and of no other cause whatever; and this remark applies perhaps to the whole of Russian America, but with greater force to " the whole of that part of the coast which constitutes the subject of discussion and which extends from 59° north latitude to 54° 40'."

It is to be observed, that beyond the general mention of islands in the first sentence of Art. III., and the particular mention of Prince of Wales Island necessitated by its cession as an island to Russia, the other islands are not mentioned. This is not because their existence is ignored, but simply that as far as the objects of the treaty are in question there is nothing in the fact of their being islands, to distinguish them from the continent to which they belong. As the Americans have been insistent in pointing out, the negotiators knew so little of the local details that masses of land, that have since been discovered to consist of numerous islands, must then have been considered as peninsular, and what have since become known as straits, must then have been regarded as the estuaries of rivers; these would be the "rivers" of the treaty, the freedom of which for the purposes of commerce, was intended to be vested for ever in the sovereignty of Great Britain. From the above mentioned considerations it appears reasonable to suppose, that at the time the treaty was made neither Russian or Briton had the slightest idea that behind the continental coast that bounded the ocean, lay hidden away a "mainland coastline," and that consequently it was impossible either should have contemplated such a "coast" as the base of the ten league limitation.

"It is to be observed that the reasons that induced Russia to desire this lisière were purely commercial, and Count Nesselrode, writing to Count Lieven, pointed out in April, 1824, that if Prince of Wales Island remained Russian it would be useful to Russia; otherwise the Russian establishment would be at the mercy of Great Britain." This expression of opinion by one Russian to another, has been successfully used by the United States, to obtain the surrender of British territory now, that it was quite unable to effect when the letters were written and when

the character of their contents was more correctly appreciated.

There is little room for doubt, these letters were written with a full knowledge and determination to take advantage of the principles of British diplomacy and the clerical methods of the Foreign Office; in the archives of which it must be known such letters are put on record without being stigmatized by any comment on the nature of their contents, as: "This is a lie, the writer knows we have repudiated this assumption again and again." "This statement is not borne out by the facts; under certain conditions it might be so, and it is our business to be certain such conditions shall not become established." There appear to be several of these letters in the "Appx. Br. Case," not directly addressed to the British Minister and demanding an answer that would be placed on record with them. The wonder is they should have been placed on record at all, or be accepted by any person of observant and logical habits as having the slightest value as evidence, except perhaps, of the writer's own wishes. The effect of such unbalanced assertions upon the legal mind is shown in Mr. Aylesworth's comment : "From the time of Count Nesselrode's refusal to treat as to reciprocal trading rights elsewhere than in the lisière and Mr. Canning's acquiescence in such refusal, no further negotiations whatever on that subject took place." Of course not. Canning's reply was, in effect, that if Russia would not sign the treaty in the form proposed Britain was prepared to assert her rights by force. What evidence is there to show that the "establishment" Count Nesselrode was so anxious should not be at the mercy of Great Britain, existed anywhere but in his hopes of the future? The more insistent the Russian pretensions the more determined British Ministers would be to limit their extension either in area or duration. The protection to Russian commercial interests was assured, not by ceding large areas to her rule, but by the undertaking that British subjects should not settle within the limits assigned to Russian trade. This, as well as the other conditions "on which it was impossible Russia should give way,"―till the right kind of pressure was applied—were such

as are utterly inconsistent with the idea that Britain recognised any claims of Russia to sovereignty upon this continent. The theory of Canada, as well as of the United States in this matter, appears to be, that far from careless indifference to their retention Britain never had any rights on this part of the continent to surrender; and that every provision in the treaty to her advantage has been placed there by the generosity of Russia. Even the free navigation of rivers crossing the Russian territory, and which appear to have been reserved to Britain for ever, (the only provision of the treaty to which these significant words are applied,) meant only a freedom during Russia's pleasure. This being the case, how can we fitly gage the insolence, the impotent impudence of the demands against which Count Nesselrode so firmly set his face; and all made under the hypocritical pretense of an appeal to the sense of justice, and a desire to avoid inflicting unnecessary humiliation! A nation that professes such principles in dealing with its weaker neighbours, shows itself a fit and promising object for spoliation by diplomatic lying.

There appears a difference in attitude regarding the ownership of the islands, the United States takes them as a matter of course, and says nothing about it; while British and Canadians appear to be under an emotional necessity to make a confession of faith, that these islands were so really and truly Russian before the treaty, that they were completely forgotten-or ignored— "exactly as though they had never existed." (As islands?) As no particular part of the preliminary correspondence has been cited in support of this contention, it is only reasonable to suppose there are none sufficiently explicit, but the conviction is derived from vague general impressions only.