share of the interest on this debt, let us examine in what manner she performed her share of the responsibility she assumed of disposing of the funds of the Greeks; a trust not the less sacred, surely, because it was self-arrogated, and assumed in direct violation of every financial principle of the English constitution. If we recollect rightly, the three per cents stood at about eighty-six at London, when this loan was contracted. In that case, Great Britain, by a proper use of her guarantee, might have furnished Greece with a loan at five per cent., without any loss or deduction for commission. Yet we find in the parliamentary papers, "an account of the sums accruing from the two first series of the Loan of sixty millions of francs, up to the 31st of December, 1834,"--which shows that the expenses and losses of negotiating this loan really amounted to more than four millions of francs. We transcribe the account,-it requires no comment:

"The loan being negotiated at ninety-four, occasioned a loss of six per cent.,

Commission to Messrs. Rothschild, two

Francs. Cts.

2,400,000

per cent.,

Commission on payment of three half years'

800,000

interest and sinking fund,

Commission to Mr. S. D'Eichthal, of Mu

nich, for transmission of money,.

Couriers to Paris and St. Petersburg,
Printing and stamps of certificates,

36,000

321,690.78

13,508.60

36,540

Discount to Messrs. Rothschild for prompt

payment of the instalments,

513,333.29

Total of unproductive portion of the loan, 4,121,072.67

Payments to different Powers, in execution of former trea

ties.

To Russia, on account of Turkey, to the amount of twenty-two millions of pi

astres,

5,984,235.05

To Turkey, in discharge of indemnity of

forty millions of piastres,

5,236,363.63

To England, on account of £20,000 sterling, advanced upon the loan,

341,333.33

It appears, therefore, from this account laid before the British Parliament, that in realizing the two first series of the loan, or the sum of forty millions, Great Britain authorized an expenditure of 15,683,004.68, for purposes totally unconnected with the improvement of the state of Greece. We may observe, too, that it is singular to find, that while Eng land appears to have advanced money, still a large sum is paid for discount, before the 31st of December, 1834.

We must now quit the Parliamentary Papers, in order to seek for some light concerning the commission paid to a banker at Munich, for the transmission of money. The information concerning the loan, published in Greece, enables us to trace a considerable portion of it to the coffers of Bavaria, before any part reached the Greek treasury:

"Expense of Transporting the King, Regency, and Bavarian Officials, to Greece,

Drachmas.

422,207.20

Expenses of Bavarian Employé's visiting
Greece, on special missions,

163,545.20

Expenses of Coining the portion of the
Loan remitted to Greece,

459,728.52

Salaries of the Regency,

Discounts paid to Bankers at Munich, Insurance, Loss on Foreign Money, &c.

Total received by the Bavarians,

928,984.36

9,280,946.56"

Additional Papers relating to the third instalment of the Greek loan, 1835,

1836, presented to both houses of Parliament, August, 1836; p. 2.

These last sums are stated in drachmas,* but as we have omitted noticing a payment made out of the proceeds of the loan, to Mr. Eynard, the banker of Count Capodistrias, and some other items, we are within the mark when we say, that about twentyfive millions of francs were expended by the three powers, and by Bavaria, with the advice and consent of Great Britain, before a single dollar of the loan reached the hands of the Greeks. Besides this, the accounts of the Greek revenue since the establishment of the monarchy prove that the expenses entailed on Greece by the Bavarian troops, volunteers, and civil officials, by the civil list of the king, and by the diplomatic missions which the royal dignity was supposed to require at Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Munich, Madrid, and Constantinople, considerably exceed the sum of fifteen millions of francs. So that Greece, far from receiving any pecuniary advantage from the loan, has been a very serious sufferer. Indeed, it appears that Greece has only received about ten mil lions of the loan of sixty millions, in order to cover the deficit. which has occurred in the budget since the year 1832, and that the remaining fifty millions have been expended, either in the manner we have stated above, or in payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan, as it became due. In the month of June, 1836, Russia proposed "that the funds accruing from the third instalment of the loan should be appropri ated exclusively to the payment of the interest and sinking fund of the loan during the next five or six years." This strange proposition to retain Greece in perpetual thraldom, by increasing her debt unnecessarily, was not adopted by the other powers; but Greece has not been a great gainer by the modifications they introduced.

The revenues of Greece average about thirteen millions of drachmas. Of this sum, about two millions are absorbed by the expense of collection, for a worse financial system than that of the Greek monarchy cannot be found, - one million is wasted on the exorbitant civil list of King Otho; so that only ten millions remain to defray the current expenditure of a government which has an army of five thousand men, and a fleet manned by two thousand sailors. Capodistrias governed Greece with a revenue of about four millions, and the increased expenses of the monarchy were imposed on the country by the

There is a difference of more than ten per cent. between the franc and the drachma;-six drachmas are equal to our dollar.

three powers, and fostered and encouraged by Great Britain, during the lavish expenditure of the English party, in 1835 and 1836. It is, therefore, an act of political iniquity as well as open hostility, for Great Britain to hold Greece responsible for the whole of the loan of sixty millions. No court, either of law or equity, would condemn a private individual standing in the position of Greece towards the protecting powers, to repay more than the sum which these guardians can prove was actually employed for the maintenance of their ward. Now Greece can show, that if those having the power had paid due attention to the Greek finances, ten millions of francs, or even drachmas, would have covered the deficits in the Greek budgets up to the end of 1836, when the allies commenced the issue of the third series of the loan, to pay themselves the interest and sinking fund of two former series spent under their authority.

It is really lamentable to behold France, Great Britain, and Russia, the three great powers of Europe, which so rarely combine to confer any benefit on the human race, uniting in the closest alliance to keep the Greek population in perpetual thraldom by a financial juggle. They reduce the king they have appointed to a worthless pageant, the government to a trembling deputy, and they destroy the future hopes of the nation. That they have all soiled their fingers with the ink of the Greek accounts, is undeniable; but it was reserved for the unquiet spirit and restless hands of Lord Palmerston to daub with this ink the blushing cheeks of Britannia.

The question here suggests itself, why do the great powers exert themselves so determinedly to retain the Greek `nation in a state of subserviency? The explanation must be sought in the unsettled state of the East and the critical position of the Ottoman empire. The Sultan still rules over more than three millions of Greek subjects, and each of the allies entertains some hope of making the condition of the Greek population useful to advance its own projects of ambition, should any sudden event cause a revolution in the Ottoman empire. The anti-Greek policy of Great Britain during the administration of Colletti, whether at Athens, Corfu, or Constantinople, has, however, seriously injured the popularity of that power among the whole Greek nation. At a moment when the consolidation of internal order and the advancement of social improvement was the prayer of every Greek, British diplomacy stepped forward to produce financial confusion, in order to drive Collet

ti from office, at the risk of involving Greece in civil war and anarchy.

In the meantime, Russia, who can hardly be supposed to view the establishment of a free people in the Levant with much favor, has sufficient prudence to leave to England the unpopular task of arresting the progress of Greece. Russia knows well that the feeble and trimming policy of the French government will effectually prevent France from affording Greece the aid necessary to develop her moral resources in such a manner as to open a new destiny to the Greek race; and she already perceives that the hostility of Great Britain will in all probability soon involve Greece in such a state of anarchy as must drive both the people and the king to throw themselves at the feet of Russia, and refer the settlement of their affairs to her arbitration.

We have very little to say concerning the conduct of France. Her policy seems to be confined to keeping Colletti in office and obtaining from the king as many crosses and stars for Frenchmen as his majesty can be induced to part with. For the internal improvement of Greece, France has not done more than her colleagues. No measures have been recommended to check the corruption of the general government, nor to prevent the pillage of the large revenues of the Greek municipalities. Oligarchy is supported in the communes, and all the absurdity of a double election of mayors and aldermen; while universal suffrage exists as regards the legislature. No internal improvements are made; and from what we have seen of Athens, the capital of Greece, we are inclined to think, that, with one of the largest palaces in Europe, it has the filthiest streets and worst police that ever disgraced an overgrown village. Yet Athens has large local revenues, and four deputies in the house of representatives.

The Greek nation, when separated entirely from its rulers, offers to our contemplation a more cheering scene. The revolution owed its success to the mass of the population; their enthusiasm and endurance secured the liberty of Greece. The army and navy were utterly inadequate to encounter the forces of the Sultan in a protracted war, and the government had neither the talents nor the resources required to contend with the Pasha of Egypt; the people alone, by their persevering spirit of resistance, rejected the idea of defeat, and clung to their independence. Nor has the popular energy relaxed since the establishment of the monarchy, though it has now taken a