cipher telegrams. Space forbids the enumeration of other humiliating conditions. Væ victis indeed-though Rumania was betrayed rather than conquered. When the fourth treaty was signed, Bucarest presented a mournful appearance. The streets were patrolled by German soldiers; a German general was installed in the palace; the King and Queen were far away in the Moldavian Carpathians; famine and disease prevailed. What a contrast to the gay scenes which marked the signature of the third treaty! Flags were waving over the crowded streets; parades of the victorious troops, receptions, banquets, investitures, concerts were the order of the day. Every one was happy and triumphant except the Bulgarian delegates. Pictures displaying the valorous exploits of the Rumanian troops, and post-cards which represented' grateful Civilisation' crowning M. Maioresco with a wreath and M. Také Jonesco administering the coup de pied to M. Daneff, abounded in the windows of the shops. And yet, amid all this jubilation, King Charles, who never lost his calmness of judgment, was inspired with prophetic misgivings. Receiving a wellknown Rumanian journalist a few hours after the signature of the treaty, 'It is not a treaty,' he said sadly, 'it is only a truce, and it cannot last.' 'Thanks to you it is definitive,' he telegraphed to the Emperor William, but he did not believe this in his heart.

The first Treaty of Bucarest marked the awakening of the Christian nations of the Balkans, the second the beginning of their fratricidal quarrels, the third the zenith of their madness, the fourth its inevitable consequences. In the interests of civilisation, militarism must disappear not only from Germany but from the Balkans.

Art. 11.-SPAIN AND GIBRALTAR.

1. Las Llaves del Estrecho. Estudio sobre la reconquista de Gibraltar. Por José Navarrete, precedido de una carta prológo del Exc. Sr. Teniente-General Don José Lopez Dominguez. Madrid: Hernandez, 1882.

2. Gibraltar y la Bahia de Algeciras.

Por D. Camilo Vallés, Coronel de Artilleria. Madrid, 1889.

3. La Humanidad y los Césares. Por D. Mario Roso de Luna. Madrid, 1916.

4. La Cuestion del dia: Gibraltar y Africa. Discurso del General Primo de Rivera. Cadiz, 1917.

ON the 25th of March 1917, General Don Miguel Primo de Rivera, military governor of Cadiz, delivered an address on 'The Recovery of Gibraltar,' at the Royal Academy of Sciences and Arts in that city. A few days afterwards, he was summoned to Madrid by the Minister of War, and discharged from his office. The Spanish Government, perhaps, conceived his theme to be inopportune and his utterances indiscreet. In 1915, Señor Dato, then Prime Minister, had opened, with the greatest reserve, pourparlers with England and France about Gibraltar and Tangiers; and, though no definite conclusion was reached, hopes were entertained in Spain of their renewal at some later date. Probably also, since the recovery advocated by General Primo de Rivera was to be through friendly negotiation with England, the Spanish Cabinet feared to arouse Germany's suspicions.

General Primo de Rivera's academic address did not, in reality, give any cause for offence. He touched upon a very ticklish question, and one which the Spaniards consider a sore wound to their pride, but he did it in terms of much courtesy to England, voicing, at the same time, the universal feeling of his countrymen. As to the opportunity for bringing the affair of Gibraltar before the public, and calling the attention of the Spanish Government to it, he believed that no better could be found. The peace of Europe is going to be settled, according to him, in a conference or congress of nations. If Spain, as a neutral, is denied a voice in that parliament, she will surely find one of the belligerents whom she has represented during the conflict, to take up her

interests. What more befitting occasion than that for offering to England, with Europe's approval, the exchange of Ceuta for Gibraltar?

General Primo de Rivera knows that to abandon Ceuta would mean the end of Spanish aspirations in Africa; but the idea of African expansion, under present conditions, is to his mind a deceptive dream, and the acceptance by Spain of the African zone of influence allotted to her in the Conference of Algeciras was a mistake. The recovery of Gibraltar is of far greater importance, above all from the moral point of view.

'The wish to recover it (he exclaims) is unanimous on the part of the nation; and unanimous also the conviction that it is, more than anything, a question of honour. It is more vexing than dangerous for Spain, that the English should possess Gibraltar; it pains more than it harms us to see a foreign flag wave in our own territory.'

This is the first time within the last fifty years that the question of Gibraltar has been treated by a Spaniard in so gentle and diplomatic a way. The late General Don José Lopez Dominguez owed much of his popularity and political influence to his fiery speeches on the same subject in the Spanish Senate. His ideas were explained and somewhat enlarged in a book by Don José Navarrete, an officer of artillery, who published it in 1883 under the title Las Llaves del Estrecho.' In 1889, LieutColonel Don Camilo Vallés published in 'La Revista Cientifico-Militar' of Barcelona, a series of essays on Gibraltar and Algeciras, which aroused much public attention. But both General Lopez Dominguez and Colonel Vallés expected to recover Gibraltar by force of arms, with the aid of batteries on the neighbouring Spanish positions. Señor Navarrete suggested an alliance with some other European nation' in order to defeat England-a plan warmly recommended by the Pan-Germanist propaganda which preceded the war. Who can doubt that Germans were behind the veil, when in 1911, 1912 and 1913, some newspapers in Madrid named Germany as the ideal ally for helping Spain to recover Gibraltar?

Happily, General Primo de Rivera's project is not so unfriendly; and the General's popularity both in the Army

and outside, and his influence in the last cabinet of Señor Dato (in which his uncle, the venerable Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, Marqués de Estella, held the portfolio of War), only a few months after Don Miguel's discharge from the Military Government at Cadiz, are clear evidences that his address was well received by public opinion. We are far from the times when Canovas del Castillo indignantly rejected the idea of exchanging for Gibraltar any other part of the national territory, and war was believed the only solution of the problem. The consensus of opinion now is that Spain ought to proceed by way of friendly negotiation. Even Señor Maura-in spite of a veiled threat-seems to support this idea by his declaration that some negotiation about Gibraltar and Tangier must take place before Spain's attitude in the European conflict can be defined. Señor Alvarez (leader of the Reformistas), Señor Lerroux (of the Radicals), and the Republicans and Socialists in general, ascribe to the narrowmindedness of the Spanish Government, since the 18th century, the lack of an agreement with England on this point. In April 1917, the subject was academically discussed at the Ateneo; and the conclusion prevailed that, since Richard Cumberland's mission to Madrid in 1780 until to-day, the failure of all negotiations with England about Gibraltar is to be laid to the charge of Spain. That the English flag still waves over Gibraltar'-said Señor Roso de Luna last year in his spirited book against German imperialism entitled 'La Humanidad y los Césares'

'is due to the incapacity of Spanish politicians, who could have found long since some method of saving Spanish sovereignty, and giving to England what she needs what we might call her right of way.'

Naturally, such utterances are balanced by the illfeeling against England so abundant in the newspapers influenced by Germany. General Primo de Rivera has been accused by them of playing a part, and acting under suggestions made to him during his recent visit to the British front in France-a charge which he disproved by showing that his address was presented to the Academy long before he went to France, though the meeting at which he read it took place subsequently. In the same

address he deprecates the policy of hates and grudges, followed on account of spite and disappointment.' He believes the demonstrations against Great Britain a great mistake, and warns his countrymen against the disastrous consequences of sowing hostility instead of affection.

Human nature is prone to resent such prudent counsels. There can be no doubt that the question of Gibraltar is one of the several causes of Spain's lukewarm feeling towards the Allies, and of the sympathy for Germany which is evident among a large part of her population. But it is far from being the only, or the most important cause.* I firmly believe that to remain neutral until the end of the war would be the decision of an overwhelming majority of the Spanish people, even if no question of Gibraltar existed. The Conde de Romanones, leader of the Liberal party, is well known for his sympathetic attitude towards the Allies. He represents a policy of friendliness with France and England, and on account of this, and the opposition it provoked among his best political friends and in the country at large, he had to resign office last year. Yet, on Nov. 24, 1917, at a banquet given in Madrid by his party, after explaining that he never thought of a participation by Spain in the present conflict, he declared that 'to drag Spain into the war would be a crime'; and that whoever ascribed to him such intention, lied, lied and lied.' The Conde de Romanones' words elicited a thunderous applause.

·

The political parties in Spain are divided into two large groups, irrespective of their support or dislike of the Monarchy, and according to their clerical or anticlerical, their reactionary or their liberal tendencies. They are called derechas and izquierdas, those of the 'Right' comprising various sections, from the rabid jaimistas, or partisans of the pretender Don Jaime and of absolute monarchy, to the moderate Conservatives led by Señor Dato. With very few exceptions-Señor Dato's group is 'neutral'-they sympathise with Germany. The 'Left' comprises not only Romanones' party, and Garcia Prieto's among the latter there are some uncompromising Germanophiles, and Señor Garcia Prieto declares

* See the article on 'Spain and Germany,' in this Review, July 1917.