the geographical suggestion by which this nauseous insinuation. is sugar-coated; these suggestive questions are here repeated in minuter detail, so that if they lose on the question of the admitted exclusiveness of their possession, they may miss no chance of obtaining the territorial concessions by which this exclusiveness may be maintained; well understanding, that if anyone stood on her own corns, Great Britain would not wait for relief till the aggressor was at leisure to listen to a suggestion to move on ".

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It is evident from the substance of LORD ALVERSTONE'S JUDGMENT, in answer to the 5th Question, that he was either unconscious of the application to the commercial interests of Canada of the exclusiveness it asserted, or that he admitted this to be the intention of the Treaty; the closing paragraph of his answer implies that the latter is the correct interpretation of his convictions. He must have considered it his duty to form an opinion entirely by the evidence presented before the Tribunal, apart from any prepossessions of his own that might be derived. from general knowledge, or from any independent investigations he might have undertaken.

It appears there is here a contributory cause of the loss we have sustained; the Canadian case seems to have entirely neglected this assertion of exclusiveness, by which the objects and provisions of the original treaty are actually reversed. This, in fact, was the only really vital question that was before the Tribunal; it is difficult to find an excuse for this neglect unless in a conviction that this question was one of those that had been excluded from consideration. No doubt the United States strove to produce this impression, but in an obscurity that is perhaps not in keeping with its importance, the assertion is sufficiently in evidence to justify an assumption that the Tribunal has deliberately answered this question in the affirmative.

It is no question NOW between the two countries, as to what the intention of the former treaty may have been, but what was the intention and meaning of the Tribunal at the time

the Award was given; the asssumption of an exclusive intention was utterly untenable in face of the incidents developed by the Dryad affair. And though it is not to be supposed that any other consideration than the interests of the United States, would affect the Judgment of the Commissioners they sent, a sufficient exposition of the falsity of this pretence would have convinced the world of the nefariously extortionate nature of these claims upon the territory and commercial freedom of Canada.

Even could it be shown, that the Boundary of the Award has the remotest resemblance to the Boundary of the Treaty, its spirit would demand that British subjects should have free bonding privileges and access through such concession, by rail or other customary modes of transit, to or from British ships lying in the harbours of the coast, and be liable to no other charges than would be collected from the subjects of whatever Power might, by any change of ownership, be in occupation of the same territory. Such freedom of transit, appears so inherent a right to enjoy and duty of civilization to grant, that its refusal from no better reason than an extortionate intention, is sufficient to justify any method of warfare by which the right may be recovered.

We may consider then, that what has been answered in the affirmative as the 5th Question, is simply: In extending the line of demarcation northward—was it the intention and meaning of the said Convention of 1825 that there should remain in the exclusive possession of Russia a continuous strip of coast on the mainland, from the 56° of north latitude, to the 141° of west longitude, separating the British possessions from the bays, ports, inlets, havens and waters of the ocean? And also, that the 6th has been answered in the sense that the width of the strip is to be measured from the heads of the inlets.

Shortly stated; the difficulty in locating this part of the boundary line, is the meaning to be attached to certain geographical terms as used in the treaty. There are three almost equally misused by the disputants and misunderstood by the public,

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they are Ocean ", "coast", and "continent "; the three include the water, the land, and the line of contact that equally separates or joins them; all in fact that is contained in the Treaty.

The writer remembers as a boy at school, finding the first chapter of the class geography occupied by the definitions of the meanings and use of the terms employed. It would not be surprising to find that for the last sixty years, and under the guidance of American ideals, these definitions-in anything like a precise form-have been omitted from the text books used in Canadian schools; while much ingenuity has been devoted to depriving some of these terms of their distinctive meaning.

There is no ambiguity about the meaning of the word ocean", it always means THE OCEAN and nothing else. Lawyers may apply the same processes of reasoning to the OCEAN, as Theologians do to the "substance" of the DEITY, and imagine they can introduce through tortuous channels into their own backyard, a body of water that in its narrowest part is thousands of » miles wide; but when they have done it to their own satisfaction, the OCEAN remains as it ever was. So with the word "coast", this is the rocky margin of the land, which holds back the ceasless warfare of the waves from further encroachment. The idea expressed in the word "coast" is so exclusively appropriate to the OCEAN, that the term "ocean coast" would be almost as superfluously absurd as would be "foot heel" applied to human anatomy; the word may be borrowed from the ocean, but in this case it must be prefaced by the name of that to which it is lent, as the "sea coast". Its inherent character is not altered by the careless omission of the words that should express the neighbourhood of the COAST; a strip of coast" conveys an idea that can be correctly defined only by a paraphrase, as, “a strip of territory bounded on one side by the coast". In this sense, Lord Alverstone is correct in objecting to accept "the word'coast' being used with two meanings in the same clause ;" the "coast" of the Treaty, whatever form of expression is used, is simply the line of contact between the ocean and the continent.

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The use made of the word "continent ", by which the English people designate the mainland of Europe, as distinguished from the island they inhabit, affords some justification for a similar application of the term in relation to the northwest coast of America; but this use of the word, even in England, is colloquial rather than technical. On the Atlantic coast the islands of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia are considered as part of the continent, though they are much larger and more detached than are the islands on the part of the Pacific coast in question.

Lord Alverstone, as does every one else in relation to this dispute, appears to understand the word "continent" as having been used with the intention of distinguishing the mainland from the islands by which it is bordered ; this is a misuse of the word that makes it very difficult to follow his reasoning, and more difficult to state some objections thereto, and quite impossible to arrive at a correct understanding of the terms of the Treaty, as the word does not appear to be used in this sense therein.

If the word "continent" as used in the Treaty, is to be understood as "mainland" in this exclusive sense, it follows that the expression "coast of the continent" must be understood as meaning the coast of the mainland; and in consequence, as the "coast" is the landward limit of the Ocean, the "ocean" of the Treaty must be considered as including the islands and the channels by which they are separated from the mainland.

Mr. Ch. Robinson, K.C., in his address before the Tribunal, states: "It was admitted on both sides that the Treaty intended Russia to have the islands." In his "DISSENT" Mr.Aylesworth says: "In this treaty the Powers were, with reference to the lisière, dealing with mainland coast alone, and in that regard, speaking and contracting exactly as though no islands existed and as though the shore of the mainland was washed by the open sea." In acknowledging the receipt of a paper, he also states: "The diplomatic correspondence preceding the Treaty clearly demonstrated that Russia insisted upon-and England conceded-a strip of mainland along the coast of the Continent in addition to

the islands north of the 55° of north latitude. Great Britain was not to have any part of any of the islands north of the boundary line which starts from the southernmost point of Prince of Wales Island." It is unfortunate that no one in connection with the Award of the Tribunal has placed on record the exact words of the correspondence on which this conviction is founded.

The writer, with a view to discover if it is possible to condense the argument, has given considerable attention to Lord Alverstone's answer to the 5th Question; the following is an attempt to express these reasons somewhat more concisely.

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'Stated shortly, . . I have come to the conclusion . . that the boundary was to run round the heads of the inlets, and not to cross them.

The language of the Treaty of 1825 does not of itself enable this question to be answered distinctly-on the contrary, it contains the ambiguities which have given rise to the discussion upon the one side and the other.. Paragraph 2 of Article III. states that the line of demarcation shall follow the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast. It is in my opinion correctly pointed out, on behalf of the United States, that the word 66 coast is an ambiguous term, and may be used in two, possibly in more than two senses. . . This is the clause upon which the question really depends. . . Article IV., however, is of importance, as it may tend to throw light upon what was the meaning of the word "coast" in Article III., and the words in paragraph 2 of Article IV. are wherever the summits of the mountains which extend in a direction parallel to the coast from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude shall prove to be at a distance of more than ten marine leagues from the ocean. '. . There cannot be any question that the word " coast " in Articles

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I. and II. refers to the north-west coast of America. In Article III. the opening words "upon the coast of the continent" also refer to the north-west coast of America. The first ambiguity arises upon the word " coast in the phrase "parallel to the coast " in the description of the boundary in Article III., and as to the word coast" in the words parallel to the coast" in the second paragraph of Article IV., and the words "the line of coast" and "the windings of the coast in the same paragraph. Article V. does not bear directly on the question in dispute, but the words " or upon the border of the continent" ( lisière de terre ferme "), which follow the words "upon the coast, "afford some slight guide to the meaning of the word "coast" in Article III. The word coast" in Article VI. evidently means the coast of the continent as it is in contrast with the words ocean and the interior.

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Considering these various passages, and the use made of the word