FREE AGENCY OF MAN. 33 pride, but take their rise from the original frame of human nature; and if so, their author is God himself, and they must be founded in truth. He would not inspire his creatures with hopes and wishes, that have nothing in nature to gratify them. (7.) The apprehensions of wicked men in regard to the punishments of a future state have equally a foundation in nature. They seem to have been implanted by the Creator, to restrain men from crime in this life, and to operate as a motive to virtue; and they answer this purpose to a valuable extent. (8.) Another argument is founded on the unequal distribution of good and evil in the present life. This argument is noticed in a preceding chapter, and needs not to be repeated here. These and other arguments render highly probable the doctrine of man's future existence after death: but no absolute certainty can be attained respecting it, except by examining the pages of that invaluable communication from God, which has "brought immortality to light;" not only declaring the fact, but disclosing the circumstances of man's future being, and thus furnishing the most powerful motives to rectitude of conduct in the present life. So, when the tomb's dull silence finds an end, There shall the good of earth be found at last, WILLIS G. CLARK. III.-Free Agency and Accountability of Man. It has been shown in a previous chapter, that man is under a moral government. To fit him for this state he is constituted a free agent. He is endowed with intellectual and active powers; he has judgment to know the meaning of a commandment, and ability to obey it. By moral government, we understand the establishment and operation of laws for the direction of rational beings, and the enforcing those laws by rewards and punish B* 34 FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. ments. The subject of such a government must be a free agent. 56. By the liberty of a moral agent, we understand a power over the determinations of his own will. Every man has a conviction that he is free, and acts toward others in the persuasion that they also are free. Our deliberations, purposes, and promises, all suppose this liberty in ourselves; and our advices, exhortations, and commands suppose it in others. On this subject philosophers may talk; but consciousness and experience decide. I am conscious of freedom. I can weigh motives and desires; I can judge which are most consonant to sound reason, and to my best interest; and yet can decline regulating my conduct by them. I can choose and refuse. I can act agreeably to the convictions of my understanding, or I can pursue a different course. Advice and exhortation may influence conduct, but they do not impair liberty. The same is the case with motives; they may prompt to action, but they do not act. A necessary agent, whose actions are as irresistibly determined by desires or motives as a stone in falling to the ground is by the great law of gravitation, cannot be the subject of moral government. He is incapable of virtue and vice, and unfit for reward and punishment. 57. Moral responsibility is the subjection of a moral agent, that is, one capable of moral conduct, to rewards and punishments. Moral accountability is the liableness of a subject of law to the approbation or disapprobation of the lawgiver, on the ground of right, equity, and truth. Man is placed under the precepts and sanctions of law, as has been briefly shown on preceding pages. One of the great characteristics of that law is utility; or, in other words, it prescribes what the Deity, in his boundless wisdom, saw would be best, not merely for one or a few individuals, but for all; best for all if all were to obey it. Abundant proof of this position will be found in the latter part of this volume, in the comments on the Ten Commandments. 58. This law, to some extent, is intimated to us by reason and the moral faculty, and by an observation of the course of nature. Reason (the faculty by which we distinguish truth from error, and combine means for the attainment of ends), pondering all the phenomena, instructs us to revere the Deity; to exercise justice, candor, and mercy toward our fellow-men; and to cherish temperance, fortitude, and diligence in our several avocations. But, for the discovery of the great outlines of the will of God and duty of man, we are not left to the exercise of reason alone. Conscience, or the moral faculty (that by which we distinguish between right and wrong), comes in to the aid of reason; and by reason and conscience all men may perceive the great features of moral law. Accordingly, there are certain dispositions and actions which have been always applauded or commended, and others which as generally have been the subjects of censure and detestation. All men approve of piety, benevolence, integrity, veracity, temperance, fortitude, industry: all men disapprove of contrary dispositions and conduct. Reason and the moral faculty may be perverted. This perversion however results from the abuse of free agency; and for it, mankind have themselves to blame. Man is a free agent; but his body, his mind, and nature around him, are so constituted, that if he exercise his freedom in an irregular, capricious manner, in defiance of the dictates of reason and conscience, he must suffer a corresponding loss of happiness, or degree of pain. 59. IV. Man, even in his present state, is happy or unhappy, rewarded or punished, as he obeys or disobeys the law. This demonstration of a moral government has been treated in Book I. chap. 3. See also Fergus on Nature and Revelation, Book III. chap. 5. 60. V. Exercise and trial are powerful means of improvement, and sources of happiness. The constitution of nature, and the government of the Creator, are such as to call forth our bodily exertions, and to solicit and encourage the exercise of our intellectual and moral capacities. Under these trials, if we act wisely, we shall make the most rapid progress in improvement. In this pro gress, the present life soon comes to a close; but we are immortal beings, and we have reason to think that there is an intimate connection between the present and the future, and that the great scheme, which is evidently going on at present, will be continued in a future state of being. [Fergus.] 36 VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE. 53. Prominent characteristics by which man is honorably distinguished from the other inhabitants of this world? 54. As a rational being, how is he distinguished from other animals? 55. What are some of the arguments by which we satisfy ourselves, independently of revelation, that man is destined to be an immortal being? 56. What do we understand by the liberty of a moral agent? 57. What do we understand by the responsibility and accountability of man? 58. How far is this law intimated to us by reason and the moral faculty; and how far does the course of nature countenance and support it? 59. On what does the happiness of man, in the present state, greatly depend? 60. Of what service to man is the present state of probation and discipline in which he is placed? CHAPTER II. THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE. SECTION I-ITS NATURE AND OPERATION. 61. THE voluntary principle is that power of the mind by which it determines to act, or not to act, in those cases which depend on its own determination: the act of the mind in thus determining, is denominated volition. : The will must be influenced before any active energy is put forth it becomes important therefore to ascertain those principles of our nature which, on account of their exerting this influence, have been termed active and moral; and to the operation of which we trace every virtue and every crime, from the deeds of beneficence by which the names of patriots and legislators have been consecrated, to the guilty ambition which treads in blood to the attainment of its object. 62. Those human actions which are performed independently of an act of the will, are termed involuntary. There are others which, because they partake of the nature of voluntary and involuntary actions, are called mixed; they are under the power of the will, but are generally performed without it. Voluntary actions may be distinguished from all others by this, that they are done with a view to some object; and proceed from the volitions of a being possessing reason and intelligence; whereas those which result from the principles called instincts, are generally, if not always, per RELATION OF MOTIVES TO VOLITION. 37 formed without any previous conception of them. This remark applies also to things which, though originally done by conscious volition, are afterward performed by habit. Thus we often shut and open our eyes without the consciousness of any such operation. 63. Whatever incites man to act is called a principle of action. It is difficult to give a complete enumeration of the various exciting causes by which all men are influenced. It is to be observed also that the same train of actions may proceed from different principles: and again, actions which seem to spring from one or two principles may actually proceed from many. [Dewar's Moral Philosophy.] 64. The chief springs of action in the constitution of man are, the appetites; the affections; the desires; the moral faculty, or conscience. The nature of these we shall briefly set forth, after offering an explanation of the influence of motives. 61. How may this principle be described? 62. With respect to the will, how are human actions distinguished? 63. What do philosophers mean by a principle of action? 64. What are the chief principles or springs of action, in the constitution of man? SECTION II.-INFLUENCE OF MOTIVES. Nature of the relation between Volition and the circumstances on which its regularity depends. 65. THE circumstances in which we are placed, in so far as volition is regulated by them, are usually called motives. Motives therefore are not a distinct set of entities (existences), but any kind of entities whatsoever that influence volition. Pleasure, for instance, may be a motive; friendship, or enmity may be a motive; a favorable season may be a motive, an unfavorable season may be a motive; fire, water, snow, and ice, may each be a motive. In short, everything in the universe which the mind can conceive, may become a motive. 66. The relation between motives and volitions may be understood from the following observations: (1.) Nothing can be regarded as a motive unless we have some knowledge of it. (2.) Motives do not operate physically or spontaneously, |