corresponding responsibility. The British Empire will not justify its continued existence if it does not everywhere maintain the great principles upon which it was founded-justice, liberty, progress, equality, pure and free religion. But if the Lambeth Conference and the Pan-Anglican Congress shall stamp upon the hearts of all members of the Church of England a deep sense of moral and spiritual responsibility for the Empire, they will not be held in vain; they will be inspiring sources of a consecrated imperial energy to which it is difficult even in thought to set a limit.

J. E. C. WELL DON.

THE CULT OF THE MONSTER WARSHIP

THE cult of the 'monster' warship has flourished greatly during the last three years, and has affected naval construction in all maritime countries. Very large increases have been made in the dimensions, displacements, and costs of battleships and armoured cruisers, as compared with vessels of similar classes previously constructed. Underlying these increases is the assumption that the true principles of design necessarily involve successive additions to the size and cost of individual warships. Enthusiastic supporters of the policy, in fact, contemplate and announce the possibility, at no remote date, of vessels being built which will make the warships of 1908 seem puny and ineffective. In view of these circumstances it is not surprising that cooler heads, familiar with naval history and desiring to profit as fully as may be from the study of past experience in naval warfare, express doubts of the wisdom of recent changes; refuse to accept as conclusive the present universal adoption of the 'big-ship' idea; and urge reasons for reconsideration of a policy that was hastily adopted, and will involve most serious consequences if it is followed slavishly. This policy is based on the assumption that the concentration in each capital' ship of an exceptionally powerful armament in association with strong defence, high speed, and great coal-endurance, is essential to success in future naval campaigns. It may be tersely described as the 'policy of Goliath.' It involves immensely increased expenditure on each unit, while it fails to provide safeguards against some of the most serious risks incidental to modern naval warfare. It makes difficult the provision of the numbers of ships required for the protection of the British Empire, with its widespread and varied interests; unless a total expenditure is incurred which must be enormous, and of which the amount has never been stated, even approximately, by advocates of the system. In essence, the policy merely revives an old idea, frequently proposed and to some extent adopted here and elsewhere; but the scale and extent of its present applications go far beyond precedent, and raise most serious issues which certainly ought to be faced. As one familiar with the history of warship construction since the ironclad era began, the writer is naturally much interested in the controversy. He now proposes to

state the case as fairly and fully as he can, within the limits which have been assigned, and to indicate his personal conclusions.

In order that the recent exceptional increase of size and cost of individual warships-initiated in 1905 by laying down the Dreadnought and ordering three armoured cruisers of the Invincible class— may be understood by readers unfamiliar with technical matters, a brief preliminary explanation is necessary.

INCREASED SIZE OF RECENT WARSHIPS

Warships are usually compared by stating their lengths, breadths, draughts of water, and 'displacement' tonnages. Lengths and breadths, of course, are fixed quantities in any ship; draughts of water and displacements vary as changes occur in the weights of coal, ammunition, and consumable stores which are carried. Fair comparisons between warships can be made therefore only by taking their condition when fully laden and ready for sea-service-with bunkers full and the maximum weights of stores and ammunition, &c., on board. The draught of water with ships fully laden is termed the 'deep-load' draught; the total weight of a ship and all she carries when floating at that draught is the displacement tonnage by which she should be measured in order that she may be compared fairly with other ships also fully laden. Tabulated lists of warships, however, usually give figures for draughts of water and displacement tonnages which do not represent' deep-load' conditions; the tabulated figures nearly always correspond to conditions existing when ships float at arbitrarily assigned draughts of water, termed 'normal' draughts, with 'legend' conditions of weights on board. At these normal' draughts the bunkers are only partially filled with coal, the stores and ammunition may be incomplete; consequently the total weights (displacement tonnages) of the ships corresponding to normal draughts of water are much less than the tonnages at deep load. In the Royal Navy List for British ships, for example, and in similar official Lists for foreign ships, there appear only displacement tonnages corresponding to 'normal' draughts, and not to deep-load draughts. Moreover, the excesses of deep-load displacement tonnages of ships over their so-called 'normal' displacements vary greatly; not merely as between the warships of different countries-whose naval authorities adopt different rules for fixing 'normal' conditionsbut as between the warships built at different dates for the same navy. This point is of great importance, and it may be well to illustrate it by a few examples, which will also bring into relief the new departure in rules for 'normal' draught and displacement which was made when the Dreadnought and Invincible classes were designed. As a consequence of that new departure the real increases made in the deep-load displacement tonnages of these and later ships have

been masked and minimised. It is not asserted, of course, that any improper motive influenced the changes then made; but their effect ought to be understood. The following facts and figures, it should be explained, are not based on confidential information, but on Parliamentary Papers and other authoritative statements, from which any trained naval architect can make the deductions made by the writer.

According to official papers presented to Parliament, the normal draught of the Dreadnought is 26 feet 6 inches; the corresponding displacement is 17,900 tons. The Civil Lord of the Admiralty not long ago informed the House of Commons that when the Dreadnought is fully loaded her draught of water is 31 feet 6 inches; to this draught there must correspond a displacement tonnage of about 22,200 tons. The sinkage' of 5 feet from normal to deep-load draught occurring in the Dreadnought has never been approached in previous British warships. The corresponding increase in displacement-24 per cent. of the 'normal' or Navy List tonnage is also altogether exceptional. Taking the battleships of the King Edward class—the last of a long series designed by the writer-the contrast of conditions becomes more apparent. For the King Edwards the designed 'normal' draught is 26 feet 9 inches; their Navy List displacement is 16,350 tons; their deep-load draught, ready for sea, with fuel supply complete, is a little less than 28 feet 5 inches; the corresponding displacement is about 17,500 tons. The sinkage' from normal to deep-load draught in the King Edwards is not quite 20 inches-less than onethird of the sinkage of the Dreadnought; the corresponding increase in displacement is 7 per cent. of the normal (Navy List) displacement. In other British battleships built from 1889 to 1902 the increase in displacement from normal to deep-load draught has varied from about 4 to 8 per cent. of the Navy List displacement; the sinkage (from normal to deep-load draught) has varied from 10 to 20 inches. These figures indicate the magnitude of the changes made in fixing the so-called 'normal' conditions in the design of the Dreadnought class; and the effect which an arbitrary selection of the load of coal, &c., to be carried at normal draught has upon the reputed displacement. Had the sinkage' accepted in previous battleships been adopted for the Dreadnought, her Navy List displacement would have been stated as 20,800 tons instead of 17,900 tons; and the recorded increase over the King Edward class would have been about 4450 tons instead of 1550 tons now given in official returns. In the Dreadnought design therefore, if the ordinary rules previously in use are applied, there is an increase of more than 27 per cent. on the Navy List displacement tonnage of the King Edward class. Its relative importance can be judged from the statement that the Royal Sovereign class designed in 1888 were of 14,150 tons; the King Edward class, designed in 1901, were of 16,350 tons-an increase of 2200 tons in

thirteen years, and of about 15.5 per cent. on the Navy List displacement tonnage of the Royal Sovereigns. The deep-load displacement of the Royal Sovereign class was about 14,700 tons, and that of the King Edward class is 17,500 tons, while that of the Dreadnought is increased, at one step, to 22,200 tons. These are the figures requiring to be kept in mind, and not the reputed displacements appearing in the Navy List and in Parliamentary Papers.

Later vessels of the Dreadnought type have a normal draught of 27 feet, the Téméraire group having a Navy List displacement of 18,600 tons, and the St. Vincent group of 19,250 tons. Should the sinkage' from normal to deep draught in these vessels be as great as that reported for the Dreadnought, their corresponding fully-laden displacements will be respectively about 23,000 tons and 23,600 tons, with 32 feet draught of water.

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For the Invincible class of armoured cruisers the normal draught of water is 26 feet, and the Navy List displacement is 17,250 tons, with 1000 tons of coal on board, as against 900 tons for the battleships of the Dreadnought type. These cruisers have engines developing 41,000 horse-power, as against 23,000 to 24,500 horse-power in the battleships. If their full fuel supplies are to have the same proportion to their engine-powers as in the battleships, their sinkage should be no less. Few particulars are available for these cruisers as yet, but if the 'sinkage' be 5 feet, their load displacements will be about 21,500 tons. The Minotaur class, the largest armoured cruisers previously laid down for the Royal Navy, have normal displacements of 14,600 tons, and their load displacements are probably about 16,000 tons.

When one turns to official returns for other navies the contrast between the Dreadnought class and contemporaneous battleships is equally great. For example, the normal draught of the latest United States battleships (Delaware and North Dakota) is 26 feet 11 inches, and the corresponding (Navy List) displacement is 20,000 tons. On these figures the American vessels appear to be 5 inches deeper in draught than the Dreadnought herself, and about the same draught as the Téméraire and St. Vincent; while in displacement they are apparently 2100 tons greater than the Dreadnought, 1400 tons greater than the Téméraire, and 750 tons greater than the St. Vincent. These comparisons are fallacious, because different 'sinkages' have been arranged for in the designs of the American and British ships. In the former the deep-load draught will be about 291 feet, and the corresponding displacement about 22,100 tons, as against the deep-load draught of 314 feet (given by the Civil Lord) for the Dreadnought, and a corresponding displacement of about 22,200 tons. The American ships therefore will have an enormous advantage in draught, being about 21 feet less when fully laden; and they will be of practically the same load displacement