sole cause; demurring to the popular notion that God made the world. It is a matter of regret that he either has not read what we have so often proclaimed on this point, (e.g. The sermon on Science and Religion), or that having read it he should have altogether ignored it.

An answer to his objection quite adequate to the purpose is to tell him that Theism is a religion absolutely independent of all enquiries as to the mode of God's existence and the origin of the world. We not only know no more than the scientists of those inscrutable mysteries, but we claim for Theism as he claims for Modern Science, that it "does not pretend to solve the ultimate problem of the universe."

The time is not yet ripe for the investigation much less for the solution; and if we may say so, without offence, it is upon Science and not upon Theism that rests the responsibility of the grand search.

A fortnight before this Westminster Review appeared, I stated with sufficient clearness that Theism is absolutely independent of all metaphysical theories. (Plea for true religion. Part I. Sept. 12th, 1875.)

"We have no need whatever to define what we mean by God, ie., so as to touch in the least, the question of His essence or mode of being. Of such matters we not only confess that we know nothing at all, but also say that we care nothing about them from a religious point of view. We thus drown beneath the waters of Lethe whole battle-fields of discord and confusion. We leave theologians and metaphysicians to go on discussing these questions if they please; but they have nothing whatever to do with religion. It would be as absurd for us to meddle with them, as for a man who had to make a perilous journey by daylight to sit down and analyze the constitution and chemistry of the sun. His business is to use the sun and travel by it as fast and as securely as he can; and solar analysis would be altogether subversive of the duty before him. So with us and God. As the Sun of our souls, we have to journey onwards by His light, cheered and warmed by His all-embracing beams; and it would be subversive of our many obligations and wasteful of our privileges to enter upon an analysis of His nature or mode of existence."

"2. In the next place, and for similar reasons, we entirely dispense with any enquiry as to God's relation to the material universe. Whether he made it or planned it, or rules it in this way or that, is nothing to us, so long as He who is Lord of our souls is likewise Lord of heaven and earth. It is nothing to us whether God is pervading from without or immanent within. It is enough that we in London can lift our souls to Him and feel His presence here, and that our fellow-men are doing the very same thing at the antipodes and in every part of the wide world at the same time."

"We thus get rid of theology and metapysics at the very outset of our religious life, no longer in danger of being shocked by the one or bewildered by the other.'

"3. We dispense with the necessity of explaining or vindicating all the events of which our earth has been the scene. We do not feel obliged to see from one end to the other of the long chain of successive phenomena in order to trust the infinite goodness of God. We do not disguise our deep interest in discovering anything which may throw light upon the wisdom and goodness of His dealings, i.e. the course of history; but we do not feel at all bound to explain every perplexing mystery of life and sensation in the animal and human world. We take for granted-and here we anticipate a smile of derision from those philosophers who think they never take anything for granted-we take for granted, I say, but not without reasons which I have stated elsewhere, that there is in God sufficient wisdom and goodness to adopt the very best means in His reach to attain the good purpose which He has ever before Him. Consequently, though we delight in vindicating the ways of God to men, and indeed, likewise, His ways to our poor dumb fellow-creatures, yet our faith lays us under no obligation to find such vindication, being already sure that there is one if only it could be found, and that whether we can see the wisdom and goodness of His ways or not, still "all His ways are right."

Our religion you see is not hampered by any physical theory of the universe, and consequently all that the essayist says on this point as an objection to Theism falls to the ground.

Still, were the facts otherwise, we might take objection to the argument which he sums up in the following words :

"If God's power be limited, he is not sole first cause, and if it be unlimited, he is not benevolent; but it must be either limited or unlimited therefore God is not sole first cause or he is not benevolent. Either term is fatal to Theism."

I dispute the first proposition, on the ground that every exercise of power involves a limitation of power; as, on the hypothesis of God being a creator, when God creates a tree, His power is henceforth limited by that tree, inasmuch as it can have the functions of a tree and nothing more while it remains as it is. That tree cannot walk, or fly, or think, or speak. It must also occupy a portion of space which God Himself cannot fill with other matter at the same time.

So, if God created a man, so long as he willed that he should be a man, God's power would be limited by that man, and therefore by the physical or moral conditions of that man's nature and circumstances. The thought of God as sole first cause, absolutely alone in the universe, though it may be true, is simply inconceivable; but after making the nearest approach to it that we can by assuming that the world was originated by Him, we must admit that the very act of creation placed certain temporary limits upon His power. It is of no importance whatever to Theism either to regard God as sole first cause, or to regard the universe as coeval and co-eternal with Him. Therefore it does not distress Theism to acknowledge the limitation of God's power.

The second proposition: that "if God's power be unlimited, then he is not benevolent," we also dispute, and on ground which ought to commend itself to those who stipulate for keeping within the bounds of our experience. It is a pure assumption that the infliction of pain (moral and physical) is under all circumstances whatever a mark of malevolence. It is also a pure assumption that the good purpose supposed to be aimed at by such infliction could be secured in any other way. Nay, there is everything to lead us to infer that the present is the only means for securing that particular beneficent end. But if God's power be unlimited (which we do not admit) and if there are other means of securing the said end, but nevertheless He chooses the painful instead of the pleasant method for its attainment, we could not pro

nounce against His benevolence, until we had first put Him fairly on His trial and heard His own reasons for adopting such a course instead of some other. Surely the faith which is willing to bear any suffering so long as it is by the Lord's loving decree, which is willing to say "Though he slay me yet will I trust in Him," is willing also to give Him credit for the wisest method as well as the best intentions. As therefore we are bounded by a very narrow experience both as to the end in view and the choice, if there be any of the means for its attainment, we refuse to admit that God is not benevolent, even if His power be unlimited. Furthermore, we can afford to grant our essayist this point, if insisted on, because, as a matter of fact, the limitation of God's power is already proved. Whether that limitation extends to choice of means employed in carrying out beneficent designs we cannot positively declare; but it is highly probable; our essayist himself says with commendable frankness: "Every sober mind will admit that the present state of things may be the best or only means of attaining some desirable end."

Certainly no Theist will abandon the benevolence of God, though it be a matter of total indifference to him whether or not God be sole first cause. So, neither the limitation, nor the infinite expansion, of God's power is " fatal to Theism." Triumphantly does our essayist, in criticising Miss Cobbe's renunciation of God's omnipotence, exclaim :

"Miss Cobbe's God is not the Almighty Creator' of the Theists, but the Deity of Aristotle over again, struggling with an intractable material--in fact making the best of a bad job. We are back in Dualism.”

Yes, but what Dualism? The old theory of God and Devil, of Ormuzd and Ahriman? Not So, but the ever-present dualism of mind and matter -spirit and flesh-God and the visible world. There is no longer the idea of antagonism, of despotic against rebellious will; but of plastic clay moulded by the potter, of rough metal purified and refined in the furnace, or rude stone shaped and chiselled into beauty and use; better still of growth from simple to complex, from lower to higher, from death to life, from earth to Heaven. The material may seem "intractable" to men who were born but yesterday and

whose finite sense cannot grasp even the few figures which it takes to write down the age of our little planet. But to that far-searching gaze which searches all space from eternity unto eternity, there is not one barrier opposed to His realm of Light and Life, and Love; in those skilful powerful hands which have set going the mystic harmony of the spheres, there is not one atom redundant or out of its place; not a thread of life which is not being woven into a destiny of bliss and goodness for all sigh for rest, or pant for celestial toil. It is indeed too soon to renounce our faith as a childish dream. God is not yet dethroned, nor are the hopes of mortal men eclipsed for ever.

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