1672. people for a family, under which they had been fo long eafy and happy..

The

neral.

When the Prince was of full age, it was proPrince of pofed in fo many places that he fhould have the Orange made Ge- fupream command of their armies and fleets, that De Wit faw the tide was too ftrong to be refifted. So, after he had oppofed it long, he proposed fome limitations, that fhould be fettled, previous to his advancement. The hardeft of all was, that he fhould bind himself by oath never to pretend to be Stadtholder, nor fo much as to accept of it, tho' it fhould be offered him. These conditions were not of an eafy digeftion. Yet, it was thought neceffary, that the Prince fhould be once at the head of their armies: That would create a great dependence on him: And if God blefs'd him with fuccefs, it would not be poffible to keep him fo dow, as thefe limitations laid him: And the obligation never to accept of the Stadtholdership could only be meant of his not accepting the offer from any tumultuary bodies of the populace, or the army; but could, not be a reftraint on him, if the States fhould make the offer, fince his oath was made to them, and by confequence it was in their power to releafe the obligation that did arife from it to themselves. The Court of England blamed him for fubmitting to fuch conditions. But he had no reafon to rely much on the advices of those, who had taken fo little care of him during all the credit they had with the States, while the Triple Alliance gave them a great intereft in their affairs. As foon as he was brought into the command of the armies, he told me, he spoke to De Wit, and defired to live in an entire confidence with him. His answer was cold: So he faw that he could not depend upon him. When he told me this, he added, that he was certainly one of the greatest men of the age, and he believed he ferved his country faithfully. De Wit reckoned, that the French could not come to Holland but by the Maefe.

!

And

And he had taken great care of the garrifon of 1672. Maeftricht; but very little of those that lay on the Rhine and the Ifel, where the States had many places, but none of them good. They were ill fortified, and ill fupplied. But most of them were worse commanded, by men of no courage, nor practice in military affairs, who confidered their governments as places, of which they were to make all the advantage that they could.

Now I come to give an account of the fifth The fifth Crifis brought on the whole Reformation, which Crifis. has been of the longest continuance, fince we are yet in the agitations of it. The defign, was first laid against the States. But the method of invading them was furprizing, and not look'd for. The Elector of Coloign was all his life long a very weak man: Yet it was not thought that he could have been prevailed on to put the French in poffeffion of his country, and to deliver himself with all his dominions over into their hands. When he did that, all upon the Rhine were ftruck with fuch a confternation, that there was no fpirit nor courage left. It is true, they could not have made a great refiftance. Yet if they had but gained a little time, that had given the States fome leifure to look round them, to fee what was to be done.

The King of France came down to Utrecht, The like a land flood. This ftruck the Dutch with fo French fuccefs. juft a terror, that nothing but great errors in his management could have kept them, from deliver. ing themselves entirely up to him. Never was more applaufe given with lefs reason than the King of France had upon this campaign. His fuccefs was owing rather to De Wit's errors, than to his own conduct. There was fo little heart or judgment fhewn, in the management of that run of fuccefs, that, when that year is fet out, as it may well be, it will appear to be one of the leaft glorious of his life; tho', when feen in a falfe light, it appears one of the moft glorious in hiftory. The conquest

VOL. I.

G&

1672. conquest of the Netherlands at that time might have been fo eafily compaffed, that, if his underftanding and his courage had not been equally defective, he could not have mifcarried in it. When his army pafs'd the Rhine, upon which fo much eloquence and poetry have been bestowed, as if all had been animated by his prefence and direction, he was viewing it at a very fafe diftance. When he came to Utrecht, he had neither the Prince of Conde, nor Mr. Turenne to advise with: And he was wholly left to his Minifters. The Prince of Conde was flightly wounded, as he paffed the Rhine: And Turenne was fent against the Elector of Brandenburgh, who was coming down with his army, partly to fave his own country of Cleve, but chiefly to affift his allies the Dutch. So the King had none about him to advise with, but Pom. ponne and Louvoy, when the Dutch fent to him to know what he demanded. Pomponne's advice was wife and moderate, and would in conclufion have brought about all that he intended. He propofed, that the King fhould reftore all that belonged to the seven Provinces, and require of them only the places that they had without them; chiefly Maeftricht, Bois Le Duc, Breda, and Bergen-opzoom: Thus the King would maintain an appearance of preferving the feven Provinces entire, which the Crown of France had always protected. To this certainly the Dutch would have yielded, without any difficulty. By this he had the Spanish Netherlands entirely in his power, feparated from Holland and the Empire; and might have taken them, whenfoever he pleased. This would have an appearance of moderation, and would stop the motion that all Germany was now in; which could have no effect, if the States did not pay and But fol- fubfift the troops. Louvoy on the other hand prolowed by pofed, that the King fhould make use of the conan ill ma- fternation the Dutch were then in, and put them out of a condition of oppofing him for the future.

nag:

ment.

He therefore advised, that the King fhould demand of them, befides all that Pomponne moved, the paying a vaft fum for the charge of that cam-. paign; the giving the chief Church in every town for the exercise of the Popish religion; and that they fhould put themselves under the protection of France; and fhould fend an Embaffador every year with a medal acknowledging it; and fhould' enter into no treaties, or alliances, but by the directions of France. The Dutch Embaffadors were amazed, when they faw that the demands rose to fo extravagant a pitch. One of them fwooned away, when he heard them read: He could nei ther think of yielding to them, nor fee how they could refift them. There was an article put in for form, that they should give the King of England full fatisfaction. But all the other demands were made without any concert with England, tho' Lockhart was then following the Court.

I fay nothing of the fea fight in Solbay, in which De Ruyter had the glory of furprizing the English fleet, when they were thinking lefs of engaging the enemy, than of an extravagant preparation for the ufual disorders of the twenty ninth of May t Which he prevented, engaging them on the twen ty eighth, in one of the most obftinate sea fights that has happened in our age; in which the French took more care of themselves than became gallant men, unless they had orders to look on, and leave the English and Dutch to fight it out, while they preferved the force of France entire. De Ruyter difabled the fhip in which the Duke was, whom fome blamed for leaving his fhip too foon. Then his perfonal courage began first to be called in queftion. The Admiral of the blue fquadron was burnt by a fire fhip, after a long engagement with a Dutch fhip much inferior to him in ftrength. In it the Earl of Sandwich perifhed with a great many about him, who would not leave him, as he Gg 2. would

1672.

1672 would not leave his fhip, by a piece of obftinate courage, to which he was provoked by an indecent reflection the Duke made, on an advice he had offered, of drawing nearer the fhore, and avoiding an engagement, as if in that he took more care of himself than of the King's honour. The Duke of Buckingham came aboard the fleet; tho' it was obferved, that he made great hafte away, when he heard the Dutch fleet was in view. The Duke told me, that he faid to him, fince they might engage the enemy quickly, he intended to make fure of another world: So he defired to know who was the Duke's Priest, that he might reconcile himself to the Church. The Duke told him, Talbot, would help him to a Pricft. And he brought one to him. They were for fome time fhut up toge ther. And the Prieft faid, he had reconciled him according to their form. The Duke of Buckingham, who had no religion at heart, did this only to recommend himfelf to the Duke's confidence.

The

Detch in great ex

tremities.

It may be easily imagined, that all things were at this time in great diforder at the Hague.. The French poffeffed themfelves of Naerdin: And a party had entred into Muyden, who had the keys of the gates brought to them. But they, feeing it was an inconfiderable place, not knowing the importance of it, by the command of the water that could drown all to Amfterdam, flung the keys into the ditch, and went back to Naerden, But when the confequence of the place was under ftood, another party was fent to fecure it. But before their return, two battalions were fent from the Prince of Orange, who fecured the place; and by that means preferved Amfterdam, where all were trembling, and thought of nothing but of treating and fubmiffion. The States were very near the extremities of defpair. They had not only loft many places, but all their garrifons in them. Guelder, Overyffel, and Utrecht, were quite loft: