than material and intellectual find a reflex in that Chamber; great jurists are there, and great soldiers and sailors; experienced proconsuls and successful administrators; except that of manual labour there is scarcely a national interest which cannot find a spokesman. And yet it would be difficult to claim for the House of Lords, in the aggregate, that it is a truly representative assembly. Nor is the reason far to seek. Side by side with a large body of men who could under no circumstances be excluded from any assembly which was genuinely representative of national interests there is a considerable if not actually a larger body of men to whom admission would indubitably be denied. The weakness of the House of Lords consists not in the absence of competent legislators, but in the potential presence of a large number of incompetents.

That any assembly charged with the task of legislative or administrative revision should be efficient for the purpose goes without saying. But to be really efficient it is almost essential that it should be manageably small. Perhaps the two most powerful Second Chambers in the world are the American Senate and the German Bundesrat. The former contains less than a hundred, the latter just over sixty, members. If federal comparisons must be excluded we may still remind ourselves that the French Senate with half the numbers of the House of Lords is at least twice as powerful.

There have been schemes in plenty for the reform of the House of Lords. In 1869 Lord Russell carried to a second reading a Life-Peerage Bill. In 1884 Lord Rosebery presided over a Select Committee which recommended certain changes in regard to the Scotch and Irish Peers. The same statesman tried to interest the Lords in larger schemes in 1884, and again in 1888, but on both occasions in vain. Lord Salisbury, in 1888, did actually embody certain definite proposals in a Bill which was twice read in the House of Lords, but he did not persevere, and thus the Tory party lost an opportunity of 'reform from within,' which will never recur. With the return of the Radical party to power in 1906 a change passed over the spirit of the scene. A determined attack was opened on the whole position of the House of Lords, an attack which culminated in the Parliament Act of 1911. Meanwhile, Lord Rosebery made one more gallant effort to obtain a general assent to certain broad principles of reform.

In 1907-8 he himself presided over a very strong Committee of the House of Lords which in December, 1908, presented its Report. The Committee endeavoured in its recommendations to preserve as far as possible the fabric and posi'tion of the House of Lords within the Constitution, and with 'such modifications only as the circumstances of the age and 'the needs of efficiency seem to require.' That the scheme recommended was open to criticism goes without saying, but it furnished an admirable basis for reforms at once drastic and reasonably conservative. Like much else, however, it never got a chance even of consideration, being overwhelmed in the revolutionary flood of 1909.

No scientific student of politics can regard the Parliament Act of 1911 as other than a temporary and party makeshift. It effectually clips the powers of the existing House of Lordsuntil the next turn of the electoral wheel brings the Tories into power. But it does less than nothing to repair or to strengthen the Constitutional fabric, or to provide the country with a Second Chamber, at once intelligible and efficient, independent and in the best sense popular, in sympathy with that great floating mass of public sentiment which has no permanent party attachments, and commanding the respect of the best men on both sides. That the erection of such a Chamber is not outside the region of possibility has been demonstrated in the foregoing pages. It is doubtful, however, whether any party in England desires a brand-new symmetrical Senate. Is it possible to combine the historic and the efficient; to reconcile the spirit of conservatism with the claims of democracy?

The Rosebery Committee started from the proposition that henceforward the possession of a Peerage should not of itself give the right to sit and vote in the House of Lords. The hereditary principle, as an exclusive and sufficient qualification, was thus, at the outset, jettisoned. The next point, upon which emphasis was laid, was a rigid curtailment of numbers. The Rosebery Committee contemplated a Chamber of 400 members; a House of 300 or even 200 would probably be both stronger and more efficient. Of these half might be elected by the Peers from among the members of their own order, just as the Scotch and Irish Peers elect their representatives at present, but with some regard to the principle of proportion, secured by the device

of the single transferable vote. In this moiety some Bishops would find a place. The other moiety should, pending the creation of a Federal Legislature, contain some direct representatives of the Dominions, some representatives of Labour, elected perhaps by the Co-operative Congress, by the Trade Union Congress, and by the 'Free' Labour Council. Elected representatives of the Roman Catholic and the' Free' Churches should also be included; as well, perhaps, as representatives elected by the Councils of Counties and County Boroughs. The nominative element should be rigorously excluded, for experience, notably that of Canada and Italy, tends to prove that of all devices this is the one least calculated to produce the desired object-a Chamber at once efficient and independent. It may be argued that some infusion of the nominated element is necessary in order to prevent deadlocks between the two Houses. This is an important matter, but the object can be better attained in other ways: by a joint session; by a simultaneous dissolution of both Houses; or by a referendum.

These changes would probably have sufficed ten years ago; whether they would satisfy the country to-day is perhaps doubtful. During the last ten years the political situation has fundamentally changed; changed also is the temper of the multitude. No one who has not mingled with the working folk of Scotland or the North of England can have any conception of their set determination not to allow themselves to be 'bossed 'by the Lords' in future. It has been recently pointed out that it took the middle classes-nominally admitted to political supremacy in 1832—at least a generation before they could make effective use of their power. It took the manual workers -admitted to the franchise in 1867-just thirty-nine years before they recognised the significance of the change, or were ready to take advantage of it. Down to 1688 or perhaps down to 1714 the English Constitution-despite certain checks and balances was pre-eminently monarchical. From that time until 1906 the actual government was vested, notwithstanding the changes effected in 1832, 1867, and 1884, in rival groups of men who belonged, with insignificant exceptions, to a small and select class. In fine, England was essentially an aristocracy. During the last ten years the balance of forces has once more undergone a profound readjustment. Whether that readjustment will contribute to the stability of the Common

wealth and to the contentment of the people it is much too soon to say.

For the moment it is obvious that the new wine of political supremacy has mounted to the heads of men who are unaccustomed to strong liquor, to whom the wisdom of the ages is the doddering imbecility of age. They have yet to learn, in the only school where they can be taught, the hard lessons of experience. The next thirty years may, therefore, prove to be the most critical in our history. No effort should be spared to give to this young Democracy all the assistance which can be derived from efficient political institutions. The vanity and folly of individuals may render of none effect the wisest and soundest Constitution in the world. No safeguards can ultimately save men from themselves. But that does not prove the inutility of all safeguards.

Among political safeguards a strong and efficient Second Chamber is without question one of the most important. The existing Second Chamber has been reduced to the verge of impotence. It has lost faith in itself. It can never in its present form be reinvested with sufficient authority and power to enable it to fulfil the functions appropriate to its position. 'The best constitution of a Second Chamber,' wrote Mill in 1861, is that which embodies the greatest number of elements exempt from the class interests and prejudices of the majority, 'but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic 'feeling.'

To compass the creation of such a Chamber; to discover for it a basis which shall be at once intelligible and differentiating ; to secure to it the power of effective revision without the power of control; to render it amenable to permanent public sentiment and yet independent of transitory phases of opinion; to erect a bulwark against revolution without interposing a barrier to reform-this is one of the most vital and immediate, as it is one of the most perplexing, problems which to-day await solution at the hands of British statesmanship.

J. A. R. MARRIOTT.

No. 462 will be published in October.