highly favoured by our own courts, which have liberally imparted to it their encouragement and protection. To a system thus supported, I feel it too strong to apply the maxim "malus usus abolendus est." The time may come when the institution may fall, as similar institutions have fallen in other countries; but I am of opinion it can only fall by the joint expense of both countries, for it is in a peculiar measure the crime of this country; and I rather feel it to be an objection to this species of emancipation, that it is intended to be a very cheap measure here, by throwing the whole expense on the colony. It has been said that the law of England discourages slavery; and it certainly does within the limits of these islands; but it uses a very different language, and exerts a very different form, when it looks to its colonies, -for to this trade in the colonies it gives an almost unbounded protection, and is in the habit of doing so at the present time in many exercises of public authority, and, ever since slavery, the authority of many statutes for the purpose of carrying it into full effect in the colonies. All the efforts of those who have contended for its abolition, and who have obtained Acts of Parliament for its regulation, have in no degree weakened the force of those English statutes.

"It has been observed, that the state has declared that all laws ma in the colonies con

tradicting its own law, shall be null and void, and cannot be put in execution; but is that the character of the colonial laws for the encouragement of the proprietors in slaves? Has not our law declared, in the most explicit and authentic manner, its encouragement of slavery in its colonial establishments ? Have not innumerable Acts passed which regulate the condition of slaves, which tend to consider them, as the colonists themselves do, as res positæ in commercio,-as goods and chattels, subject to mortgage, constituting part of the value of the estates, as liable to be taken in execution for debt, and to be publicly sold for such purposes? And have not the highest courts in this country, the privy council and the court of Chancery, not made regulations for carrying the system into effect with most scrupulous regularity, and under the sanction of Acts of Parliament? Can any man doubt, at this day, that slaves in the colonies may not be transferred by sale made in England, and which would be affirmed, without reference to the court so empowered? and how, under the guarantee of such protection, can it be asserted that the law of England does not support, and, in a high degree, favour, the law of slavery in its West Indian colonies, however it may discourage it in the mother country? Is it not certain that this trade of the colonies has been the very favoured trade of this

country, and so continues, as far as can be judged from the encouragement given in various formsthe making of treaties, the institution of companies, the devolution from one company to another, the compulsion of the colonies to accept this traffic, and the recognition of it in a great variety of its laws? If it be a sin, it is a sin in which this country has largely shared in its guilt, and ought to bear its proportion of the redemption. How this country can decline to perform the act of justice in performing the act of charity, men of great wisdom and integrity have not been able to discover."

It is evident, in the preceding argument, the opinion of the judge is founded on the assumption that the origin of slavery had custom only for its support, and that such custom operated with the force of law.

I find the following definition of the legal phrase custom in Blackstone's Commentaries, and also the description of the conditions that give custom the force of law:-"When a custom," says Blackstone, "is actually proved to exist, the next inquiry is into the legality of it, for if it is not a good custom, it ought to be no longer used. Malus usus abolendus est. To make a particular custom good, the following are necessary requisites." And these requisites, divested of legal phraseology, he states, are the following :

1st. That it has been from time immemorial.

2nd. That it has been continued. 3rd. That it has been peaceable. 4th. That it must be reasonable. 5th. That it ought to be certain. 6th. That it should be consistent.

I will only ask, which of these remarks, with the exception of the second, has slavery upon it?

The next opinion is that of Lord Mansfield, on the case of the negro Sommerset, who claimed his freedom in 1772, in the Court of King's Bench, being then in England, and refusing to return to slavery in the West Indies. In his judgment, Lord Mansfield observed, "The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being now introduced by courts of justice upon mere reasoning, or inferences from any principles natural or political; it must take its rise from positive law the origin of it can in no country or age be traced back to any other source. Immemorial usage preserves the memory of positive law long after all traces of the occasion, reason, and authority, and time of its introduction, are lost, and, in a case so odious as the condition of slaves, must be taken strictly." The man was declared free in the language of Curran, he had touched the soil that is consecrated by the genius of universal emancipation, and the law declared him "redeemed, regenerated, and disenthralled." Now,

in the preceding judgment, it is implied that slavery, to make it legal, required stronger supports than could be adduced for it, derived from natural and political principles. If slavery is attempted to be derived from natural principles, the claim can never be supported; if from political ones, the difficulty is equally great; for I believe it will not be contended that slavery has ever proved politically advantageous to any country, if prosperity be acknowledged a test of political advantage.

The last opinion I have to notice is that of Lord Eldon, in a case that came before him many years ago. "When I find," says his Lordship, "the system of slavery instituted, fostered, and encouraged by the British laws, and under the auspices of the highest sanction, I would hesitate a long time before I ventured to say it was contrary to the genius of the British empire."

This great lawyer, the world knows, was in the habit of hesitating a good deal; but there are few Englishmen, I apprehend, whether lawyers or not, who would not hesitate still longer than even his Lordship did, before they would come to the conclusion that slavery was congenial to the spirit of the British Constitution.

I am, my dear Sir,

Yours very truly,

R. R. M.