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remedy applied, even in that case, though satisfactory for the time, can have no application to future difficulties or differences of opinion. Let us suppose that a general election takes place in that Province next year, and that the great body of the people are dissatisfied with the mode in which the patronage of the government has been distributed, and the general bearing of the internal policy of its rulers. If that colony were an English incorporated town, the people would have the remedy in their own hands; if they were entrusted with the powers, which, as British subjects of right belong to them, they would only have to return a majority of their own way of thinking; a few men would change places; the wishes of the majority would be carried out; and by no possibility could anything occur to bring the people and their rulers into such a state of collision as was exhibited in that fine Province for a long series of years. But under the existing system, if a hostile majority is returned, what can they do? Squabble and contend with an Executive whom they cannot influence; see the patronage and favor of government lavished upon the minority who annoy, but never outvote them; and, finally, at the expiration of a further period of ten years, appeal by delegation to England; running the hazard of a reference to a clerk or a secretary whose knowledge of the various points at issue is extremely limited-who has no interest in them, and who, however favorably disposed, may be displaced by some change in the position of parties at home before the negotiations are brought to a close.

In 1836, a general election took place in Nova Scotia ; and when the Legislature met for the dispatch of business, it was found that the local government had two-thirds of the members of the representative branch against them. A fair-minded Englishman would naturally conclude that the local cabinet, by a few official changes and a modification of its policy, would have at once deferred to the views and opinions of so large a majority of the popular branch. Did it do so? No. After a fierce struggle with the local authorities, in which the revenue bills and the appropriations for the year were nearly lost, the House forwarded a strong address to the foot of the throne, appealing to the Crown for the redress of inveterate grievances, the very existence of which our Colonial rulers denied, or which they refused to remove.

To give Your Lordship an idea of the absurd anomalies and ridiculous wretchedness of our system up to that time, it is only necessary to state, that a Council of twelve persons administered the government, and at the same time formed the upper branch of the Legislature, sitting invariably with closed doors. Only five of these twelve gentlemen were partners in one private bank, five of them were relations, two of them were heads of departments, and one was the chief justice, who in one capacity had to administer the law he had assisted to make, and then in a third, to advise the Governor as to its execution. To heighten the absurdity of the whole affair, it is hardly necessary to add, that only nine of these twelve were members of a particular church, which, however useful or respectable, only embraced one-fifth of the whole population of the Province. To the passage of certain measures for the regulation of our currency, the derangement of which was supposed to be profitable to those who dealt in money, the bankers were said to have opposed their influence. Any attempt at reduction of the expense of the revenue departments, the heads of which sat at the board, was not likely to prevail; while the patronage of the government was of course distributed by the nine churchmen, in a way not very satisfactory to the four-fifths of the people who did not happen to belong to that communion. Such a combination as this never could have grown up in any Colony where the English principle of responsibility had been in operation. Indeed, there was something so abhorrent to British feeling and justice in the whole affair, that Lord Glenelg at once decided that it was too bad ;" and, while in Her Majesty's name he thanked the Commons for the representation they had made, he directed the Governor to dissolve the old Council, and form two new ones, free from the objections which the Assembly had urged.1

Had the instructions given been fairly carried out, there is little doubt that in Nova Scotia, as in New Brunswick, the people and their representatives would have been contented for a time; and would have felt that, in extreme cases, an appeal from their local rulers to the Colonial Secretary would be effectual. The existing machinery of government might have been supposed to be adequate to the necessities of the country, with

1 See Longley, op. cit.

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perhaps an entire revision and repair at the hands of the master workmen at home once in ten years; or whenever the blunders of subordinates in the Colony had completely clogged its operations.

But mark the result. The Governor was instructed to call into the new Councils those who "possessed the confidence of the country." Now, you in England are simple enough to believe, that when the Whigs have, in a house of six hundred and fifty-eight members, a majority of eight or ten, they possess the confidence of the country; and if their majority should happen to be double that number, you would think it droll enough if they were entirely excluded from political influence, and if the new creations of peers and selections for the Cabinet should all be made from the ranks of their opponents. This would be absurd at home; and yet it is the height of wisdom in the Colonies. At the time these commands were sent out, the party who were pressing certain economical and other reforms in Nova Scotia, were represented by two-thirds of the members of the popular branch. The relative numbers have occasionally varied during the past three sessions. At times, as on the recent division upon a delegation, the reformers have numbered thirty-three to eleven, in a House of forty-six. On some questions the minority has been larger; but two-thirds of the whole may be fairly taken as the numerical superiority on all political questions, of the reformers over their opponents. It will scarcely be believed, then, in England, that in the new appointments, by which a more popular character was to be given to the Councils, six gentlemen were taken from the minority, and but two from the ranks of the majority. So that those who had been thanked for making representations to the Queen, and who were pressing a change of policy, were all passed over but two; while those who had resisted and opposed every representation, were honored by appointments, and placed in situations to render any such change utterly hopeless. The Executive Council, the local cabinet or ministry, therefore, contained one or two persons of moderate views, not selected from the House; one from the majority, and eight or ten others, to render his voice very like that of the man crying in the wilderness." He held his seat about half a year, and then resigned; feeling that while he was

sworn to secrecy, and compromised by the policy he had not approved, he had no influence on the deliberations of the Cabinet or the distribution of patronage. Things were managed just as much in accordance with the royal instructions with respect to the Legislative Council. The pack was shuffled, the game was to remain the same. The members of the majority, as I have said before, were all omitted in the new creation of peers, but one; while, both from the House and beyond it, some of the most determined supporters of old abuses were selected; and among them, a young lawyer who had shown a most chivalrous desire to oppose everything Her Majesty so graciously approved; and who, in the excess of his ultra zeal, had, upon the final passage of the address to the crown, when almost all his friends deserted him, voted against the measure in a minority of four.

Here, then, Your Lordship has a practical illustration of the correctness of Lord Durham's observations; and may judge of the chance the present system offers of good Colonial government, even when the people have the Queen and the Colonial Secretary on their side. Such policy would wither all hope in the Nova Scotians, if they did not confide in the good sense and justice of their brethren within the four seas. We do not believe that the Parliament, press, and people of England, when rightly informed, will allow our local authorities" to play such tricks before high heaven;" or force us to live under a system so absurd, so anti-British, so destructive of every manly and honorable principle of action in political affairs. The House of Assembly, as a last resort, after ample deliberation, determined to send two members of that body as delegates to England, to claim the rights of Englishmen for the people of this country. Your Lordship's declaration tells me, that on this point they will be unsuccessful; but patient perseverance is a political characteristic of the stock from which we spring.

You ask me for the remedy. Lord Durham has stated it distinctly: the Colonial Governors must be commanded to govern by the aid of those who possess the confidence of the people, and are supported by a majority of the representative branch. Where is the danger? Of what consequence is it to the people of England, whether half a dozen persons, in whom that majority have confidence, but of whom they know nothing and care less, manage

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our local affairs; or the same number, selected from the minority, and whose policy the bulk of the population distrust? Suppose there was at this moment a majority in our Executive Council who think with the Assembly, what effect would it have upon the funds? Would the stocks fall? Would England be weaker, less prosperous or less respected, because the people of Nova Scotia were satisfied and happy?

But, it is said, a Colony being part of a great Empire, must be governed by different principles from the Metropolitan State. That, unless it be handed over to the minority it cannot be governed at all. That the majority, when they have things their own way, will be discontented and disloyal. That the very fact of their having nothing to complain of will make them desire to break the political compact, and disturb the peace of the Empire. Let us fancy that this reasoning were applied to Glasgow, or Aberdeen, or to any other town in Britain, which you allow to govern itself. And what else is a Province, like Nova Scotia, than a small community, too feeble to interfere with the general commercial and military arrangements of the government; but deeply interested in a number of minor matters, which only the people to be affected by them can wisely manage; which the ministry can never find leisure to attend to, and involve in inextricable confusion when they meddle with them? You allow a million of people to govern themselves in the very capital of the kingdom; and yet Her Majesty lives in the midst of them without any apprehension of danger, and feels the more secure, the more satisfaction and tranquillity they exhibit. Of course, if the Lord Mayor were to declare war upon France, or the Board of Aldermen were to resolve that the duties upon brandy should no longer be collected by the general revenue officers of the kingdom, everybody would laugh, but no one would apprehend any great danger. Should we, if Lord Durham's principles be adopted, do anything equally outré, check us, for you have the power; but until we do, for your own sakes-for you are as much interested as we are-for the honor of the British name, too often tarnished by these squabbles, let us manage our own affairs, pay our own officers, and distribute a patronage, altogether beneath your notice, among those who command our esteem.