seems of substantial and intelligent persons, refused to find the bills, and, although twice sent back by the court, resolutely persisted in their refusal. The matter excited the more notice from the circumstance that lord Ellesmere was at this time dangerously ill, and, although he afterwards recovered, was generally believed to be dying on this very day; and it now made so much noise, that it was brought before the king in council. It was referred by him to sir Francis Bacon, sir Henry Yelverton, sir Henry Montague, sir Ranulph Crewe and sir John Walter, and, after an examination of precedents, they supported the jurisdiction of the chancellor in an elaborate decision, which put the question at rest, and seems to have been at least acquiesced in by the chief justice himself as well as the soundest lawyers of the kingdom.*

Sir Edward Coke is generally allowed to have been much in the wrong for endeavoring to maintain the jurisdiction of his court by such violent measures, and was afterwards accused at the council-board of uttering very reprehensible language on the subject from the bench. But in the business of the commendams he seems to have demeaned himself with a spirit of dignity, firmness, and independence, which redounds as much to his honor as the pusillanimity of the other judges does to their disgrace.

This celebrated case of the commendams, even more curious in its connexion with the history of the administration of justice in England than that which we have just detailed, was the following. John Clifton and William Glover brought a writ of quare impedit against Richard, bishop of Coventry and Litchfield, of a presentation to the church of Clifton Camville. The plaintiff's declaration made out a good title to the advowson in them; but the bishop's plea recited, among other matters of defence, that his metropolitan having granted him a dispensation from the statute of pluralities, the king, to whom

* See a full statement of this affair in a tract printed in the Collectanea Juridica, v. i. n. 2. See likewise Wilson's Life of James in Kennet's History, vol. ii, p. 704; Bacon's Letters in his Works, v. iii, p. 284, and the cases cited in Bacon's Abridgment, v. iii, p. 139. Many curious circumstances regarding it are also collected in the notes to the Biographia Britannica. Although sir Edward, as he could not avoid doing, acquiesced in the king's decision, yet he was not convinced that he had done wrong. In his Pleas of the Crown, c. 54, Premunire, pp. 122-125, he maintains that a judgment rendered in the king's bench could not be lawfully examined in chancery, and after citing precedents to that effect, says that the privy seal was obtained by the importunity of the then lord-chancellor being vehemently afraid.'

it accrued by lapse to present to the benefice in question, did accordingly present the defendant to hold the same in commendam. Various important questions grew out of this case, in arguing which in the court of common pleas the king was informed by Bilson, bishop of Winchester, who attended the trial at the king's desire, that the counsel for the plaintiff's had maintained several positions highly injurious to his royal prerogative, namely, that the translation of bishops was contrary to the common law, and that the king had no power to grant commendams but in cases of necessity, which necessity could never happen, because no clerk was bound to hospitality beyond his means, and therefore in no case could there be need of augmentation of livings. James took alarm at these dangerous doctrines, and, determined not to suffer any more discussion of points so nearly concerning his royal dignity, commanded the attorney-general, sir Francis Bacon, to signify his pleasure to the lord chief justice, that he held it necessary himself should be consulted before any further proceedings were had in the cause, which was shortly to have been argued before all the judges in the exchequer-chamber. Bacon, who seems to have acted as the chief adviser of the king in all these measures, accordingly wrote a letter to the chief justice (April 25, 1616), imparting the king's wish that the day for hearing the argument might be deferred. Sir Edward Coke, on receiving this letter, requested of the attorney-general that the like should be sent to his brethren; which being done, all the judges assembled and unanimously came to the resolution of doing their duty exactly as if the letters had not been written. Afterwards they sent a letter under their hands to the king in justification of their conduct, certifying that they conceived obedience to the letters of the attorney-general to be inconsistent with their oaths, inasmuch as they were expressly sworn to pay no regard to any letters that should come to them contrary to law, and that, the case in question being a private difference between subjects and as such earnestly calling for expedition, they considered it would be an unlawful delay and denial of justice to defer the cause: wherefore they had proceeded, according to their duty, following what to the best of their judgment they understood to be the meaning of the acts of parliament provided in this behalf. The king imnediately replied that, as he would not have his royal prerogative wounded through the side of a subject, and as he held

the allegi

he perem

matter unt
mouth. I
the judges
After the
reprimand
counsellor
it was thei
who bore:
as to their
of a cause

delay of ju
proceeding
staying a c
concerning
involved m
since the ro
disputed at
alone did th
dam. Last
to disobey
them to jus
cate, instea
submitting
king had m
the faultines
their knees
sir Edward
letter, mainta
denial of jus
should be ha

ques

wise be terous for the whether his advice on the lord-chancell delay. Lor

sentiments at first deliver th defended the reasons alrea

the alleging their oaths only an impertinent pretence, therefore he peremptorily commanded them to meddle no more with the matter until they were apprized of his pleasure from his own mouth. No sooner was the king returned to the city, than all the judges were sent for to the council-table (June 6th 1616). After the king had narrated the above facts, he began by reprimanding the judges for their remissness in suffering a counsellor at the bar to impeach his prerogative, telling them it was their duty to check and bridle these impudent lawyers, who bore so little respect to the authority of the crown. Next, as to their letter, he acquainted them that to defer the hearing of a cause upon sufficient reasons was neither a denial nor a delay of justice; it rather indicated wisdom and matureness of proceeding; and there could never be a better reason for staying a cause than a desire to consult the king in a matter concerning his prerogative. Then he denied that the case involved merely a private interest betwixt party and party, since the royal prerogative was openly, directly, and largely disputed at the bar; nay by virtue of that very prerogative alone did the defendant claim to hold his benefice in commendam. Lastly, he observed that it was a new thing for subjects to disobey the king's express command, and most of all for them to justify their disobedience by returning a bare certificate, instead of modestly laying down their reasons and then submitting the whole to his princely judgment. When the king had made this declaration, all the judges acknowledged the faultiness of their letter in respect to the form, and on their knees begged pardon of the king for their error. But sir Edward Coke entered into a defence of the matter of the letter, maintaining that the delay required would have been a denial of justice, and adding that the judges meant the case should be handled so that the royal prerogative should in no wise be questioned. The king answered that it was preposterous for them to take on themselves peremptorily to discern whether his prerogative was concerned, without asking his advice on the subject; and, as to the rest, he called upon the lord-chancellor to deliver his opinion upon the legality of the delay. Lord Ellesmere, excusing himself from declaring his sentiments at present, desired that his majesty's counsel might first deliver theirs: upon which the attorney-general, of course, defended the king, and the other counsel concurred, for the reasons already advanced by the king. This widened the

breach still more; for sir Edward Coke complained of the king's counsel for disputing with the judges, saying they were to plead before the judges, not to dispute with them; to which sir Francis Bacon returned, that, by his oath of office, he was explicitly bound to proceed against any person whatever, should he be the greatest peer in the realin, who exceeded the limits of his authority or invaded the rights of the crown; and therefore he deemed the challenge of the chief justice to be an affront, for which he and his fellows appealed to the king for reparation. To this appeal the king replied, that his counsel had done their duty and he would maintain them in it; which ended the controversy; for sir Edward immediately said he would not dispute with his majesty; and the lord-chancellor then pronounced the king's requisition to have been no violation of the judges' oath or of the laws. All the lords of the council then put the question to the judges, commanding them to say whether if, in any case depending before them, the king conceived his interest to be concerned, and therefore desired to be consulted, they would accordingly stay the proceedings. The judges all answered in the affirmative, excepting sir Edward Coke, who merely said: when the case shall be, I will do what is fit for a judge to do. Sir Henry Hobart was so complying as to say that, for his part, he would ever trust the justice of his majesty's command. After all this discussion was over, the king made the judges promise that, in the farther argument of the commendams, they would carefully abstain from whatever tended to weaken or draw into doubt his prerogative, nay, would in plain terms correct the bold speeches already made in derogation thereof, and never again permit them to recur.*

Satisfied with the

recantation and ample assurances of the eleven judges, the king allowed the cause to proceed, and judgment was finally entered for the plaintiffs.

Such was the termination of the case of commendams, than which few have excited more commotion, because on the one hand the church was incensed to find the courts looking into their evasions of the law against pluralities, and the king was yet more incensed that one of his prerogatives should be

*All the proceedings in council are printed in Collectanea Juridica, vol. i. n. 1, and in Bacon's Works, vol. iii, p. 311. See likewise Bacon's Letters, Ibid. p. 305. The case which occasioned the difficulty is very fully reported in Hobart's Rep. p. 140.

openly atta of liberty directly int tween subj acting acco laws of the Sir Edw

to keep any the council tion to the entertained The lord-c with regard was very attempt, a l claimed by

court demar tion every w had counten

sons in bring arbitrary d now a fixed powerful m see that hi admirable p personal ene arbitrary and sent for by th with indecen

court of chan affair of the cil-table and

of assize. Ja Edward's Re

that many ext tive law; and Sceptre of thre title-page of t to the immem

*Moor's Repor 13. The act of co Statute of Sewers,

openly attacked as illegal; and on the other hand every friend of liberty was shocked to perceive the power of the crown directly interposed for the determination of a private suit between subjects, and to see the judges personally outraged for acting according to their best understanding of the established laws of the kingdom.

Sir Edward Coke's enemies no longer thought it necessary to keep any measures with him; for his manly conduct before the council was easily distorted into a contumacious opposition to the royal authority. The king seems even to have entertained a petty jealousy of his popularity and influence. The lord-chancellor could not forgive sir Edward's conduct with regard to the jurisdiction of the courts. The council was very much offended with him, also, for his laudable attempt, a little while before, to limit the exorbitant power claimed by the commissioners of sewers: for this inferior court demanded for its proceedings a freedom from examination every where but in the council; whereas the king's bench had countenanced, as it was right they should do, several persons in bringing actions at common law on account of some arbitrary doings of the commissioners.* As there was

now a fixed design of humbling sir Edward, in which many powerful men were embarked, it was not difficult to foresee that his great integrity, his unshaken courage and his admirable parts would prove too weak to shield him, when his personal enemies were to sit in judgment upon him, with an arbitrary and irritated king for his accuser. Accordingly, being sent for by the council, arraigned on his knees, and charged with indecent language in the king's bench concerning the court of chancery, and undutiful behaviour to the king in the affair of the commendams, he was sequestered from the council-table and forbidden to ride the summer-circuit as justice of assize. James, in his wisdom, also undertook to criticise sir Edward's Reports, which were already published, telling him that many extravagant opinions were there set down for posi-tive law; and the weak-minded pedant, who then held the sceptre of three kingdoms, condescended to find fault with the title-page of the tenth Report, because sir Edward, according to the immemorial usage of his predecessors, sanctioned by

* Moor's Reports, pp. 825, 826; Blackstone's Commentaries, vol. iii, p. 73. The act of council on the subject may be found in Callis' Reading on the Statute of Sewers, p. 76.