back to within four years of the date of the will. This clearly made it incumbent on the party propounding to show the sanity, by much clearer proof than would have been required, had no such disease been admitted, on all hands, to have clouded her understanding towards the close of her life. But it is also to be observed, that insane delusions are very clearly shown to have taken possession of her mind previously to the date of the will; and, although the degree of disease which then existed has been made the subject of dispute, no one can pretend that there was perfect soundness of mind some few years before March, 1834. This renders it still more necessary for the court of probate to be satisfied that these delusions had ceased, and the mind recovered its healthy state before the factum. Nor is this all: the delusions, which existed at an early date, are proved to have increased after the will was made. They gathered force until it became necessary to sue out a commission; and the result of the inquisition was, that in 1838 she had become perfectly insane. Thus it becomes quite impossible to disconnect the different periods of this unhappy person's history. There is every probability that the diseased state, which commenced before the factum, continued up to its date. The likelihood is, that the delusions, of which evidence exists before and after, continued during the intermediate time, although no proofs may be obtained of the precise fact; and all the presumptions, which would otherwise have been in favour of sanity at that date, are turned the other way by these important circumstances. Hence, it is not at all a just and correct view of this case, which affirms that the presumption is in favour of the testatrix's soundness; and the proof of continued delusion is thrown upon those who deny it, merely because there is no evidence directly applicable to the date of the will. No one, who finds a person labouring under the same kind of delusions before and after a given period, can be justified in refusing his belief to their continuance during the interval, unless clear evidence be produced of their having ceased for a time, and then returned. The very great probability is, that they existed all the while, and were only not apparent, because the subject with which they were connected did not happen to be openly mentioned before others who might give evidence. The very great probability is, that the patient laboured under them all the while, although she did not openly declare her belief in them, and act or speak under that belief. Another observation remains to be offered, before proceeding to a more minute commentary on the evidence. The existence of delusions being proved, and their continuance proved or assumed at the date of the factum, so that the court is satisfied of the testatrix then labouring under their influence, it is wholly immaterial that they do not appear in the will itself. The party propounding often approached this point in argument, and repeatedly adverted to the fact-perhaps we should rather say, the assertion or the assumption-that this will betrays no marks of the alleged delusions, or generally of an unsound mind. There was a

manifest disposition to lay down a rule, that no person labouring under monomania or partial insanity can be deemed intestable, unless the kind of insanity appears on the face of the will. But there was wanting the courage to lay down a position which would at once have been rejected, and must have been met by the questionCould any court admit to probate the will of the man who said, (in the case cited by Sir John Nicholl, in Dew v. Clarke,) I am the Christ,' although that will bear no marks whatever of an unsound mind, still less of the dreadful delusion under which the party laboured? It is hardly possible, on the other hand, that any will can be so framed as to rebut all presumptions of insanity arising from proved facts."

It was our intention to have made some lengthy comments on the above judgment of Lord Brougham, which press of matter compels us to defer until the next number, when the important subject of partial insanity, in its legal bearings, will be fully considered.

TRANSIENT INSANITY.

WE copy the following observations from the Spectator of March 10th, a paper which has always taken a prominent and praiseworthy position among the newspaper press of this country in its advocacy of philosophical and psychological truths. The poor woman who was represented to have been, when she threw her son into the Regent'scanal, in a state of "wild excitement," undoubtedly was suffering from an attack of transient insanity, using the term insanity as indicative of that condition of mind so often associated with loss of all power of self-control. Cases of this nature are not of uncommon occurrence. Many a man commits suicide under the influence of an attack of insanity, of the existence of which his most intimate friends have not the slightest idea. Persons labouring under the effects of terrible delusions have been known to conceal the fact for months. Those most closely allied to them-on terms of intimate and close association-apparently possessing their confidence, have been kept in ignorance of the existence of anything resembling a morbid state of mind. We have been consulted by persons who have confessed to us that they have been struggling unknown to any one but themselves for months with a morbid desire to take away human life! Others under the influence of concealed false perceptions have manifested strong suicidal impulses. Many a man destroys himself whilst in a state of insanity, giving no indication of any morbid condition of mind. We have often been amazed at the degree of control which many lunatics are capable of exercising over their delusive impres

sions. We have no right invariably to conclude, in cases of self-destruction, that the mind is unclouded and free from insanity or delusion, because the party has given no clear proof, prior to death, of the presence of mental aberration. We have no doubt that many crimes -for which the severest penalty of the law has been inflicted-many suicides, have been committed under the overpowering influence of some terrible delusion known only to the parties themselves! The brain is subject to occasional attacks of temporary disturbance, during which the mind, for a short period, is thrown off its balance, the person so affected being insane. This is what we understand by the term transient insanity. A gentleman who had been exposed to great anxiety of mind, impairing his general health, became affected with melancholia. Apart from his depression of spirits, the party in question gave no evidence of insanity. This gentleman was sitting one day with his wife, when he suddenly jumped up from his chair, exclaiming, in wild excitement, "Fly, for your life! Fly!" His poor wife, without saying one word, instantly left the room. He felt a sudden and, to him, unaccountable impulse to beat his wife's brains out with a poker. In a few minutes the attack subsided, and he reflected with horror on the dreadful position in which he had been placed. Not many months back, a gentleman of fortune, happy in his domestic circle, apparently without a care or anxiety to annoy him or ruffle his temper, deliberately stood before the glass and cut his throat! Who would be so bold as to declare that this unfortunate man's mind was free from disease? We purpose, in an early number, to consider the important subject of transient insanity more in detail.

She

"A verdict at the Central Criminal Court exemplifies at once the great advance made in the right understanding of matters that come within the cognizance of the criminal law, and the very imperfect state of the law itself. Anne Mallandine was tried on the charge of attempting to murder her son. She was an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age; the child was a boy of six or seven. was seen to throw him into the Regent's-canal, at Haggerstone; and she would have plunged in herself, but a passenger came up and prevented her. The boy was rescued, and she was detained. She then proved to be in a state of wild excitement, brought on by distress. Her counsel, Mr. Cooper, suggested to the jury, that the evidence. disclosed such a state of mind as did not amount to actual insanity, but prevented her from being aware of the effect of what she was doing. On that argument, apparently, the jury pronounced a verdict of acquittal.

"The ground on which Mr. Cooper obtained this verdict has the merit of going to the kernel of the matter; and the decision of the

jury is as near an approach to the true conclusion as our law will permit; but still it is a very imperfect approach. It comes nearer than a verdict of guilty,' with 'a recommendation of mercy,' because that hands the prisoner over to the discretion of the judge, who sometimes pays no attention to the qualification. And it is evident that the jury did not hold the woman to be so accountable for her act as to deserve punishment. Yet there are grave objections to a simple acquittal in the case of a person not insane, but proved to have attempted murder. It opens a wide and difficult question as to the line between criminal passion leading to a criminal act, and excitement originating in an innocent cause but resulting in a criminal act-between the brief madness of anger and the brief madness of despair. If the jury had adopted Mr. Cooper's view-and the evidence left no alternative except that view or a verdict of guilty they had come to a conclusion which the state of the law did not empower them to record. Multiply such verdicts, and you open the door of release to a dangerous class of persons who are excitable to the perpetration of outrage: on the other hand, a wiser perception of truth and justice will more and more forbid juries from affirming guilt where there is no moral accountability, or accountability in a very imperfect degree. They ought to be enabled to make a true record of the right judgment, and to hand over the prisoner for a treatment suitable to the case."

MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE-THE PLEA OF INSANITY. PARRY V. GARDNER.-This was an action of ejectment brought to recover an estate at Belcham, in the County of Hertford, said to be of the value of 10,000l. Sergeant Channel and Mr. Chambers appeared for the plaintiff, and Sergeant Shee and Mr. Peacock for the defendant. The case commenced on Wednesday, and occupied the court till a late hour on Friday night.

The plaintiff was Mr. Nicholas Parry, a gentleman of fortune, residing near Puckeridge, and was admitted to be the heir-at-law of a person named James Spalding, deceased, who had been the owner of the estate in question. James Spalding, during his life-time, had lived in the house with the defendant, who was a connexion of his family, and who had had the management of his estate. In 1821, James Spalding made his will, and devised the whole of his estate to the defendant; by a codicil dated in 1825, he gave other property, which he had subsequently purchased, to the defendant also. The testator died in 1847, when the defendant took possession of the estates by virtue of the will. This action was brought by the plaintiff as heir-at-law of the testator, to recover possession of the property, and the case set up by him was, that the testator, Mr. James Spalding, was not in such a state of mind as to enable him to understand the nature of a will, that he was incapable of exe

cuting such an instrument, and that the will in question had been made by him under the coercion of the defendant. In order to support this case, a great number of witnesses were examined, whose testimony showed that even while at school Mr. Spalding was treated as a boy of weak intellect; that after he left school, he resided with and was under the charge of his mother, who, when he was twenty years old, used to treat him as a child. Upon the death of his mother and brother, and when he had no longer any relation to take an interest in him, he went to reside with the defendant, who had been appointed by his sister, Mrs. John Spalding, to manage the property, and according to the evidence, he was treated for a great number of years by the defendant, not like the owner of the estate, but more like a labourer; that he was dressed in mean apparel, was never allowed to take any share in the management of the farm, and that the defendant used frequently to horsewhip him, and use other personal violence towards him. It was likewise proved that from childhood the testator had been addicted to most filthy and disgusting habits, and the groom, who used to ride out with him while he was under the care of his mother, stated that he was always looked upon as a person of weak intellect, and was treated as such by the family. Evidence was also adduced to show that he was continually in the habit of getting drunk, and that he was never seen with more money in his possession than a few pence at a time, and that he used to borrow sixpence or a shilling from the people about the neighbourhood, and a variety of other facts were proved, making out a very strong case with regard to his insanity, or at all events, incompetency to understand the nature of such a document as he was represented to have executed.

Sergeant Shee, on behalf of the defendant, produced a great many witnesses, who gave evidence to show that the testator had upon several occasions interfered in the management of his property, and that he had also, at different times, executed mortgage deeds, which had been prepared by some of the most respectable solicitors in the country, all of whom, however, it appeared, were dead, and it was urged that persons in such a position would not have sanctioned his taking such a proceeding, if he had not been perfectly competent to Some letters and documents written by the testator, were also put in as a proof of his competency of mind.

do so.

At the conclusion of the evidence on Friday night, the learned judge summed up, and the jury retired at nine o'clock, to consider their verdict. At half-past ten they returned, giving a verdict for the plaintiff, thus establishing the title of the heir-at-law, and setting aside the will.

SARAH GROUT, aged 31, was indicted for the wilful murder of James Grout, her son, by cutting him in the neck with a billhook.

There was a second indictment against the prisoner for the murder of Mary Anne Grout, another of her children, by the same means.