Art. 14.-THE COURSE OF THE WAR.

THE flagging of the German offensive, which became noticeable on March 31, continued during the first few days of April; the enemy confining themselves to local attacks, which were for the most part unsuccessful, while the Allied forces made progress in several localities. The village of Ayette, which had been lost on March 29, was recaptured by our troops on April 3; and enterprises in the Hebuterne sector resulted in the improvement of our positions, with the capture of some 300 prisoners. The combined French and British forces also gained ground between Moreuil and the Somme. The great German offensive south of Arras in fact came to an end with the month of March, the operations of the succeeding days on this portion of the front marking a period of transition to a new scheme, which was about to unfold itself further north, and being partly designed, no doubt, to keep alive the anxiety which the Allies naturally felt for the safety of Amiens.

On April 4 the Germans resumed the offensive with large forces between Montdidier and the Somme. Our troops were obliged to evacuate Hamel; Mailly and Morisel fell to the enemy's assaults; and the Grivesnes sector was heavily attacked, but the French maintained their positions in this quarter. On the following morning the Germans, while continuing their pressure south of the Somme, threw ten divisions against our positions between Albert and Bucquoi, but without gaining any important success in either region. On April 6 the right wing of von Boehm's army began a new offensive on the south bank of the Oise, which, in the course of three days' intermittent fighting, obliged the French to withdraw behind the Ailette. The Germans contented themselves with the possession of the right bank of the river from Chauny to Landricourt; and the general situation between Arras and the Aisne remained practically unchanged till May 27, though occasional engagements of some severity were fought in several localities, principally on the front between the Somme and the Avre.

It is now known that, as was conjectured in the article which appeared in the April number of the 'Quarterly Review,' the object of the enemy, in the first

phase of the offensive, was to gain possession of the railways which cross the Somme estuary at Amiens and Abbeville, with the view of attacking subsequently the smaller group of Allied armies north of the river, which would have been isolated by the loss of these lateral communications. This object they had partially attained by intercepting the double-track railway from Montdidier to Arras, and by bringing under long-range artillery fire the other lines which cross the river immediately above and below Amiens. Their plan was, however, very far from completion. Their abandonment of the enterprise may fairly be attributed to the staunch resistance of the Allied armies on both flanks, towards Arras and Montdidier, which frustrated their design for the envelopment of Amiens. To persist in the endeavour would probably have entailed greater sacrifices than the Germans were in a position to incur.

It may, in fact, be surmised that they had miscalculated, at the outset, the strength and time necessary for the completion of the first phase of the operations; and that they had to choose between relinquishing the attack on Amiens and dislocating their arrangements for the second phase (the offensive against the northern group of armies) by withdrawing a great portion of the force assembled for its execution in order to reinforce the armies on the Amiens front. In choosing the former alternative they no doubt acted wisely. The Allies had gained time to concentrate large forces on the front south of Arras, and to strengthen their positions. The attack might fail; or, if successful, it might involve an expenditure of force which would so weaken the German armies as to necessitate a revision of the whole plan of campaign. It seemed, therefore, preferable to strike in a fresh locality, trusting to the effect of surprise, to the partial interruption of the Allied communications, which would delay the lateral movement of reserves, and to the probable reluctance of the Allies to withdraw troops from the Amiens front, where the situation was critical, to meet a blow which might prove to be only a diversion. In this connexion it may be observed that, if any significance is to be attached to the reports of press correspondents, there was a natural tendency at the Allied headquarters to doubt the seriousness of each

fresh move on the enemy's part until the presence of large forces had been definitely ascertained. In the instance under consideration, the situation on the Amiens front was too menacing to admit of any dispersal of the reserves so long as the enemy's intention was in doubt.

The Germans, accordingly, proceeded at once with the second part of their programme, leaving the first part unfinished. Their first objective was that portion of the line held by the Portuguese troops, who were, at the moment, in course of being relieved. The first sign of the impending attack was given by a heavy bombardment of the front from the La Bassée Canal to Armentières, which began on the morning of April 8, and continued at intervals till midnight. As on previous occasions, the action of the German artillery embraced both the front lines and the back areas, and gas shells were liberally used. In the early morning of April 9 the bombardment was resumed; and later, under cover of a dense mist, the infantry attack began to develope irregularly, the Germans, apparently, seeking for a weak point before engaging the bulk of their forces. By 9 a.m. the battle became general on a front of about eleven miles from the neighbourhood of Bois Grenier to the La Bassée Canal, the enemy employing ten or twelve divisions. The first breach was effected in the Fauquissart sector of the Portuguese line; and, by the end of the day, the Germans had advanced as far as the Lawe at Lestrem, and, on the right, had reached the Lys between Bac St Maur and Estaires. On the extreme flanks the British troops maintained their hold on the positions about Givenchy and Fleurbaix; but, on the following morning, they were obliged to withdraw behind the Lys below Estaires, the Germans pressing forward in the direction of Steenwerck.

On April 10 the battle spread northwards to the Ypres Comines Canal. The enemy entered Hollebeke, reached the crest of the Messines ridge, captured Ploegsteert, and made some progress in the wood of that Armentières, being overwhelmed with gas-shells and threatened with envelopment, had to be evacuated. On the succeeding days the Germans made continuous progress in the centre; but the gallant 9th and 51st divisions retained their positions on either flank, the

former holding off the enemy's attacks on the Wytschaete heights till the 16th, and the latter maintaining an unbroken front about Givenchy throughout the battle. Merville was evacuated on April 12, Locon on the following day; and, after a stubborn resistance, the front north of the Lys was withdrawn to the line Neuf Bercquinrailway south of Bailleul-Neuve Eglise-Wulverghem. Severe fighting continued for several days north of the Lys, which resulted, by April 16, in the capture by the enemy of Wytschaete, Wulverghem, Neuve Eglise, Bailleul, Meteren, and Vieux Bercquin. In conformity with the situation south of the Comines Canal, our forces had been withdrawn, without interference, from the Paschendaele ridge, Poelcapelle, and Langemarck, to positions behind the Steenbeek. In the meantime the Germans had made some progress south of the Lys; but the bulk of their forces, which were continually strengthened by the arrival of fresh divisions, operated in the region north of the river.

On April 17 the enemy made a determined attempt to eject the Allied forces from the Ypres salient by a concerted system of enveloping attacks. Their plan comprised four principal operations: (1) an advance in great strength from the Wytschaete-Wulverghem front in a westerly direction towards Kemmel; (2) a northwesterly advance between Neuve Eglise and Bailleul; (3) a northerly attack round Meteren; (4) an advance towards Bixschoote, on a front of about three miles between the Houthulst Forest and the inundations near Kippe. The first three attacks, after gaining some initial successes, were driven back by the French and British troops. For the fourth operation the Germans had assembled seven divisions, three of which were held in reserve and took no part in the engagement, their design being to capture Bixschoote, and to advance towards Elverdinghe and Brielen. They attacked at daybreak, without any preliminary bombardment, and, in the early stages of the engagement made some progress in the area south and east of Merckem. The Belgians, however, soon recovered from their surprise, and, by a counter-attack from about Luyghem, drove the enemy from part of the lost positions, the remainder of which were recovered by a second counter-attack later in the

day. The result of the battle was a complete victory for the Belgians, who captured 700 prisoners and a great quantity of material, and slew large numbers of the enemy, who, losing their way, had become entangled among the marshes.

After the failure of these enterprises the enemy made no further move of importance in the direction of Ypres for more than a week, with the exception of a series of strong attacks, on April 18, between Givenchy and the Clarence River east of St Venant, which left the situation in that quarter practically unchanged. At this stage the Germans seem to have recognised that they had lost the advantage originally gained by surprise, that the arrival of Allied reserves had eliminated their numerical superiority in the new area of operations as a whole, and that their only prospect of success lay in a redistribution of their troops, reinforced by fresh divisions, with a view to concentrated action on a restricted front. The objective chosen was the line of heights stretching westwards from Kemmel, which they designed to capture by concerted attacks on the Bailleul-Wulverghem front from the south, and from the east on the front Wytschaete-Comines Canal.

The week's interval was devoted to making arrangements for these operations; and, on April 25, the new offensive opened with a series of heavy attacks, in which nine divisions were engaged, between Wytschaete and Bailleul, the fighting being especially severe about Vierstraate, Kemmel, and Dranoutre. On the following day the battle extended northwards to the Comines Canal, when the Germans captured St Eloi, Wytschaete, the village and hill of Kemmel, and Dranoutre. Severe fighting continued on April 27 and 28, in the course of which positions changed hands repeatedly. Locre fell to the fourth assault, but was recaptured in the evening; Voormezeele was lost and recovered; and, in a local action beyond the main battle-front, the Australian troops regained the outskirts of Meteren. On April 29 the Germans made a final effort, embracing the whole front from Zillebeke to Meteren and the Belgian positions north-west of Ypres. The entire area was deluged with German shells in the early morning; and the infantry attack, which began soon after 5 a.m., was