Government. Its population of forty-seven millions was dependent for two-thirds of its food on foreign supplies. In particular, our islands produced only onefifth of the wheat, only three-fifths of the meat and bacon, and none of the sugar that they consumed; on the other hand they produced more than nine-tenths of the milk, and all the potatoes required. The only staple food of which they produced far more than they consumed was fish. Obviously, therefore, as everybody knows only too well, our very existence in time of war depends on our command of the sea.

At first no statesmen and very few generals seem to have anticipated that the war could last beyond a few months; and neither in this nor in any of the belligerent countries-once the panic of the first few days with its mad run upon the food-shops was over-does there appear to have been any special anxiety about food supplies. It was only as the probable prolongation of the war began to be perceived that drastic measures to secure the feeding of their peoples were taken by the Central Powers, while our own Government was content to devise means to meet special crises as they happened to occur. The Government, said Mr Runciman two years later, had regarded 'practical objects as the only objects worthy of attainment.' None the less, however much in theory Mr Asquith's Government may have been 'wedded to the old voluntary principle,' the actual history of what they did in practice to secure ample food supplies may come as a surprise even to close observers.

As soon as war was declared, the Government appointed a Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies, which took immediate steps to secure supplies of sugar, meat and corn, and-most important of all-unrestricted transport by land and sea. On Aug. 4, 1914, it assumed control over the railways. Next day it announced a system of State insurance for British shipping to compensate our shippers for losses at sea through enemy action. It foresaw a shortage of sugar, due to the fact that in normal times 65 per cent. of the supply came from Germany and Austria; and it made immediate arrangements for the state purchase of sugar from other sources. To guard against a possible meat shortage, it obtained a list of all refrigerated vessels afloat, and gave orders to the Navy to

shepherd them all to our shores; and on Aug. 6 it secured from the Queensland Government the option of the whole of the Colony's frozen meat supply. To allay the senseless food panic of the first few days it took over the control of all flour mills, and appointed on Aug. 7 a Consultative Committee on food supplies, which, in conference with representatives of large distributive Companies and the Grocers' Federation, issued lists of maximum prices-without indeed any legal sanctionat which articles of food might fairly be sold in the retail shops.

On Aug. 10 it passed the Defence of the Realm Act, under which it was authorised to requisition not only food, fodder and stores for the Navy and Army, but also all food-stuffs unreasonably withheld; and on the same day it appointed a special Committee of the Board of Agriculture to consider the production of home supplies. It also ordered the Board to make a survey of our food resources both at the moment and afterwards periodically, and, to increase confidence, announced that there was in the country five months' supply of wheat and nearly a twelve months' supply of potatoes. Further, it prohibited all export of food-stuffs and, two or three months later, all export of fodder. Finally, on Aug. 20 the Cabinet Committee on Food Supplies handed over the purchase of sugar to a special Commission, which it had already empowered to purchase, sell and control the delivery of sugar, and generally to take such steps as may seem desirable for maintaining the supply.'

This last step was the boldest of the measures then taken to safeguard supplies; and, though it was at first subjected to much adverse criticism, it has proved so successful, that the Sugar Commission even now continues its work with but little change from the form in which it started. The Commission was composed of five persons, assisted by a small staff. At the end of August there was in the United Kingdom only one month's stock in store, but by the following November, by purchases through ordinary trade channels in the United States, Cuba, Mauritius, Java, the Philippines and elsewhere, the Commission had completely relieved the shortage; and from that time onward maintained stocks in this country at the normal level till early in 1916, when

difficulties of tonnage and exchange led to a slight reduction, which down to the end of that year never became serious. The rise in price, however, was considerable, being over 200 per cent., from the ante-bellum price of 2d. to 54d. per lb. in December 1916, of which 11d. is accounted for by additional taxation. By November 1916 the Commission had expended 81,000,000l. in the purchase of sugar. Though the article has practically been made into a State monopoly, the Commissioners have added to its cost price onlyd. per lb. in order to cover insurance and working expenses, and to provide a reserve fund large enough to maintain uniformity in price and to meet any possible reduction in prices at the close of the war.

To return to the activities of the Government during the first autumn of the war. In October 1914 the import of sugar through ordinary trade channels was prohibited, in order to prevent enemy sugar from reaching England through neutrals; and a Committee on Grain Supplies was formed, composed of representatives of various Government Departments, on the ground that it was 'too risky to leave the bread supply of the country and its armed forces entirely to private enterprise.' Its scope was limited to the piling up of a grain reserve; and, during the next four months, it purchased 3 million quarters of wheat, besides large quantities of flour from the United States and India. Large purchases of frozen meat were made by the Government from the River Plate and elsewhere, but only for army purposes, the balance remaining over for civilian consumption being insignificant.

In October and November a disquieting feature began to show itself. Shipping freights rose sharply. The Admiralty at once met the difficulty, so far as merchant vessels requisitioned in its service were concerned, by making an agreement with the owners for fixed rates (the so-called 'Blue Book' rates) on all cargoes. But in the open market, from November 1914 to March 1915, the rise in freights was steep and continuous; e.g. the rate on corn cargoes rose from the ante-bellum figure of 12s. per ton to 142s. The causes were obvious. The Admiralty had already requisitioned a large number of our merchant vessels and was always requisitioning more;

some seventy to eighty British vessels were interned in German harbours, and a hundred more locked up in neutral ports in the Baltic; nearly a hundred big steamers were transferred from the British to neutral flags before the practice was forbidden about the end of the year; and 3 millions of enemy tonnage, shut up in British, American, and other harbours, were unable to trade. Moreover, an appreciable number of our vessels had been sunk by the enemy cruisers. The Battle of the Falkland Islands and other successes cleared the seas of these surface raiders, but drove the enemy to adopt a far more dangerous engine in the submarine.

By the end of the year, food prices had risen by 17 per cent. In January 1915 prices continued to rise; and the Labour Party began to agitate for more State interference, demanding State purchase and ownership of all stocks of wheat and its sale at fixed prices. But, beyond the Board of Trade's taking over the control of the Australian meat import under ordinary commercial conditions, and the appointment of a Cabinet Committee to consider the rise of prices, little was done. The results of the Committee's deliberations were presumably given in Mr Asquith's comforting speech in the House of Commons in the middle of February. He pointed out that, though food prices had risen by 20-24 per cent., the prices of five of the necessaries of life-wheat, flour, meat, sugar, and coal-had not yet reached the level of the time after the Franco-Prussian War; he attributed the higher price of wheat to the failure of the Australian crop, the embargo on Indian export, the delay of the Argentine export owing to bad weather, the closing of the Dardanelles against Russian wheat, the loss of the crops in Belgium and northern France, and the competitive purchases of France, Italy and Holland; and he explained that the advance in meat prices was caused by the enormous consumption of the new armies. Maximum prices he roundly condemned as discredited, not only theoretically, but by their ill success in Germany. But, except for a brief reference to the steps taken to secure the surplus of Indian wheat, Mr Asquith made no reference to the measures which the Government had already taken to meet the various difficulties of the situation. How little strength there was at this time

behind the Labour Agitation is plain from the fact that the Labour Resolution, after severe criticism from Mr Runciman, Mr Bonar Law and Mr Chamberlain, was allowed to be talked out.

On

At this time, however, a cloud was rising on the horizon of the food situation which at the present timethree years later --has darkened the whole scene. Jan. 26, 1915, the German Government announced its control over all food-stuffs, including imports from overseas. Our Government countered the stroke by proclaiming all food cargoes for German and even for neutral ports, if their ultimate destination for Germany was evident, to be contraband of war. On Feb. 4 Ger

many replied by announcing that, as from Feb. 18, British or neutral merchant vessels in British waters would be sunk by submarines without notice and without provision for the safety of crew or passengers. In 1914 only three British merchantmen had been sunk by submarines. Between Jan. 1 and March 31, 1915, the number was thirty. Our Government left the task of coping with the new danger to the Navy, and in the sphere of food supplies limited its activities to forming an Indian Wheat Committee to cooperate with the Indian Government in securing the Indian surplus-it was, to the amount of 21 million quarters, safely shipped to the United Kingdom-and to revising, in consultation with shipowners, the so-called Blue Book rates for freight on all requisitioned shipping, which had in October 1914 been fixed considerably below market level. The new rates came into force on March 1, and it was agreed that no further change should be made during the war. At the end of 1916 they still held good.

For some months, although a small group of agriculturists in both Houses of Parliament continued to urge the increase of home production, both the nation and the Government were more occupied with the pressing problems of recruiting, munitions and finance than with the gradually rising prices of food-stuffs. At last, in June 1915, the question of increased home production was definitely raised, but only as a side issue, as part of an economy campaign started by the Government in view of the enormous War Budget and of the subscription to the Second War Loan. As yet there was no general