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is a preposterous vanity to Americans, and the rock-ribbed conservatism of China is vanity to all the world else. It makes no difference what name is given to the set of ideas which cause a people to cling tenaciously to their own fashions. It remains a fact that the Americans are an extremely conservative people, while not desiring to be considered so.

To the great majority of Americans it is a matter of no consequence whence they derived their institutions-in what ancient quarry their forefathers digged. The popular Fourth of July conception is that they were invented, made out of whole cloth, struck out at a heat; that they sprang into existence Minerva-like without gestation or heredity. It needs no professor of evolution to tell us that this kind of birth for a government as for an individual is impossible. Historically the American form of government is the British government of the last century with hereditary succession left out. I am speaking now of the form of government, and not of the machinery by which it is kept going; of the legislative, executive, and judicial processes, not of the distribution of the suffrage or the sources of power. The form of King, Lords, and Commons was adopted not only for the Federal Government, but for each of the thirteen original States, and has been copied in regular succession by twenty-five additional States-King, Lords, and Commons without hereditary succession, and of limited tenure.

would reject any bill from the House which the majority of its members did not like—would reject it thirty times as easily as once. On the other hand, the House, finding its measure rejected once, would not pass it a second time until changes in the personnel of the Senate should give indications of a change in its temper.

The difference between the executive modes of the two countries is still more marked. Any measure which passes the Commons is supposed to have received the royal sanction in advance at the hands of her Majesty's Ministers, or, failing that, at the hands of her Majesty's Opposition, who straightway become Ministers. Hence the subsequent approval of the bill is a matter of form, and a matter of course. But the President of the United States would veto a bill without hesitation as many times, and under as many different forms and guises, as Congress should pass it—as President Hayes did during the recent session of Congress; and in so doing he would be sustained by public opinion as exercising a lawful discretion. The country might think the discretion erroneously exercised, but the right to exercise it would never be questioned. As a matter of fact nine tenths of all the Executive vetoes in the annals of Congress have been salutary and conducive to the public weal; and probably the same proportion will hold good as to the vetoes of the State Governors. The veto power is a conservative force which has nothing corresponding to it under existing English practice. The unqualified power of restraint which the upper House exercises over the lower in the United States is also one of the lost arts of government in the United Kingdom, and I suppose very few desire, and none expect, to see it restored.

Since the adoption of this form of government far greater changes of substance have taken place in England than in America. The powers vested in the President, Senate, and House of Representatives, and in each of them, are no whit less now than they were under George Washington. Those of the Crown and the Lords are vastly less than they were under George III. So attenuated have these become that it is a matter of dispute whether they have any direct powers left that can be successfully asserted against the Commons. Indirect powers they have, undoubtedly, of considerable magnitude and import, the greatest being the influence exercised by the Lords upon the elections of the Commons. This, however, is the influence of landownership rather than of lordship. The House of Lords a short time since rejected the Irish Volunteer Bill after its passage by the Commons. Possibly they may reject it a second time, for it will surely come up again. But after its third passage by the Commons the Lords will pass it also, not because they will like it any bet--a question not so easily answered as this stateter than before, but because they must. And so it would be with any other bill about which the Commons should show any decided purpose and determination. The Senate of the United States

The question whether the United States might usefully ingraft upon their system of government the principal improvement wrought in the English system since the separation of the two countries, has been a good deal discussed in pamphlets and on the rostrum of late years. Reduced to its simplest terms, the question is, whether it would be wise for the United States to have one government like the House of Commons, upon which public opinion can impinge and concentrate readily and effectively, or three governments, to wit, President, Senate, and House of Representatives, upon which public opinion is dispersed and unable to act effectively except at certain periods fixed in the almanac, and even then not simultaneously upon all three

ment of it would seem to imply. To accomplish such a change it would be necessary to give the members of the Cabinet seats on the floor of Congress, to confide to them the initiative of the

principal measures of legislation, to hold them collectively responsible for everything, and to send them adrift whenever for any reason they should fail of the support of a majority of the popular branch of the Legislature. Mechanical difficulties in the way of such an arrangement, which are very considerable if not insurmountable, will be noticed hereafter. An initial step has been proposed in the form of a bill in Congress by Senator Pendleton, of Ohio, which presents no difficulties at all except the difficulty of getting a majority to agree to it. The bill provides that seats shall be assigned to the Cabinet in both branches of Congress; that they shall be free to occupy them at all times, and required to be present at certain times to answer questions propounded to them, in the same way as her Majesty's Ministers are catechised by members of the House of Commons. The right to participate in general debate is not recorded by the bill, and the right to vote is denied by the Constitution.

Looking at the general run of questions and answers in Parliament where members are at liberty to ask the Right Honorable Secretary of This what he thinks about the deterioration of the quality of Irish butter, and the Under-Secretary of That whether the survivors of Rorke's Drift have been allowed an extra flannel shirt and trousers as a reward for their gallant conduct-two questions which, with others of like gravity, were propounded in the writer's hearing at the sitting of the 16th of June last-it would seem hardly worth the effort of passing Mr. Pendleton's bill in order to get so little as he offers to give. I have attended many spellingschools that were livelier and more entertaining. The right to join in general debate saves the Ministerial bench from becoming a mere class in conundrums. Indeed, it would seem impossible to draw a line between answers to questions and general debate thereon. In the greater number of cases where information is sought by the Legislature concerning the acts of the Executive, what is especially wanted is the reason for the act. When the head of a department is asked for his reasons for a particular line of action, he must be allowed to choose his own words, and decide for himself how much time is needed for his explanations. It is impossible to open the mouths of the Cabinet in Congress, and close them at the same time. The Cabinet would probably decline to occupy the seats offered to them on such conditions, and the power to compel their attendance is at least doubtful.

Mr. Pendleton expressly disclaims the intention to introduce or even to pave the way for the English style of parliamentary government. The advantage he ascribes to his measure is that it

would greatly facilitate and expedite the business of Congress to have the heads of the executive departments within reach when information is wanted; and here it must be allowed that the argument on his side is strong. Under existing methods the procuring of information from a department for the use of the House is most cumbersome and dilatory. Some member of the House, on resolution day (which comes once a week), offers a resolution calling for it. The House may adopt the resolution or reject it, or refer it to a standing committee. In the latter case the committee can report it back when the committee is called in its order, which will happen about three times in the course of a session, the mover having meanwhile lost all responsibility for his resolution, and the committee having assumed it. Most commonly, however, the House adopts or rejects the resolution without referring it. It is then engrossed by a clerk, signed, and certified, and conveyed by a messenger to the Secretary of the proper department, who refers it to a bureau where manuscript is accumulated upon it more or less. Then the answer is sent back to the Secretary, who takes time to consider whether the information ought to be given at all. Before it actually reaches the House all interest in it has perhaps evaporated, or, if it be still alive, the time when it would have been most useful has gone by. It frequently happens, however, that some part of the desired information is wanting, or is furnished in such shape that it is unintelligible to the member who called for it, so that a supplementary resolution of inquiry must be sent through the same devious channel. By this time, probably, nobody cares whether the question is ever answered at all.

Evasion of the point of an interrogatory is not uncommon when the answer is communicated in writing. If the Secretary is reluctant to give the information, or if he wishes to puzzle a political adversary, or wear out his patience, or do anything except deal frankly and openly with him, it is very easy to employ words which seem to answer, but do not. Such trickery is impossible when the parties are brought face to face in an open court of two or three hundred practiced dialecticians. A good illustration is found in the colloquy which took place in the House of Commons on the 14th of August, when the Secretary for the Colonies was asked whether it was true that a price had been put on King Cetewayo's head. Of course, the gravamen of such an inquiry was whether her Majesty's Government sanctioned assassination as a means of getting rid of an enemy in war. The Right Honorable Secretary replied that he did not know whether a price had been put on Cetewayo's head or not. He was evidently apprehensive that the thing

had been done, and he hesitated to condemn the practice lest he should cast censure upon the commander of the forces in South Africa. The Opposition saw the opening, and rushed at it. After a brief skirmish the Chancellor of the Exchequer was fain to admit that assassination was an unjustifiable mode of warfare, and to pronounce against it in unqualified terms. Under our system it would have been impossible either to get a satisfactory answer from an unwilling Secretary, or to punish him for withholding it.

Committees of Congress have a more expeditious way of obtaining information. They invite the Secretary to attend their sittings, and, although he may come or not as he pleases, he generally does come, and, through the medium of questions and answers and verbal colloquy, he soon puts the members in possession of all the facts they desire to know, and of his own reasons and opinions also. But what transpires in a committee-room is supposed to be secret. None but members of the committee are enlightened in this way. Congress itself is as much in the dark as the public in reference to the proceedings of committees. In fact, Congress depends upon the newspaper reporters for the details of such proceedings, which are wormed out of members with every variety of inexactitude. Now, publicity and responsibility — responsibility for the question, and responsibility for the answer-are as desirable as expedition in the obtaining of information, and precision in its character when obtained; and all these desiderata may be secured by Mr. Pendleton's bill. But it is hardly conceivable that the reform proposed should be merely a change of vehicles by which information is conveyed from the departments to Congress, like substituting the telephone in place of pen and ink. The tendency to a change of substance-a change in the relations which the legislative and executive branches of government hold toward each other-would grow stronger with each day's wrestling in the arena of Congressional debate. Indeed, it is only in this view that the measure calls for any philosophical attention. Personal contact is a step toward fusion of the two bodies brought together. There will still be a wide difference between English and American methods of administration, but less difference than before. If the American Cabinet is ever to become what the English Cabinet is-an executive committee of the popular branch of the Legislature the first step in that direction will be something like Mr. Pendleton's bill. It is proposed now to glance at the principal advantages and disadvantages of such a change.

The principal advantage would be the establishment of harmony between the Legislature and the Executive, so that they might always be pull

ing in harness together, instead of contrariwise, as now often happens. Under existing arrangements a Republican President can usually be relied upon to be at cross-purposes with a Democratic Congress all the time, and with a Republican Congress half the time. President Johnson's Administration was a continued scene of conflict between the executive and legislative branches, growing out of differences respecting the reconstruction of the Southern States; and the fact that both President and Congress belonged to the same political party served rather to intensify than to mitigate the bitterness between them. President Grant commenced his civic career with a prodigious quarrel of the same sort, growing out of the attempted annexation of San Domingo, leading to the ostracism of such men as Sumner, Schurz, and Trumbull, the evil consequences of which have not even yet disappeared. The relations between Congress and President Hayes were those of mutual suspicion and aversion until a very recent period, when active hostilities broke out, and veto messages followed each other like the discharges of a Gatling gun. In the cases of President Johnson and President Grant the civil service was used unsparingly to tempt the weak and break down the strong among their opponents in Congress. The public offices furnished ammunition for the fray, and demoralization was spread far and wide. The course pursued was very much in harmony with the precedents of George III., and the personal quarrels of that monarch with the most eminent men of his day. It is much to President Hayes's credit that he has abstained from such exhibitions of spite, but we have no guarantee that his next successor may not arm himself with the carnal weapons of eighty thousand offices when he comes in collision, as he probably will, with the politicians at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. Civilservice reform is the crying problem of the day, and the difficulties that beset it would be diminished by any step which should insure to the Executive a majority in the Legislature, or to the Legislature the control of the Executive, whichever form of expression be preferred.

The independence of the two, or rather of the three, branches of government is so inbred and ingrained among American conceptions, that the idea of the President controlling Congress, or Congress controlling the President, is repulsive at first sight. But seeing that both are elected by the people at regular and short intervals, the evils arising from such a condition, whether more or less, can not be dangers to liberty, and they may be wholly imaginary. The objection oftenest raised to the plan of bringing the Cabinet officers into Congress is that the power of the Executive would be unduly augmented; that

this power is already swollen beyond reasonable bounds by means of the patronage; that members of Congress are already sufficiently under Executive influence as sharers of the patronage; and that under the proposed régime the powers of Congress would be submerged under those of the President. This objection is not only fallacious in itself, but it involves a complete misconception of the objects sought to be attained. These objects are avowedly to blend the two functions of government together, which is not the same thing as overthrowing and destroying one of them. But experience shows that parliamentary government tends to the absorption of executive power by the Legislature rather than of legislative power by the Executive. The course of English history is conclusive upon this point, and that of French history has furnished some notable illustrations of it since the establishment of the republic. If we suppose the seven members of the American Cabinet to be placed upon the floor of Congress with all the rights and privileges extended to delegates from the Territories (who are likewise extra-constitutional members), their influence and standing would depend upon their ability, experience, and force of character. At first the President might choose a Cabinet of his own cronies, as General Grant did, without reference to their training, their eminence in public life, or their acceptableness to anybody but himself. A selection thus made may answer its purposes without any great harm in mere routine work, already organized in bureaus and divisions and circumlocution, and especially in a country which needs more than anything else to be let alone. But when brought into the rough-and-tumble of parliamentary life the House will soon find out which of them are fit for their places and which are not. The jackdaw with peacock's feathers in his tail was soon plucked by the nobler fowls in the farmyard, and so it would be with any pretender of statecraft who should be thrust into competition with three or four hundred of the shrewdest and most active, if not the most highly trained intellects of the country, and required ex officio to be a leader among them. His position would soon become too miserable to be borne. The law of natural selection would come in play, and after more or less floundering and groping, which must be looked for in any political transition, the President would learn to choose for his Cabinet men who were acceptable to the House, and capable of leading it. Thus the Cabinet would be virtually the choice of the House, although nominally that of the President. The President would still be their chief, and eventually his will must prevail over theirs, within constitutional limits, but the success of his Administration would depend upon

his having a Cabinet capable of leading the House, and ex necessitate rei in harmony with it.

The next advantage claimed for the plan is that it would bring the whole framework of government more within the range and influence of public opinion. Whether this would be a real advantage under our system of universal suffrage is a debatable question, which will be considered further on; but that it would have the effect mentioned can not be doubted. At present the Administration can be brought to account only once in four years. Its measures are often taken with indifference to public opinion, oftener still in ignorance, and sometimes in defiance of it. The people seldom or never rule effectively with reference to a particular measure, but only with reference to a sum total and average of all the measures for which an administration or party can be held responsible. Instances might be enumerated where the people have voted against measures after they were passed, and when opposition to them had ceased to be effective. The mischief had been actually done, and the after-indignation of the public served perhaps to punish, but not to prevent or cure. The repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the socalled "back-pay grab" were cases of this kind. Neither the annexation of Texas nor the purchase of Alaska could have been accomplished by popular vote, or under any system where the judgment of the people could have been brought to bear upon them in good time. Chastisement is often a good thing, but prevention of the offense is better. Most commonly the offense itself is forgotten before the election comes round, having been superseded by some new excitement.

Moreover, the periods for settling accounts with the three branches of government are not the same, the nearest approach to a general verdict being the quadrennial election for President, at which time one of the biennial elections for members of the House of Representatives occurs. The Senators are elected at no particular time; but one third of the whole number must go out every two years.

Public opinion is thus greatly scattered and frustrated in its action upon particular measures, being much less prompt and effective than its action in England, where it strikes the whole government at once through the House of Commons. Geographical distance and preoccupation with State affairs are accountable, in some degree, for the slower and less energetic movements of public opinion upon Washington City; but still more is this sluggishness chargeable to the division of responsibility at Washington, and to the fact that nobody's term of office can be shortened by any amount of public clamor, unless for some impeachable offense. Now, if it be

desirable to make the Government more amenable to public opinion than it is, and to give the people a chance to act upon particular measures while they are pending, instead of passing judgment upon them in a lump after they have been adopted or rejected at Washington, some one body of the three must be selected to receive the impact of popular force; and it would naturally be the one which most often returns to the people to give an account of itself, and to solicit the suffrages of the community-to wit, the House of Representatives. And to enable the impact to reach the Executive as well as the Legislature -as frequently and as powerfully-a responsible Cabinet, having seats in the House, initiating the principal measures of legislation, answering publicly for all Executive acts, and standing or falling according to their ability to get their measures and policy approved by the House, would seem to be well adapted to that end.

These are the principal but not the only advantages of the proposed change. Another may be mentioned before passing to the consideration of objections. Since all legislation relates to one or other of the executive departments, imposing duties or restrictions upon them, it would be manifestly advantageous to have the benefit of their experience, and to hear what they have to say, not through incomplete and tedious statements in writing, or private conferences in committee-rooms, but through the medium of free public debate. Not long since the House of Representatives passed a bill transferring the entire administration of Indian affairs from the Interior Department to that of War, without consulting the Secretary of either!

Turning to the other side, we remark, first, that responsible, or parliamentary, or cabinet government is the product of that natural evolution by which monarchical or personal government turns itself into free government. Wherever it exists there has been a force from behind pushing it on. It is a growth, and not a device. It was never invented by anybody; and, probably, the world's verdict upon it a priori would have been that it would not work at all. Nevertheless, it is overrunning Europe irresistibly. Its highest development is found in England; but it exists with scarcely less vigor in the Low Countries, Italy, and Scandinavia. Its various shadings are found everywhere, from Gibraltar to Constantinople. Wherever we hear of a ministerial crisis, we hear the tocsin of responsible government. We never hear it in Russia, Prussia, Switzerland, or the United States, because those countries are governed upon different principles. The republic of France is aiming at ministerial responsibility with an elective President of limited tenure, and bids fair to achieve

that novelty. M. Waddington gave offense to his party some months ago by saying that a parliamentary republic was a great experiment. The remark was both true and timely. The friends of freedom throughout the world ardently wish success and permanence to the latest born of republics; but in its attempted blending of English and American forms it is a new thing under the sun, and has not yet passed beyond the region of experiment. In the Dominion of Canada parliamentary government exists under a written Constitution, and with the smallest thread of connection with the Crown. If this connection were severed entirely, there is no reason to suppose that Canada would need to establish a dynasty, or do anything different from what she does now. In America, there being no monarchy, no hereditary governing power, whose hands must be tied, there is no force from behind pushing toward parliamentary forms of administration. The movement is wholly in the domain of theory. It appeals to the reason, not to the necessities, of men; and it may fairly be urged as an objection against such doctoring, that the country does not particularly feel the need of medical treatment.

Again, in America the greatest possible extension has been given to the democratic principle. The suffrage has been granted to all adult males, including, for instance, a vast body of blacks who were only recently toiling under the lash of slavery, and who will continue to toil under the lash of ignorance till they sink into their graves, and their children succeed to a brighter inheritance. The suffrage is granted every day to a still more mischievous class from the Old World, who have brought the doctrines of Lassalle and Karl Marx into an atmosphere where they can not be so summarily dealt with as at home. As the population of cities increases, a pernicious sort of demagogism gains ground. The idea that the majority have a right to govern tends to expand into the idea that what the majority want to do is ipso facto right. The dangers arising from this condition are, I think, considerably overstated in Macaulay's letter to the editor of the works of Jefferson, and also in a recent widely read article in the "Atlantic Monthly Magazine." But it is a serious question, and entirely apposite to this discussion, whether, under such conditions, it is wise to throw away any of those checks and balances which now and then disable the majority, prevent them from carrying hasty decisions into effect, and compel them to reconsider their purposes and the grounds thereof. For the introduction of responsible government, in its entirety, would put more power into the hands of the majority than they now have, and a good deal more. It would make the House of

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