The Oxford Handbook of RationalityAlfred R. Mele, Piers Rawling Oxford University Press, 2004-01-08 - 496 psl. Rationality has long been a central topic in philosophy, crossing standard divisions and categories. It continues to attract much attention in published research and teaching by philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines, including economics, psychology, and law. The Oxford Handbook of Rationality is an indispensable reference to the current state of play in this vital and interdisciplinary area of study. Twenty-two newly commissioned chapters by a roster of distinguished philosophers provide an overview of the prominent views on rationality, with each author also developing a unique and distinctive argument. |
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Rezultatai 1–5 iš 90
5 psl.
... person's theoretical rationality . In his concluding sec- tions , Audi discusses the scope of theoretical rationality and the kind of cognitive integration it requires . In " Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning " ( chap . 3 ) ...
... person's theoretical rationality . In his concluding sec- tions , Audi discusses the scope of theoretical rationality and the kind of cognitive integration it requires . In " Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning " ( chap . 3 ) ...
7 psl.
... person believes a proposition strongly to the extent that she presupposes its truth in her practical and theoretical ... person's graded beliefs and conditional beliefs ; ( 5 ) empirical learning is best modeled as probabilistic ...
... person believes a proposition strongly to the extent that she presupposes its truth in her practical and theoretical ... person's graded beliefs and conditional beliefs ; ( 5 ) empirical learning is best modeled as probabilistic ...
11 psl.
... person as a reflective rational agent ; ( 5 ) this definition of the person has led Locke and others to distinguish personal identity from animal identity ; ( 6 ) although it is a platitude that a person has special reason to be ...
... person as a reflective rational agent ; ( 5 ) this definition of the person has led Locke and others to distinguish personal identity from animal identity ; ( 6 ) although it is a platitude that a person has special reason to be ...
26 psl.
... person who knows it a priori . " Knowl- edge through testimony , then , even if direct in the sense of " noninferential , " might be called secondary , in contrast with the kind that does not depend ( in the way testimony - based ...
... person who knows it a priori . " Knowl- edge through testimony , then , even if direct in the sense of " noninferential , " might be called secondary , in contrast with the kind that does not depend ( in the way testimony - based ...
31 psl.
... person acquires the conceptual capacity needed to achieve justification , justification cannot derive from one source at a time ( nor need we suppose that concept - formation develops earlier than , or in isolation from , the formation ...
... person acquires the conceptual capacity needed to achieve justification , justification cannot derive from one source at a time ( nor need we suppose that concept - formation develops earlier than , or in isolation from , the formation ...
Turinys
3 | |
17 | |
Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning | 45 |
Procedural and Substantive Practical Rationality | 57 |
Humean Rationality | 75 |
Rationality as Practical Reason | 93 |
Duty Rationality and Practical Reasons | 110 |
Bayesianism | 132 |
Paradoxes of Rationality | 257 |
Rationality and Psychology | 279 |
Gender and Rationality | 301 |
Rationality and Persons | 320 |
Rationality Language and the Principle of Charity | 343 |
Rationality and Science | 363 |
Economic Rationality | 380 |
Legal Theory and the Rational Actor | 399 |
Decision Theory and Morality | 156 |
Rationality and Game Theory | 182 |
Practical Reasoning and Emotion | 206 |
The Rationality of Being Guided by Rules | 222 |
Motivated Irrationality | 240 |
Rationality and Evolution | 417 |
References | 439 |
Index | 469 |
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Pagrindiniai terminai ir frazės
akratic action argues argument backward induction basic Bayesian behavior Cambridge chap choose claim cognitive coherence commitment conception of rationality confirmation bias consider cooperation Cosmides Davidson decision theory deliberation desire economic emotions epistemic epistemology ethics evaluation evidence evolution evolutionary evolutionary game theory evolutionary psychologists example expected utility explain externalist feminist game theory Gauthier gender human Humean hypothesis inductive inductive reasons inference interpretation irrational irrationality judgment justified Kant knowledge logical lottery Mele moral motivated Nash equilibrium normative objective one's option outcome Oxford Parfit payoff person perspective Philosophy players possible practical rationality practical reasoning preferences principle probabilistic probability problem propositional attitudes propositions psychological rational agents rational belief rational unity reflective rational relevant replicator dynamics requires role rule scientists sense Skyrms social strategy subjects substantivists suppose theoretical rationality theoretical reasoning things thought tional truth University Press utility function utility maximization
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