ed by Sensation, nor by any aggregation of sensations; for the reason that Sensation requires Particularity, and has to do only with particulars, whereas to generalize is to perceive the secondary and dependent nature of particulars, and thus implies that the faculty corresponding to particulars- namely, Sensation is a subordinate one. Of this, indeed, the Inductive theory is partly conscious, for Induction implies that less weight is given to particulars, as such, and a more or less distinct feeling that the important point is what is common to all of them? But its error consists in this: that instead of seeing that the common principle must be the one reality manifesting itself under these various forms, it sees in it only an (accidental) coincidence of certain attributes, to be got at by abstracting the other attributes. Instead of a common principle, therefore, we have as many coincidences as there are attributes distinguishable by the Understanding. It is thus a system of abstractions. We hear various philosophies, that of Kant, for instance, or Aristotle, blamed for their abstractness, by writers of this school. But the abstractest of all philosophies is the Inductive; for its great principle is Abstraction, and its results are abstract attributes, which it seeks again to embody by attaching them to fancied substrata, the existence of which it does not always even pretend to believe, and can in no instance show. Where do we find such a string of abstractions as in the modern English Physics-their "philosophy" par excellence?-Caloric, Electricity, Galvanism, Magnetism, and the rest. Has any one ever seen these things? So far from it, that it is not pretended that they are things at all. Yet a separate existence is given to them, and they are supposed to be induced upon or imparted to Matter. Now, to the Inductive Philosophy, if consistent, whatever is no thing, that is, has not material existence is nothing. Hence the hypotheses of fluids, vapors, latency, &c.,-in which qualities are supposed to exist, yet unattached to Matter: that is, to exist and not exist, at the same time. Thus, for instance, it was formerly fancied by physiologists, that nervous communication must take place by means of a fluid, and accordingly they conjured up for the occasion, not only the fluid, but canals through the nerves for it to run in. But the nerves being found to be solid, and Galvanism meanwhile of fering itself as a yet more convenient hypothesis, was proposed instead. So the great category of Force, which is nothing else but abstract motion or action.

It would be easy to point out inconsistencies in this system, in pretending to derive all knowledge from observation, and yet building theories upon assumptions, where observations are confessedly impossible, or at least have never been made. But the point of interest is, that these errors are not accidental or at random, but show a progress of the system itself beyond its own principles; that it transcends, and thereby refutes itself. The term transcendental is often used by persons of this way of thinking, as equivalent to Utopian or mystical,- (or misty, which is supposed to be the same thing,) — and as denoting a pretence of human faculties to accomplish what is beyond their sphere. But this again can apply nowhere so well as to the Inductive System itself. For this is precisely its position. It has got so far as to feel that the reality it seeks is not the phenomenon ; - but recognizing no concrete reality except Matter, it does not get beyond this negative conception of unphenomenal matter; matter, that is, from which all attributes are abstracted; thus it makes Reality an abstraction, and at the same time speaks of it as concrete and present to experience. It may be worth while shortly to describe the process gone through by the Inductive Theory.

Were phenomena pure realities, one fact would be as conclusive in Science as a thousand; all that we can learn at all we could learn at once, and there would be no need of Induction. But every one feels that in every fact there is much that is accidental, and belongs to the particular circumstances of its appearance. If every fact were a pure reality, then a five-legged calf would be a new species. This, however, was never imagined, unless by a child or a savage. Men, with very little aid of Science, come unconsciously to the notion of a type, that is, a universal form, to which phenomena ought, but sometimes do not, conform. An ideal standard is established; that is, the reality of the thing is declared to be outside of it, and not attained in any one thing, though all aim and tend towards it, but each hits more or less wide of the mark. This is the true sense of Induction, which is nothing else than the attempt to discover the reality in phenomena. But this establishing of a type is, nevertheless, directly contrary to the assumption with which the theory begins- namely, that Reality is equivalent to Matter; for here a distinction is made between the thing and its reality.

Common-sense knows nothing of these distinctions. To it the world is a solid and unmixed reality; a calf with a leg or two more or less does not puzzle the farmer; he is used, indeed, to see them with four legs, and is thus at first struck with the novelty. But he knows no reason why, if it pleased God, they should not have twenty legs as well as four; and if the birth of a five-legged calf should happen half a dozen times, would be quite reconciled to it, and think no more of the matter; that is, his conceptions are undefined; he is content with his immediate experience, and his generalization being merely instinctive, and not a matter of reflection, is readily modified. Instinctively he makes a distinction between phenomenon and reality; Matter and Form; so that different degrees of connection between them (and thus different degrees of reality) are recognized and acted upon in practice, though not in theory. As the mind is further developed it becomes by degrees conscious of this distinction, and reasons upon it. The laws of the material world become the object of interest, and the question arises whether these laws are invariable. The answer is, that the law invariably acts, but, from various hindrances, the effect does not always follow. Greater importance is thus given to the law, the general form, and less to the particular case, the subject-matter in which the law is manifested. Thus the distinction before instinctively made, is now recog nized theoretically, also; Matter and Law are separate, as Form and Substance, and come together only in the typical cases, in which the law is completely embodied, and the body completely obedient to the law. This is a great step, for here Reality is placed in the coincidence of Matter and Law; that is, they are declared to be really identical, and where they do not completely coincide there must be proportionate unreality. Here, however, the Inductive Theory becomes transcendental, or rather, (to adopt Kant's distinction,) transcendent.

The notion of type presupposes that Matter is not equivalent to Reality; that is, that the fundamental assumption is unfounded. Mr. Mill accordingly consistently rejects this notion; others, as Mr. Whewell, (Philosophy of Inductive Sciences,) admit it. But the main point is admitted by all, since otherwise Induction could not go on. But though they hold fast to the new view, they do not let go the old one; contradiction thus arises. Reality is outside of Matter; and yet is identical with it. It is, therefore, both identical and not identical; that is, it is partly identical. Material objects, them, are

partly real and partly unreal. These sides are to be separat ed; the phenomenon is to be split in halves, and the one half retained, the other thrown away. This is the actual position of the Inductive Theory.

Here, however, it is to be remarked, that the two sides are merely antithesized, declared opposites; so that if we fix A to be Reality, B must be Unreality-but it does not appear by what authority one is preferred to the other; that is, why B should not as well be Reality, and A Unreality. In whatever way we establish it, some one else may choose to reverse their relative positions to declare our abnormal cases typical, and vice versa. All classification, then, must be subjective, conventional; we cannot affirm any identity between things, but only diversity. It is necessary, therefore, to find some principle of connection between these opposites. But as they are of themselves mere opposites, there is either no such principle, or it is something distinct from and including both. Mr. Mill, as we have seen, does not distinctly show any such principle; others, as Berkeley, have sought it in God: and perhaps this is involved in the stress which he also lays on the finiteness or human character of our cognitive faculties. This reference to God, however, though satisfactory to some minds, and convenient for putting an end to discussions and replying to arguments which we know not otherwise how to answer-is in fact a mere subterfuge, and, as Spinoza says, "the asylum of ignorance." It means only that we suppose a final principle to exist somewhere, but are at a loss where to look for it. The name, therefore, is indifferent, it being a mere category of the Unknowable; and various writers have designated the same thing by various terms; Cousin, for instance, calls it "Reason;" Mr. Whewell, "Ideas;" Reid, "Common-sense," &c. In either case it is merely a reference to an ultimate authority, about which no questions are to be asked, and amounts only to saying that the reason of the thing, its reality, is not only unattained, but unattainable.

The occasion for the introduction of a third principle is this: On the one hand the original instinctive feeling that Matter and Reality are identical, is gone; Reflection has revealed to us the chasm that exists between the mind and its object; Matter is outward, unideal, rude; it does not always conform

* Ante, p. 177.

to its laws; indeed, we are obliged to begin our study of phenomena with avoiding any hypothesis as to their law, in order that we may learn the law from a series of observations, and not be led astray by an abnormal instance. The material world is to the understanding a chaos, on which a foreign and opposite principle has impressed itself from without, and arranged the originally lawless Matter into order and forms belonging to itself, and not to Matter. On the other hand, Law, whencesoever it may come, is certainly found in intimate connection with Matter. To explain this, a higher, combining principle of some sort is required, and this higher principle of some sort, this indefinite something above, is that already mentioned. This, however, after all explains nothing; for the point to be explained is not how Matter and Law coexist in themselves, but how we come to know of their coexistence. That God created the Universe according to his infinite wisdom, and ordained a certain order among things, does not prove that we know this order, or that our notions in any way correspond with reality. On the contrary, Berkeley was driven to his theory precisely by this difficulty, (to him an impossibility,) of conceiving how a finite subject can have any objective knowledge. And he very consistently declares, that our ideas, as well as the order of things, are the immediate creations of God. This, indeed, is the only logical conclusion from these premises;-only, in that case, the knowledge and the ideas are God's, and not ours, and therefore Philosophy is an empty word.

Metaphysics being nothing else than the first principles of all thought, of all intellectual and spiritual interests, wherever the views of the Inductive System have prevailed among metaphysicians, we shall recognize them also in the prevailing forms of Religion, Morals, and Government.

In Religion this is the position of the Catholic Church, (the term Catholic being used as the opposite of Protestant, as denoting that sect of Christians who rest Religion on an outward authority.) If the Highest, the object of worship, is of a dif ferent nature from the mind, and therefore inaccessible to its unassisted efforts - that is, something outward, it follows necessarily that it can be manifested to us only outwardly, as Law, or outward authority, which we have only to obey, and not to reason about. And if, then, following these principles, we admit that the Catholic Church ever was a Church, and its faith ever was Religion, that is, that it ever was a divine in