The contrast of our conduct towards Great Britain and that towards Mexico, is very marked. It was said that

our title to the whole of Oregon was clear and unquestionable," but the fleets and armies of the United States were not immediately despatched to take possession. The final decision was delayed till the next session of Congress, and submitted to their wisdom. It was finally settled by negotiation, and, notwithstanding the claim to 54° 40', the line of the treaty was fixed at 49°. It was conceded, on the other hand, that the boundaries of Texas were not "clear and unquestionable," but were matters of future negotiation; the final ceremonies of annexation were not concluded till Dec. 22, 1845; but the forces of the United States had already taken up threatening positions in the Gulf, on the Pacific, and upon the Nueces; rumors of war were rife; and although Congress was in session at the time, a secret order was despatched to Gen. Taylor, on Jan. 13, 1846,-less than a month after annexation was finally adjusted, — to advance up to the Rio Grande, into a country which the articles of the Joint Resolution themselves implied was debatable ground. Could any key to such different measures in the two cases be detected in the fact that Great Britain was strong, and that Mexico was weak? or, in the further fact, that Oregon was free territory and was not wanted, and that Texas was a slave State and was wanted, and wanted, too, up to the extreme limit to which she had ever swelled her revolutionary pretensions?

It is very true that Mexico was deeply incensed against us on account of the annexation of Texas, that her Minister called for his passports and returned home after that measure was passed by Congress, and that the further payment of the claims was suspended, and that Mexico refused to accredit Mr. Slidell as a Resident Minister. Many statesmen of all parties in the United States did not blame her indignation. A former President of the Republic of Texas

said in the Senate of the United States, that we "annexed war," when we annexed Texas. But though war might exist de jure in the judgment of the Mexican Government, since it was through the instrumentality of citizens of the South and West that Texan independence was secured,* yet war did not exist de facto. The return home of Almonte, the Mexican Minister at Washington, did not necessitate the interruption of all friendly relations between the two countries; witness the recent dismissal of the English Minister, Bulwer, from the court of Spain. No declaration of the final non-payment of claims, still due, had been announced on the part of the indebted nation. Three instalments out of twenty had been punctually paid, and the fourth was receipted for, but not received. Mexico but paused to see what would be the end of these things. She did not reject a commissionert empowered to settle the question of boundaries, but she refused a resident minister, as his reception would imply that the relations between the two countries were entirely amicable. The questions at issue must first be settled, and then she would be prepared to resume all the forms of a mutual good understanding.

We see, therefore, by this rapid glance, that although there were serious irritations and recriminations between the parties, there was no actual war; not a sword had been drawn. There was still hope, that by reason and forbearance on both sides, the term "sister republics" would not cease to be even a figure of speech. Similar difficulties

The language of Mr. Van Buren in his letter to Mr. Hammett, April 20, 1844, on the Texan question, was, "Nothing is either more true or more extensively known than that Texas was wrested from Mexico, and her independence established, through the instrumentality of citizens of the United States."

† 30th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Executive Documents, No. 60, pp. 16, 17, 24, 25, 29, 30,,31.

"General Worth. Has Mexico declared war against the United

States?

had been peacefully despatched before in our international history, and none presumed to doubt that the same result would follow now. It was the nineteenth century of the Christian era. The world had grown wiser and better. Christian ideas had begun to enter cabinets and congresses. Negotiations were more satisfactory, as well as more innocent instruments than bayonets. War was an unpopular game, and public opinion had joined with the higher voices of a Christian civilization in branding it as the master crime of the earth. So most men felt, wrote, and spoke.

There appeared to be no pressing exigency that required an instantaneous settlement of the long-standing difficulties. No new invasion of Texas was seriously meditated by her old enemy.* Mexico had not the sinews of war. Time would heal her wounded honor and pride. A handsome bonus for the brilliant gem, plucked from her coronet, might be found in remitting a portion or the whole of the instalments still outstanding. We had waited with other nations until they had recovered their reason; why could we not do the same with Mexico? We had borne long and patiently with the old monarchies of Europe, we should naturally treat, it might be supposed, with unusual tenderness and long-suffering the young republic at our side.

But the military forces of the United States were first

“General Vega. No

"General Worth. Are the two countries still at peace E

"General Vega. Yes. — Minutes of an Interview between General Worth, of the United States' army, and General Vega, of the Mexican army, at Matamoros, March 28, 1846. 30th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. No. 60, p. 136.

Hostilities" (still not declared war) "may now be considered as commenced." . General Taylor's Letter to the Department, April 26,

1846. same Documents.

* Mr. Kaufman, of Texas, said in the Senate, July 27, 1848, that "the annexation of Texas was the cause, but not the immediate or necessary cause, of the late war with Mexico."

advanced to Corpus Christi in the summer of 1845, with the ostensible purpose of protecting the new State of Texas.* Not that any imminent danger threatened. No army of invasion was mustering against her. At the most, only some windy menaces, which the sagacious estimated at their true value, were aimed at her security. Mexico was deeply engaged in her own affairs at home. She had little time. or means to attend to truants abroad. Revolution chased revolution, and leaders rose and fell on the stormy sea of her politics. She was in no state to wage a war of re-conquest; and we believe most firmly that it was not in her heart to win back her lost province at the tremendous hazard of a war with the strongest power on the western continent. Therefore, although Dr. Channing had said in 1836, that "to annex Texas is to declare perpetual war with Mexico;" though Mr. Forsyth, Secretary of State, when the plan of annexation was proposed by Texas in 1837, had replied, that "so long as Texas shall remain at war, while the United States are at peace with her adversary, the proposition of the Texan Minister Plenipotentiary (for annexation) necessarily involves the question of war with that adversary;"‡ and Mr. Van Buren had written, that "we cannot avoid the conclusion, that the immediate annexation of Texas would draw after it a war with Mexico;" and Mr. Clay, in the same year, had used the words ation and war with Mexico are identical;" and though a Texan chief magistrate had, as already quoted, declared the same, after the deed was consummated; yet no immediate acts of war did follow. Mexico did not refuse to receive a

annex

* 30th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. No. 60, pp. 79–93.

† Works, vol. 2, pp. 206, 207.

28th Congress, 1st Session, Senate, No. 341, p. 114.

f His Letter to Mr. Hammet, April 20, 1844.

Mr. Clay's Raleigh Letter.

special commissioner to treat of disputed questions and boundaries, and we affirm what will be the eternal verity of history, as we believe, when we say that facts demonstrate there would have been no war after the erection of Texas into one of the States of the American Union, had Gen Taylor never removed his camp from the banks of the Nueces to those of the Rio Grande. It was peculiarly a case for cool, calm deliberation, negotiation, dignified forbearance, in which the greater power would lose no honor, but would gain much, by a temperate and conciliating course with the weaker one. No final door of conference was closed, and much was to be hoped from that healing efficacy of time, which soothes at once the griefs of a nation as those of the humblest of its citizens.

But on the 13th of January, 1846, as before stated, the fatal order was issued by the American Executive, by which Gen. Taylor was directed to advance and occupy, with the troops under his command, "positions on or near the east bank of the Rio del Norte," as soon as it could be conveniently done. How little this measure was necessary for the protection of Texas, or to ward off any threatened or suspected invasion, is apparent from the letters of the commander-in-chief, who was on the spot, and knew what was going on, written to the Secretary of War at home.* Aug. 15, 1845, Gen. Taylor writes, "Nor do I fear that the reported concentration of troops at Matamoras is for any purpose of invasion." Aug. 20th, "Caravans of traders arrive occasionally from the Rio Grande, but bring no news of importance. They represent that there are no regular troops on that river, except at Matamoras, and do not seem

* See this whole correspondence in 30th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. No. 60. The President said in his annual message, Dec. 1845, that the forces of the United States were in a position (on the Nueces) "to defend our own and the rights of Texas." Why then were they advanced to the Rio Grande ?