

Whether or not the various bands who call themselves Constitutionalists, but are equally well known by less euphonious names, will terminate their carnival of atrocities within the walls of Mexico City on Christmas day for a breathing-spell, until they again take up the struggle among themselves, the fact will remain that for eight months the American nation has been out of harmony with the rest of the civilized world, and consequently exposed to the grave danger of becoming the objective rallying-point for a concert of powerful nations which have large potential political rights and substantial commercial and property rights in a country being devastated by the bullet, the sword, and the torch.

The American people may well congratulate themselves on the admirable patience which has been displayed in this affair by the friendly powers of Europe. One rift in the lute of outward friendliness, and the gravest consequences might have ensued. It is this factor also which the plan for ousting Huerta by mere words, by implied threats, coupled with

neutralizing declarations of intention not to intervene, did not take into proper ac

count.

President Wilson's splendidly conceived and sincerely executed plan of dealing with Huerta by officially directing against him the great prestige and influence of the American nation shows, if anything, that the President either overestimated the effect of that influence or underestimated Huerta's tenacity and powers of resistance. Its failure may also be attributed in part to the belief that the nations of Europe, and their nationals. having vested rights in Mexico, would coöperate from the very beginning with the United States by refusing or withdrawing their recognition of Huerta or by closing all sources of financial supply. As far as is known, none of these things has been done, and on more than one occasion Huerta has been actually justified in believing that there was a decided lack of harmony in the positions regarding himself taken by the United States and some of the other great powers.

If I should use the word "failure" in connection with the American plan for settling Mexico's troubles, I would refer to any plan which might leave out of consideration the fact that the present Mexican situation is not wholly an American affair. If it is anything but Mexican, it is decidedly a world affair. A plaguespot in a certain town may be most dangerous to those living in the immediate neighborhood, but it is also dangerous to the entire community. On this theory we have long since outgrown the practice of leaving it to be cleared up only by those whose nostrils are reached by the stench. Such sanitation is community work and duty. So is any outside police work which may become necessary in Mexico. This is manifestly correct in theory. Now, as regards the practice.

That the United States has a well-recognized predominant political interest in Mexico's condition and future is unquestioned throughout the world. This is in addition to the tangible interests which she shares with a number of other nations by virtue of her and their citizens in Mexico being subject to the loss and danger of loss of their lives and property. The predominant political interest of the United States may be termed that of

"strategy and propinquity." The Panama Canal and coterminous frontiers along the Rio Grande sufficiently explain this special relationship, and no statesman in Europe or elsewhere has questioned it.

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But as regards the further interest, which we share with other nations, paratively recent and very clear precedent is at hand. No reason was found why the United States should not participate in the international relief expedition sent to Peking at the time of the Boxer troubles in 1900. True, the legations at Mexico City have not yet been attacked, but the principle of killing a friendly nation's minister or one of its subjects is the same; the difference is merely one of degree.

The United States and the other leading powers, interested because of their citizens or subjects being endangered, promptly recognized in June, 1900, that there had arisen in China a condition of anarchy and rebellion with which the Chinese Government was unable to cope successfully. At least two nations felt that they had special political interests in China, but this feeling was no bar to the formation and harmonious conduct of a joint expedition to the Chinese capital, in which Japanese, Russian, British, French, and American troops participated. The United States originally destined and set in motion for China about 17,500 soldiers and marines, although only 6000 actually arrived in China before the capture of Peking. By August 16, 1900, the allied forces had relieved the besieged legations, and divided Peking among themselves for the maintenance of order. Both the admiral and the commanding general of the American forces in China received instructions to confer freely with the representatives of other powers on the ground and, if necessary, to act concurrently with their forces, under a common official direction, which was done. The Japanese Government allowed Nagasaki to be used for a secondary base and the transhipment of stores for the American forces. Two battalions of American infantry formed part of a brigade under a British general, and were highly commended by him. The American flag was the first foreign color to be raised on the walls of Peking.

There were many conflicting political interests in China, yet when the powers interested felt that the time had come to

use force for the protection of the lives and property of their subjects and citizens, the international police power was successfully and harmoniously invoked. When the emergency disappeared, the greater part of the forces was withdrawn.

By no possible means could the Boxer troubles in China be said to affect the political interests of the United States in the broader sense of the word. The sole justification for American participation was the fact that the American legation and citizens in China, in common with other foreigners, were in grave danger.

It is difficult, from the world's point of view, to see any difference between the Boxer rebellion and the present state of anarchy and chaos in Mexico except perhaps in degree. Why, then, would it not be better to invoke in similar fashion the vast moral influence and repressive force which could be exercised by three or four of the leading nations of Europe acting in harmony with the United States?

The other nations of the world having substantial national and commercial interests in Mexico have every right to be consulted and, if they desire, to participate in any exercise of the international police power in that country which may be decided on. The United States, on the other hand, has the right to expect of them that they should bear their respective parts in any such necessary, but noisome, task. Furthermore, the other nations should and would agree in advance on certain general conditions under which, the contingency arising, the task should be undertaken. This is only just, and it has the sanction of precedent.

But by far the most important feature of such joint action by all the powers interested, instead of by the United States alone, is that it would be the part of common sense and prudence. It is as certain as such a thing can well be that if the United States, acting alone, should send its armed forces upon Mexican soil to oust Huerta, that very step would unite behind him a large part of the Mexican people, whatever their present opinion of Huerta may be. It is also certain that the same spirit would prevent any other sane Mexican from succeeding Huerta for any longer time than American bayonets surrounded him. These are unpleasant, but practical, facts. There is

no need to speculate at this time on their origin.

If, however, foreign intervention by force should be deemed necessary either to unseat Huerta or to seat some Constitutionalist general, or to place and hold any Mexican citizen in control of that country, it must be remembered that the assumption of the task by the United States alone means war between the Mexican and the American peoples. On the moral and physical effects of such an unholy struggle, and on its outcome, there is no need to dilate here. Suffice it to indicate that we should not be fighting to kill Huerta and his clique of congenial power-tasters, but thousands of ignorant and blameless peons, Indians, and other Mexican citizens who would be found bearing a gun in Huerta's or other ranks either through misguided patriotism, because above them would fly their country's flag, or through being pressed into military service under pain of death. For For fear of the vengeance of his own people, no rebel leader or even bandit chief in Mexico would dare ally his men with United States troops, and a war entered into with the best and highest motives would speedily lapse into a long-drawnout guerrilla struggle, with the usual degenerating effect on both sides engaged.

If, however, the Government of the United States, having determined to put an end to Huerta's régime in Mexico, or to intervene for the purpose of assisting in the choice by the people of a constitutional executive, should invite the principal European nations interested to participate in that effort by placing in coöperation with the American commander-in-chief suitable detachments of their marines and sailors, the effect of this joint action on the minds of even the densest and most ignorant of the Mexican people, as well as on the most patriotic and enlightened, would be wholly different. It would be no longer a case of a war to the death by a proud people against the "hated Yankees seeking to annex their country." Such an incitement would then fall on comparatively deaf ears. The existence and publication of an agreement of the powers among themselves that the integrity of Mexican territory was to be absolutely maintained, that no forces of any nation were to be continued on Mexican soil beyond the

time adjudged by all nations to be necessary to restore peace and order, and that the sole purpose of an intervention was to secure the establishment of some form of constitutional government by the Mexicans themselves, under the leadership of some one approximating a popular choice, would give the lie to those who sought to incite resistance through deceiving their more ignorant countrymen. Proud Mexicans might well be stirred into resisting bitterly the advance from Vera Cruz of American blue-jackets and marines alone, but would they make war on the columns under the flags of the United States and England, France, Germany, and Spain, all engaged in the same enterprise? They would hardly feel called on to fight the whole world.

The important point is that the mere reaching of an agreement to adopt this course, in case Huerta should still absolutely refuse to step down, would probably accomplish the desired result through pressure on him from inside the capital. The details of such a joint expedition could be easily arranged on the basis that the United States Government should be predominant in the common official direction of the allied forces, and that the question of indemnities to be exacted should be submitted to arbitration.

The European powers would unquestionably welcome this solution of the difficulty even at this late day, just as they would have done at any time since the opposition of the United States to the Huerta Government became known to them. Even had they, or should they now, refuse to participate with the United States on these terms, no harm would be done, and the position of the United States would be vastly stronger through having made the proposal.

Only one thing could stand in the way of President Wilson's proposing such a plan, a sentiment which will quickly find expression on the lips of many sincere, but, with all respect, misguided, fellow-citizens. It may be put thus: no foreign force should be allowed to land on Mexican soil. Yet the answer is not difficult. It is: first, that it has already been done; yet we live. Second, that having foreign war-ships patrolling the Mexican coast in company with American war-ships is not vastly different, politically or diplo

matically speaking, from a similar joint performance on land. It is merely less efficient. Third, that a mere sentiment of exclusiveness, or a belief in some divine right to sit in judgment on and police one half of the earth's habitable surface, should not be allowed to stand in the way of a common-sense solution of a serious problem, and the prompt alleviation of untold and undefinable suffering on the part of innocent people.

It is this course which should have been tried before any announcement was made to Huerta that he must go. It is to be sincerely hoped that it either has been or will be attempted. The same announcement which was actually made by President Wilson, if it had been accompanied by a statement from the powers interested, or even by one from Great Britain, that disobedience would be followed by the landing of an international expeditionary force to march on Mexico City, under the direction of a United States officer, would probably have had a vastly different effect both on Huerta himself and on his confrères and compatriots.

Once President Wilson had made up his mind to be rid of Huerta, he should manifestly have contemplated the situation to be produced by Huerta's refusal to go. Assuming that the latter would probably refuse to obey a mere admonition, President Wilson could have contemplated, if anything further at all, only one of two things-the use of force by the United States alone or in company with some other nation or nations. Yet his frequent and unqualified declarations that he would not think of forcible intervention in Mexico give the impression that the President's mind, at the time he made his declaration concerning Huerta, had never traveled so far along the path of possibilities as to contemplate Huerta's refusal. No other conclusion seems possible.

The longer one studies the events of the last eight months, the stronger grows the conviction that President Wilson, while following the dictates of his conscience, did not seem to realize the practical nature of the problems which had inevitably to follow the utterance of his dictum. He might well have withheld his admonition. to Huerta until he had formulated a definite plan of action to meet the contin

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gency of Huerta's refusal to heed it. far as any evidence goes to show, there never any plan. While granting freely that the President could not be expected to take the public fully into his confidence in such cases as this, it should have been possible to disclose a sufficiently clear general policy to serve as a rallyingpoint for public support in this country. As a matter of fact, there has been in Washington an abundance of official and semi-official commentaries and bulletins on the Mexican situation, even to suggestions through the press that the representatives of the Mexican Constitutionalists should come forward with any proposals for the settlement of the problem, but nowhere, and at no time, has any ordinary American citizen been able to know whether his Government seriously contemplated going to war to restore peace in the republic to the south of the Rio Grande. Every citizen has been compelled to guess for himself.

President Wilson knew exactly how a political criminal like Huerta ought to be dealt with, just as he knew that a thief ought to be arrested and imprisoned by due process of law. But he apparently failed to grasp the significance of the fact that in the latter case it is only a matter of catching the thief, proving his crime, and letting a law-abiding community inflict punishment, whereas in the case of Huerta the process of catching him and inflicting punishment spells war, precisely the method which President Wilson had declared that he would not countenance. Even had he not announced his proper and natural aversion to making war on Mexico, we may assume that Huerta's own knowledge of certain inevitable advantages to accrue to himself in such a contingency would lead him rather to invite hostile action by remaining in power than to commit the folly, from his point of view, of stepping down voluntarily from the place which he had risked his life and lost his reputation to attain.

The purely "moral appeal" is slowly gaining strength among civilized peoples, and no effort should be spared by those in power to extend its influence or scope. But there has not yet been developed such a new force as might be styled "moral intervention" in the affairs of another nation. Its appeal to the person against

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