Where

For, we say now that it was, it is, and also, it WILL BE. as, it is, is alone appropriate to it, according to true speech. But, it was, and it WILL BE, is proper to be said, concerning a generation proceeding in time. For both are motions. But, that which constantly subsists according to the same [1ò de aεì xaτà Tανтù zor], immovably, cannot ever be properly made either older or younger. It has neither been already generated, nor will be hereafter. And altogether any generation has affixed nothing to those which are borne in sense. But these are generated forms of time which imitates EXISTENCE [4], and is circularly revolved according to number [2λà χρόνου ταυτὰ αἰῶνα τὲ μιμουμένου καὶ κατ ̓ ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου, γεyover sidn]. And, with them, still, these things are so; and what has been generated, is what has been generated; and what is now being generated, is what is being generated; and that which will be generated, is what will be generated; and that which is not, is the nonentiy; neither of which expressions, is strictly correct. But then concerning these things, there may not be a fair opportunity, at present, to discourse accurately. Time, then was generated together with the heaven; that having been generated together, together also, they might be dissolved; if ever there should be any dissolution of them; and according to the paradigm of the EXISTENTIAL [6] nature, that it might be as much like it as possible. But, truly, that paradigm is a being with respect to entire EXISTENCE [7]; but, this in turn, being generated continually, with respect to entire time, is both being, and being to be, alone [xai xaτà tổ лagádeɣμa tñs aiwviov φύσεως· ἵν ̓ ὡς ὁμοιότατος αὐτῷ κατὰ δύναμιν ᾖ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δὴ παράδειγμα, πάντα αἰῶνα ἐστὶν ἄν· ὁ δ ̓ αὖ διὰ τέλους του ἅπαντα χρόνον γεγονώς τε καὶ ὢν καὶ ἐσόμενος ἐστὶ μόνος].

According to these things, and for their sake, whatever of the stars were generated moving through the heaven, have turnings; that this might be most like the most perfect and intelligible animal, with the imitation of the PERVADINGLY EXISTENTIAL [8] nature [πρὸς τὴν τῆς διαιωνίας μίμησιν φύσεως]. And, indeed, the other forms he fabricated unto the generation of time, according to a similitude to that, to which each is assimilated.

Every instance of air and airios in Plato's works has now been produced, On all, excepting those in the paragraph

just quoted from the Timæus, sufficient comment has been made. This passage is peculiar on many accounts, and requires observation at large. In remarking upon it, therefore I observe;

I. The immediate verbal connexion, in which aœiòv and air vios occur, in the respective sentences, does not very positively mark the precise sense in which the author employed them. Admitting the different meanings of these words [EXISTENCE and EXISTENTIAL], which have already been stated; we might, in each of these sentences, make use, in translating, of any one out of several of them, without doing great violence to the immediate verbal connexion. So that, if we regard nothing but this single circumstance, little positive dependence could be placed on these few instances alone, for establishing the certain meaning of air and aivios in ancient Greek.

It, therefore, becomes requisite, to take a more extensive view of the case; and consider these words with reference to the general subject on which Plato was writing, the known habit of his mind and all the circumstances relating to the treatise in which this paragraph appears. These may afford much help, in ascertaining the particular meaning in question.

It is plain, that Plato employs aiov [EXISTENCE], in this particular place, with reference to some subject, different from that, in regard to which he had employed it before. The existence, which he here contemplates, is something different from human life; the only subject previously expressed by air, in his acknowledged works.

It is desirable to ascertain, so far as we may, what this particular subject was, which, in this place, he intended to express by aid [EXISTENCE], and with reference to which, he made use of the adjective aiários [EXISTENTIAL].

I trust it will be admitted, as not only within all rules of philology, but, also, as required by them, that the adjective be considered as depending, entirely, for its meaning, on the noun; until evidence appears, that it has acquired meanings for itself; and with proper regard to the nature and character of these parts of speech, severally. I, therefore consider, that airios [EXISTENTIAL] signifies such relation to air [EXISTENCE] as the circumstances, in each instance, severally indicate.

The question, therefore is, what was that existence, which Plato was here contemplating, under the name aior?

As in modern days, a sense of duration, and particularly of eternity, is generally believed to have belonged to this noun, and the meaning, eternal, to its adjective, in ancient Greek; respect for public opinion requires the question to be discussed,-whether Plato, in this passage, employed these words in this sense? Therefore

II. I cannot believe, that Plato was contemplating eternity, considered as limitless duration, under the name aior [EXISTENCE], nor eternal under the name aiovios [EXISTENTIAL], for the following reasons ;

a.) We have the whole evidence of seven Greek writers, extending through about six centuries, down to the age of Plato, who make use of alov, in common with other words; and no one of them ever employs it in the sense of eternity. Indeed, it is more than doubtful, whether they ever employ it in any meaning of duration at all, saving so far as every existence has some kind of endurance. They clearly use this word with reference to the nature of the subject, without particular reference to its duration; never in the sense of eternal duration. It will be recollected, also, that their usage of the word has been produced, not in one or two instances alone, but in every case in which it occurs in their extant works, saving a few short pieces or fragments of some of them. We have, therefore, not only their evidence, but, it may be said, their whole evidence. And, so far as negative testimony avails, it is conclusive evidence, that there was no such meaning in the word. It is not to be supposed then, that Plato should have used it in that sense; if he intended, as he doubtless did, to be understood by his readers. We are under obligation to look in his writings for a meaning in aior relating to the nature or state of the subject, before we can be justified in admitting one, that relates only to its duration; still less can we, without manifest necessity, admit a sense of duration so immense as that of eternity.

b.) Aristotle defines this word at much length; and assigns it, as a general meaning, EXISTENCE, and also LIFE; or, that which exists, and that also which lives. He teaches also, that human life is air and that the completeness of the universe is air [an EXISTENCE]; comprehending, indeed,

the term of duration, among the other qalities of the air [EXISTENCE] in question; but having no more special reference to that quality than to any other.

Had this word contained, in itself, so important a meaning as eternity, he could not have so passed it by. His silence on this head, together with his positive assertions in other respects, makes it clear, that this word, in his age, did not express eternity; but merely, an existence of any sort.

Now, Aristotle was the cotemporary of Plato, and had been his personal disciple. Had his master employed this word in the important sense of eternity, he could not in common fairness, have failed to notice it. Neither could Plato have been justified, in making use of the word in a sense before unknown, without giving information of the new meaning he was attaching to it. He was too honest to do this; and I do not believe that he did it.

c.) Plato himself employs aior, elsewhere, in the sense of human life; precisely as we often do the English word existence; and in no other senses, unless the Axiochus be admitted as his work; in which latter case, it may be said, that he employs this term, in the sense of human life, and of completeness, and in none other. It is inconceivable, then, that, in this single paragraph, he should have intended to express eternal duration, by a term, which he, every where else, employs in the simple sense of existence, or life, or a completeness, without reference to any duration at all.

d.) Plato employs the adjective aiários [EXISTENTIAL], elsewhere, twice. The first of these instances independently of the connexion of this adjective with its noun, affords no precise testimony as to what the term may or may not mean. But taken in connexion with the parent noun, and with the circumstances of the case, it seems to refer, much more aptly, to the complete and absorbing nature of the subject, than to its duration.

In the second of those instances, he sets the airov [EXISTENTIAL] in contradistinction to the άváλεov [INDESTRUCTIBLE]. This he could not have done, had he understood aiários to signify eternal. The indestructible is, certainly, the eternal, at least, a parte post; which is the most, as to duration, to which the sentence can be understood as referring. It follows, of course, that the opposite of the indestructible cannot be the eternal. And so, this second instance helps

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to establish the meaning of the first. The sense of completeness answers the context well in either case; but that of eternity would be incongruous in the one, and therefore is not to be admitted in the other.

If, then, he employed this adjective in these non-eternal meanings, every where else, it is not to be imagined, that in the solitary paragraph in the Timæus, he meant it should express eternal. In truth, in neither of the other cases, does it seem, fairly, to signify any duration; and there is no reason why it should be understood as signifying any duration here.

e.) Plato, in the very paragraph in question, calls zgóvos [Chronos] commonly translated Time, an EXISTENTIAL image of EXISTENCE [αἰῶνος αἰώνιον εἰκόνα]. Did

he mean to say, that time is an eternal image of eternity? Time, in the common meaning of the word, is the opposite, and not the image of eternity. He must have understood something different from eternity by air, when he called χρόνος its image.

I think, however, that by zgóvos, he did not understand time, considered as lapse of duration; measured duration; or the measure of duration; but, created or generated being, considered as in apparent order of succession; as we sometimes do when we speak of time, and mean by it the sum of those things which are born and die, rise and fall, appear and vanish away, seemingly to us one after another; not possessing a constant existence, [ou opioi μñedos aiúr].' But, in this sense, likewise, it would be inconsistent to call Time an eternal image of eternity'; although it may properly be called an image of that existence which Plato was contemplating under the name air. On this I may say more hereafter. But, at present, I must consider the sentence as decisive, that airios does not mean eternal, nor alov eternity.

f.) The context, in no case, requires a sense of eternity, nor even of duration of any kind to be attached to either of these words. The most that can be argued in favor of such a rendering would be a bare possibility, that, in some of the instances, such a meaning might not be inconsistent with the immediate verbal connexion, in which the words occur; although, in other instances, it would be incongruous.

Now, after the foregoing 'copious' exhibition of the habits of air in ancient Greek, something more than a bare possi