have been misquoted in exactly the opposite sense before the Alaskan Tribunal, by the ATTORNEY-GENERAL; who, it is to be supposed, must have been primed to that effect by his Canadian brief; an incident suggestive of the comparative degree of care in the appreciation of the value of original documents, by the respective parties. THE TIMES report makes the ATTORNEYGENERAL say: "George Canning insisted upon the boundary of the mountains as the limit of the lisière, but care must be taken that we do not assign to Russia immense tracts of inland territory where she only intended to ask for a strip of coast with respect to Sitka. Canning agreed to the term of ten years, subject to equal treatment in renewal of the term with other powers. (?) The negotiation, he said, was essentially about limits, and the British Government demanded the repeal of an offensive and unjustifiable arrogation of exclusive jurisdiction over an unmeasured ocean.

The following, from THE TIMES of Sept 4, is extracted as furnishing much useful information and some material for comment, from a paper the writer of which speaks of " our Canadian statesmen, " but otherwise, much might have been written from Washington.

THE ALASKA BOUNDARY CASE.

(FROM A CORRESPONDENT.)

Until quite recently the occasions when Alaska has come before the public mind have been few and far between. The publication of the Russian Ukase of September 4, 1821, prohibiting all foreign vessels from approaching within less than 100 Italian miles of the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, including the whole North-west coast of North America, was one of these. Vigorous protests were made at once by both Great Britain and the United States. Russia framed excuses and procrastinations. Mr. George Canning and Sir Charles Bagot made use of all sources of persuasion, but seemingly without avail. An explosion seemed inevitable, and it finally came when the elder Canning wrote to Mr. Stratford Canning, who had succeeded Sir Charles Bagot, that, if Russia deferred any longer renunciation of her absurd claims to the monopoly of navigation within 100 Italian miles of her coasts, "she must not take it amiss that we resort to some mode of recording in the face of the world our protest against the pretensions of the

Ukase of 1821.”

The convention between Great Britain and Russia for settlement of all disputes between the two countries on the north-west coast of North America followed, it was signed at St. Petersburg, February 28 (16), 1829. The negotiators, in their correspondence, agreed to put on one side questions of prior occupation and all arguments based on strict right. On the Russian side were the posts and establishments of the Russian American Company, and on the other side those of the Hudson Bay Company. The main guide in laying down the line of dermacation was to draw it so as to separate the posts of the companies on the mainland and islands, so that a Russian post would not find itself inside British lines, and vice versa. This rule, however, was soon departed from. As the Russians possessed no trading posts upon the mainland, the line should have been drawn along the channels between the continent and the islands. They insisted, however, on having a fringe of coast opposite the islands, as a support to their island posts. This fringe was variously described in the negotiations as une portion de territoire sur la côte," une simple lisière du continent," "un médiocre espace de terre ferme," a 'point d'appui," and "the strip of land required by Russia." This strip or lisière was conceded by the British. The British proposed an astronomical line or meridian of longitude. The Russians preferred a natural boundary. Sir Charles Bagot suggested the seaward base of the mountains which border the coast. The Russians replied that the base of the mountains might extend to the waters of the sea itself, and proposed the summit of the coast mountains instead of the base. The British readily agreed to this, but, as the treaty was being negotiated in St. Petersburg, far away from the territory in question, and on very slight geographical knowledge, they insisted that, should the mountains at any place recede more than ter marine leagues from the coast, the line for that space should be an artificial line drawn at ten marine leagues from the coast and parallel to its sinuosities.

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The sentence: "The negotiators, in their correspondence, agreed to put on one side questions of prior occupation and all arguments based on strict right," appears to supply a key to one of the causes of failure, in a want of that sentiment of pride in the character of their diplomatic service that is usually felt by well-educated Britons. The source of this pride is in the maxim: First be sure you are right, then stick to it. The opposite sentiment is reasonable enough, as part of the game of casting discredit on the Treaty, by holding the declarations of British Ministers of less value than the exaggerated claims of Russians. The proper place for the man who would agree to put on one

side, "all arguments based on strict right ", is behind a bargain counter. The inevitable effect of such a sentence, unless it is consciously condemned by a logical appreciation of the motives by which it may have been prompted, is to prepare the mind to accept the probability of any concessions to Russia, however plausible or opposed to the rights of Britain, or the eventualities of HISTORY. We may find from this account that the rights of Russia on the north-west coast of this continent, were of an even less substantial character than the United States might discover as a result of slave trading ventures in Central Africa. We see that in these negotiations, Russia was allowed the most ample opportunity, to revise and correct the terms in which the treaty was expressed, in such a manner as to clearly indicate the nature of the concessions that were made to her; so that it is safe to conclude that nothing was given that is not explicitly defined in the Treaty. The narative continues:

The "affair of the Dryad" in 1834 attracted British attention towards Alaska for a time. Notwithstanding that by the treaty of 1825 Russia had guaranteed Great Britain freedom of navigation of the riveru of Alaska for ever, in May, 1834, Barron Wrangell, a post captain in the Emperor's navy and principal superintendent of the Russian American Company's affairs on the north-west coast of America, opposed an armed force to Chief Trader Ogden, of the Hudson Bay Company, and prevented him proceeding up the Stikine river in the Dryad for the purpose of establishing a trading post inland. The Hudson Bay Company, in consequence, claimed over £22,000 damages to its business interests. Russia, after a long correspondence in which she sought to excuse the conduct of Baron Wrangell, finally offered full apology to Great Britain. The question of damages remained an open one until it was finally settled, in June, 1840, by the Hudson Bay Company's taking over from the Russian American Fur Company its lease of a portion of the coast. The Hudson Bay Company remained lessee of the territory until the cession of Alaska to the United States in 1867. Until 1867 the whole mainland coast and interior of Alaska remained a vast fur preserve under lease to one or other of the great fur companies. During the more than paternal rule of the Russian American Company, with the exception of the Dryad incident, not a sound had been heard from its distant shores. Nor has it ever been the wont of the Hudson Bay Company to attract attention to the vast dominions under its control. The outside world hardly knew of the exist

ence of Alaska till 1867.

From the date of the treaty of 1825 until 1886 British vessels, in common with those of all other nations, navigated and fished in the non-territorial waters of Behring Sea wlthout hindrance or protest. In the latter year the Thornton was arrested by the United States while fishing 70 miles south-east of St. George's Island. The vessel was condemned and the master and mate fined and imprisoned. The British schooners Caroline and Onward were seized about the same time in similar circumstances, and were afterwards condemned. Other seizures of British vessels by the United States in non-territorial waters followed. The charge was that they were found killing fur seals "within the limits of Alaska territory and in the waters thereof." Great Britain protested, and by the treaty of 1892 the jurisdictional rights of the United States in Behring Sea-the claim, in fact, that it was mare clausum— were submitted to arbitration. The Behring Sea Tribunal found that the pretensions put forward by the United States were absolutely without warrant of any kind. The Behring Sea Claims Commission subsequently, in 1897, determined the extent to which the United States was liable to Great Britain in respect of the claims on behalf of the owners, masters, officers, and crews of the different vessels at about half a million dollars. In 1892, Russia seized several Canadian schooners. Two of the seizures were decided to be irregular, and the Russian Government paid $40,078.75 compensation.

In the period following the signing of the treaty, all the conditions of the Coast were favorable to the extension of the Russian claims. Recent developments have shown that the United States was, perhaps, the conscious heir of all to which Russia could advance a claim ; while Britain had no interests that called for official attention, or that were not confided to the care of the Hudson Bay Company. If Russia had any rights upon the Coast except such as resulted from the terms of the treaty, it is incredible she should have assented to an agreement that failed to explicitly admit them. The "affair of the Dryad," was a direct violation of the terms of the treaty, that, automatically, severed the bond under which Russia enjoyed reciprocal advantages, a severance that a simple "apology" was not sufficient to replace.

Russia, apparently, and probably the Hudson Bay Co. also, were conscious of this result, and the former seems to have placed so little value upon her rights under the treaty, that after hesitating several years, rather than pay the £22,000 damages,

such rights as they had were finally abandoned to the Hudson Bay Company. It is true, this account of the transaction has never been, nor was it likely to have been, published by authority; but let us, for a time at least, put aside sentiment, and look at the matter in the practical light of individual self-interest. The Hudson Bay Co. has never been accused of placing too high a value, as a commercial asset, upon an exaggerated sense of loyalty to the British Crown, or the national interests it represents.

It would be interesting to have more light upon the actual relations of the various Fur Companies that have carried on business in the North West Territories. If it has been an instance of the survival of the fittest, we may be certain it was not only by close dealing in furs, the H. B. Co. succeeded in remaining in possession till the last.

That Russia should give up her Alaskan claim, for a sum that now appears absurdly small, when compared with the value that the same claim apparently has since assumed, may be matter of surprise only because of our ignorance of the actual value then, to Russia, of the claims, when perhaps they were nothing more than simple trading rights over a mere "fringe" of the territory the United States have since succeeded in obtaining. The Hudson Bay Co. held the greater part of their trading territory under a lease from the British Crown, as tenants only, but whatever portion of the continent they could cover with the colour of a Russian concession, would, for all practical purposes, become their own freehold; from which they could exclude all competitors, by whatever measures of severity they chose to put in practice, as there would be no authority to which an appeal in mitigation could be addressed, or any legitimate power by which they could be restrained.

For such an "estate" the United States would be the only possible purchaser, and when the federation of the Canadas became imminent, now or never, would be the time for its accomplishment. As soon as the Dominion became established, and Canadian statesmen found time to look into the matter of the