Puslapio vaizdai
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induce a knowledge of the real character of the habit in those who are its victims, we might hope that a cure would be effected. They who are of a murmuring, and fretful, and complaining spirit, always think that they are perfectly justified in all the complaints which they make. They are perfectly ready to argue with you that they do not murmur without a cause. I will not dispute that matter with them. Undoubtedly there is so much of wrong in the common habits of the world-so much untruth-so much affectation-so much neglect of obvious dutyso much impertinence and obtrusiveness, that if we choose to look at these things alone, we may complain from morning to night, and from night to morning, without exhausting all the just subjects of reproof and rebuke which exist around us, and touch even ourselves. But where is the sense or value of such an employment of our time? How far is it just to observe all the wrong, and to omit all the good done for us, which might have been left undone? Even if we had a right to torment ourselves by choosing the disagreeable circumstances of life for our sole contemplation, that right could only be exercised in a state of solitude. We can have no right to indulge this morbid fancy in the society of others, who would much rather have cheerful and agreeable things brought under their consideration. In the case of those who have the charge and regulation of a house, it is particularly

selfish and wicked to indulge this habit of discontent, because the inmates of that house have a right to expect that their comfort should be studied, which cannot possibly happen so long as a murmuring and discontented spirit possesses the director and manager of the house.

There are some who mistake a careless for a contented mind. This should be well guarded against. They who think they are philosophical because they take every thing as it comes, without any effort to make it better, are philosophical at an exceedingly cheap rate. Far be it from me to recommend any such spurious contentment as this. I think it right that every effort should be made to have that which is to be done, done well. Instruction and admonition should be given where they are required, and, if reproof be absolutely necessary, it should not be spared. All this is perfectly consistent with a rationally contented spirit. Our faculties were given us to be exercised, but to be exercised under a spirit of submission, and of cheerful resignation to whatever may happen. We ought to do our best to have things as we would, but if we cannot accomplish this, we should try to make our desires conform with our means. As Terentius says—

"Quoniam non potest id fieri quod vis,
Id velis quod possit."

Since what you wish for cannot be obtain'd,
Wish for what can, and then your point is gain'd.

But chiefly let us consider in all circumstances which tempt us to murmurings and complainings, how much worse our case might be-how much we still have to enjoy-how much better we are off than many others who are quite as deserving as ourselves-and finally, how much more cause we have to be thankful than to repine.

STANDARD OF MERIT.

No one has a right to take any merit to himself for his actions, except with reference to the principle from which they flow. And here there is a very noticeable distinction to be taken between self-judgment and the judgment of the public. In general, the public can estimate with but little accuracy the motives which direct men's conduct, and are bound to consider their actions in the abstract. It is absurd, however, to say, (as some do who affect to be exceedingly liberal in their construction of conduct) that we have no right to consider motives. The contrary is the truth. We have every right to consider the motives of all actions, especially if they relate to the public, so far as we have fair and honest means of judging of them. That which we should be cautious of is, not the taking motives into account, which indeed we cannot avoid doing, however we might will it,

but of assuming motives without reasonable authority for the assumption. But with respect to ourselves, we should watch the foundation of our proceedings, and estimate them accordingly; and, if it be our object to learn the true character of any one with whom we have to do, we must consider not merely what he does, but also-so far as we have any lawful opportunitywhy he does it.

"Not always actions show the man: we find
Who does a kindness is not therefore kind;
Perhaps prosperity becalm'd his breast,
Perhaps the wind just shifted from the east.
Not therefore humble he who seeks retreat,
Pride guides his steps, and bids him shun the great;
Who combats bravely is not therefore brave,
He dreads a death-bed like the meanest slave;
Who reasons wisely is not therefore wise,
His pride in reasoning, not in acting, lies."

These lines are full of practical truth. Man is so inconsistent a creature, that we must by no means assume his general character from one action, or even a series of actions, which may seem naturally to arise from such or such internal qualities. Nor is it safe to reason without great caution, and many allowances, from what a man has done in one position, to what he will do in another, and a very different position. The upshot of the whole is, that with respect to others we must be content to go upon general experience, and to make up our minds that we shall often find ourselves very much

mistaken. But with respect to ourselves, we have duties to follow, in which we may assure ourselves there is no mistake; and if the results be different from what we have hoped for, owing to the perverseness of others from whom we expected better things, we have a right to console ourselves with having diligently attended to our own responsibilities. It is indeed often more meritorious to fail, than to succeed, where success could only have been achieved by a sort of knowledge to which virtue and nobleness of mind cannot stoop.

DECEPTION.

ROCHEFOUCAULD says, that it is as easy to deceive ourselves without perceiving it, as it is difficult to deceive others without their perceiving it. This is antithetical enough; but the maxim seems to have a fault, not very common to the French philosopher, of being too flattering to human nature. It may very well be questioned whether we really deceive ourselves half so often as we would sometimes be willing to pretend as an excuse for the follies of which we are guilty. It is not so very often that one goes wrong without a consciousness of the wrong-doing. It is often a vague perception, and rather an instinct of wrong, than an account taken by the judgment of what we are

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