we except from it certain acts of Congress (like impeachments) which the Constitution authorizes as clear exceptions to the strict principle of the separation of powers. Then, too, by judicial interpretation practices like the delegation of discretionary and even rule-making powers by Congress to the President are upheld." Fortunately the courts have construed the supreme law not without an eye to history and governmental efficiency; and the lines of demarcation between the three departments have been somewhat blurred.

In view of these facts it appears entirely legitimate for analytical jurisprudence to define the processes, acts, and products of governmental activity with reference to the nature of the mental process involved and of the legal results produced instead of with reference to the character of the department concerned. On the other hand, it is of both political and juristic significance whether material laws or material ordinances be passed by Congress or issued by the Chief Magistrate. Hence it is expedient for the analytical jurist to elaborate his own formal classification to supplement his material classification of the phenomena. The former may differ from the formal classification of the Constitution; and, in point of fact, a much more serviceable one can be found. For formal acts of legislation are properly not all acts of the legislature, but only those which produce material laws or ordinances; 72 while formal ordinances are those acts emanating from the executive department which embody either material laws or material ordinances.73 If terms are

little, because it does not include Rechtssätze if they happen to be embodied in executive proclamations and orders.

71 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506; and many other cases.

72" Im formellen Sinne ist nur dasjenige ius scriptum Gesetzrecht, welches unter Zustimmung der Volksvertretung entstanden ist" (Laband, Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches, vol. ii, p. 62). Formal law should properly include not only such material law as is created by or with the consent of the representative assembly, but also such material ordinances as emanate from the same source. 73" Le règlement diffère de la loi proprement dite, non par son contenu juridique, mais par sa forme, par l'autorité de qu'il émane. Une règle générale posée par les Chambres législatives est une loi proprement dite; la même règle générale, si elle est formulée par une autre autorité publique, est un règlement " (Jèze, "Les prin

66

needed to cover all products of action by the popular assembly and by the Executive, respectively, the words 'statute' and decree' might serve. For present purposes there is no need to go further than to distinguish formal law' as an act passed by the legislative department containing either ' material law' or 'material ordinance', and formal ordinance' as an act issuing from the Executive containing either ' material ordinance' or 'material law.'

74

French authorities disagree as to whether ordinances are law. It is clear that they are not law in the formal sense; but certain writers deny them a place in the category of material law. For this three reasons are given. In the first place, it is pointed out that the sanction for ordinances is provided by the legislature and not the executive.75

This

cipes généraux du droit administratif," deuxième édition, 1914, p. 217). M. Duguit defines "règlement " as "toute disposition par voie générale émanant d'un organe autre que le parlement, ou si l'on veut toute disposition par voie générale en une forme autre que la forme législative (c'est-à-dire, vote par le parlement et promulgation par le président de la république)" (Manuel de droit constitutionnel, Paris, 1907, p. 191, sec. 40). Formal ordinances should properly include all Verwaltungsvorschriften as well as all Rechtsvorschriften which emanate from the Executive.

"Duguit holds that ordinances are law in the material but not in the formal sense (Droit constitutionnel, pp. 107-108). Dufour says: "L'acte réglementaire a la même autorité et produit les mêmes effets que l'acte législatif; il est vrai de dire en ce sens que tout acte réglementaire n'est qu'une loi secondaire" (Cours de droit administratif, vol. i, p. 58). Esmein, on the contrary, claims that they are not laws. He says: A vrai dire, le pouvour réglementaire ne rentre pas nécessairement dans le pouvoir législatif, et le règlement n'est point la loi. Le règlement est, en effet, simplement une préscription qui a pour but d'assurer l'exécution de la loi en la complétant dans les détails, mais sans pouvoir en changer ou modifier ni le texte ni l'esprit. Aussi le droit de faire des règlements ne revient-il pas nécessairement, ni même naturellement, au pouvoir législatif. Il droit être confié naturellement au pouvoir exécutif; car étant chargé d'exécuter les lois, c'est lui qui peut le plus utilement les compléter de cette manière." He admits, however, that they are like laws in being generally obligatory (Droit constitutionnel, sixième édition, 1914, p. 535, sec. 6).

75 A middle view is that held by Laferrière, who says (vol. i, p. 11, deuxième édition): "Entre le pouvoir législatif et le pouvoir exécutif il y a une attribution intermédiaire, celle qui consiste à faire les règlements, à édicter les préscriptions secondaires nécessaires à l'application des lois; cette difficulté sera attribuée au législateur ou au gouvernement, ou bien elle sera diversement

is certainly true of at least most of the ordinances of France,76 England," and the United States.78 Secondly, an ordinance is said not to be law because it is on a subordinate plane. An ordinance may not abrogate a statute, but a statute may abrogate an ordinance. An ordinance is bound by the existing statute law and may not contradict its letter or spirit, or (in the case of delegated ordinances) go beyond the scope of the statutory delegation." Thirdly, it is pointed out that the French administrative courts may annual ordinances, while there is no judicial body which can annul statutes.80 But to all of these points it may be said that they prove not that ordinances are not law, but that they are a form of law which in France is subordinate to statutes.

For the exact relation of statute and ordinance we must look to the particular constitutional system in question. Where ordinance making power is specifically given to the Executive in a written constitution, it is usually provided what relation such constitutional ordinances shall bear to the statutes. Thus the Japanese constitution provides for emergency ordinances "in the place of laws "; 81 while it says of other ordinances that "No ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws." 82 Many constitutions grant to the Executive the power to issue ordinances to complete the laws; and the usual provision is something to the effect that

partagée entre eux, selon que la Constitution générale de l'Etat tendra à faire plus ou moins prévaloir l'influence du Parlement ou celle du pouvoir exécutif.”

76 A general penal sanction for ordinances legally made' is provided in art. 471, sec. 15, of the French Penal Code (as revised in 1832). Special statutory sanction may be provided in individual cases, of course (See Garner, "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in France," in American Political Science Review, November, 1915).

"See Carr, Delegated Legislation, p. 54, n. 2.

7 See chap. vi. Cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506. 7 See Hauriou, Précis de droit administratif et de droit public, pp. 35, 36-37, 53, 54, 59, 60. But see p. 62. Cf. also Merritt v. Welsh, 104 U. S. 694, and Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466.

8° See Jèze, Les principes généraux du droit administratif, deuxième édition, 1914.

81 Art. 8.

such ordinances may not alter the laws (statutes).83 That such ordinances are limited strictly by the text of the statutes which they supplement might be implied from the very nature of this phase of the ordinance making power. In the exercise of such power the jurisdiction of the authority possessing it involves completion, without violation, of the enactment to be supplemented. And of course that authority, as all other, must be kept within its jurisdiction. Whether the authority find its source in statutory or constitutional delegation, it is conditioned by the terms of the grant. It may, indeed, be the case that the power is derived from prerogatives recognized by an unwritten law, or even from the theory of autocracy that the ruler, being the source of all political power, has himself all authority which he has not delegated to others.84 In such cases, the power of ordinance is not based upon a definite text, and is therefore vaguer and more capable of expansion.85 Even in such cases, however, the general rule in modern constitutional governments is that, as between statute and ordinance, the former prevails. The chief exception is where the constitution specifically provides that in certain cases ordinances may override statutes.

Otherwise statutes are superior to ordinances. And this superiority is emphasized by the fact that (under at least the systems of England, France, and the United States) the penal sanction of ordinances is attached by the legislature. The Executive has no inherent power to make the violation of its rules (even when it has authority to issue them) a crime or misdemeanor. And in the United States the legislature itself can not delegate to the Executive the power to decide what punishment is reasonable.' The creation of the punishment is so clearly the very teeth of legis

83 See, for example, the Constitution of Italy, art. 6.

8 See W. W. Willoughby, Prussian Political Philosophy, chap. v, especially p. 94 ff. Contrast the dictum of the Supreme Court in the Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666.

85 Lowell, Government of England, vol. i, p. 19.

lation, that the most that, under our rigid constitutional system, can be allowed is the delegation to the Executive of the power which is sometimes left to the courts 86 of determining within defined limits the amount of the punishment.

86 As where the law provides that the violator of an enactment shall be liable to a fine of not less than ten nor more than thirty thousand dollars, or to imprisonment for not less than one nor more than two years, or both.