THE CONCEPTIONS OF THE HISTORY OF PHI LOSOPHY.1 T is less easy than one would think to form an exact idea of the history of philosophy, of its function in the order of human disciplines, and the way in which it must endeavor to carry out this function effectively. Like all history, naturally, its task is to find out and reconstitute, and as far as possible to explain, realities which have previously come to pass; but how far does the nature of these realities agree with the labor of reconstruction, and in any case is it not of such a nature as to require special methods or special mental attitudes for accomplishing the task? It is not enough to say or to presume that the methods of investigation proper to history have simply to be applied in the present case; for limits must be assigned to the particular object to which these methods are applied, and the meaning of the questions we must ask ourselves in order to understand it should be determined: now it is from the nature of the object that the enunciation of these questions, to a considerable extent at all events, is evidently deduced. Consequently, we must inquire as to the precise way in which philosophy lends itself to historical study. At the outset, we must note that philosophy is not a thing that exists objectively, at least in an objective mate 1 The following article is a lecture given by the late Victor Delbos and is entitled "Les conceptions de l'histoire de la philosophie." It is printed in the Revue de métaphysique et de morale for March, 1917 (Vol. XXIV, pp. 135147), and the translation is by Fred Rothwell. rial existence conformable with the unity and simplicity of the word. Philosophy does not exist, but philosophies do, philosophical doctrines or conceptions which have appeared either successively or simultaneously, and many of which, strange to say, have claimed to be the vehicles of complete and certain truth, to supply the formulas which conclude investigation, and hence, in a way, as regards knowledge of their object, to arrest the course of history. These philosophies are diverse and frequently opposed to one another, not only in the solutions they reach but also in the problems from which they originate and still more in the faculties they bring into play and the methods they employ, and even in the representation of their ideal, which is strictly systematic in some and in the others more divided and parceled out, less engaged in the quest for unity: so that we have actually some difficulty in indicating those characteristics whereby philosophic doctrines or conceptions are really distinguished from other forms of intellectual production. Nevertheless, an attempt must be made to indicate these characteristics. Without either prejudging or excluding anything, we may lay it down that the various philosophic doctrines or conceptions have come about, in part or in whole, with reference to this end: from the resources of the human mind alone to supply an all-embracing explanation of reality and also such an idea of the destiny of man as will enable us to determine his essential task in this world. I state that the various philosophies have appeared with reference to this end, by which term I mean that while some of them have had this end directly in view and believed they could actually realize it more or less completely, others have wished to examine and dispute this very claim, in such a way at times as to consider it more or less illegitimate, more or less capable of realization. Some philosophies are doctrinal and dogmatic, others are critical and sceptical; others again combine or link together these two tendencies in varying proportions. From another point of view, the importance allotted to any particular part of the philosophic problem varies according to the philosophers. All the same, speaking generally, all philosophy is qualified by its relation, whether total or partial, affirmative or critical, or even consciously negative, to the end we have just set forth. Hence, while we can set approximate limits to the object of the history of philosophy, it would all the same appear that this object scarcely lends itself to historical research without being misrepresented. Indeed, is it not characteristic of many philosophic doctrines that they claim completely to reconstruct all previous work and hence to suppress their dependence on the past? To some extent, history imposes on them like dependence. Is it not also the characteristic of many of them that they claim to express the whole truth, i. e., an adequation of mind and matter, freed from the conditions of time? Now, history subordinates them, however slightly, to conditions of this kind. Cartesianism offers us a striking and decisive instance of the conflict between the historical and the philosophic mind. Descartes, when he philosophizes, does not want to know if men existed before him or not; moreover, he asserts the truth he discovers through the content and the concatenation of clear, distinct ideas, the meaning and scope of which are eternal and immutable. The philosopher contemplates or explains things sub specie aeternitatis. The historian can only consider them under the form of time. Malebranche, like a good Cartesian, is ever telling us that the knowledge of the philosophic opinions of other men is quite useless and may be extremely prejudicial to the search after truth. It cannot be denied, on the other hand, that the history of philosophy has frequently set forth the contrast between systems and the per petual and useless going over the same ground again and again on the part of philosophers themselves. Still, we must discover if such a view has not been added on to history, both by the prejudices of a sceptical mind which likes to find an irremediable contradiction everywhere, and by the excesses of the dogmatic mind which, presupposing that philosophic truth is absolutely realized somewhere in a given system, delights in proving the impotence or the obscurity of everything outside this system. To do this, however, we must endeavor to form a clear idea of the history of philosophy, for this idea is itself of varying nature and does not readily reveal itself in its exact form. Let us examine a few modern works which, directly or indirectly, have either contributed to this revelation or have claimed to do so. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to count among the works dealing with the history of philosophy such a work as Bayle's Dictionnaire historique et critique (Rotterdam, 1695-1697, 2 vols). Many of his articles, however, which treat of doctrines of the past, bear witness to far-reaching sources of information that is less well arranged than curious in its nature. Moreover, the restoration or the evocation of these doctrines is calculated to confound human reason and that along the lines of scepticism. Here we are rather dealing with a philosophical criticism of the doctrines handed down to us than with a historical criticism of the methods in which their transmission has come about. Directed along these lines, Bayle's intelligence does not always penetrate to the real essence of a system, far from it. None the less has this exposition of various doctrines resulted in a certain notion of them being spread abroad and popularized, while a stimulus has been given to the spirit of research in the domain of the history of philosophy. Before assuming a form capable of combining the philosophical interest of the object with the historical require ments of research, the history of philosophy has again in modern times acquired characteristics which have kept it more or less aloof from the one or the other of these two conditions. The History of Philosophy, by Thomas Stanley, published in London in 1655, 2d ed. 1687,—translated into Latin, Leipsic, 1711,-is no more than a pragmatic and narrative history; it follows to a considerable extent the same lines as the work of Diogenes Laërtius; moreover, it is concerned only with the philosophy previous to Christianity, on the ground that, "Christian theology being the receptacle of truth, there is no longer any reason why philosophy should seek it."-Brucker's works certainly indicate an advance on this method of procedure; his principal work, Historia critica philosophiae, a mundo incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta, 5 vols. (Leipsic, 1742-1744), is not only very erudite and unambiguous, it is also largely critical. The doctrines are stated faithfully, though the idea of their concatenation and their relative importance is lacking. Convinced that truth has its home. in Protestant orthodoxy and in the philosophy of Leibniz, Brucker judges doctrines by this standard, and occasionally almost misjudges the causes that have produced discordant systems causes that have a deeper origin than human perversity. Truth being single, error is multiple,—and the history of philosophy, by disclosing the multiplicity of systems, shows infinita falsae philosophiae exempla.—Brucker confuses the history of philosophy in its origin with that of religions, mythologies and poetry. Here, no doubt, he was right in thinking that the origins of philosophic thought raised the problem of its relation to those forms of belief which involved ideas on the world; but in those days he had no means of stating clearly and attacking effectively—let alone solving this kind of problem. At all events, even his formal statement of purely philosophical doctrines still |