HILE this Government is anxious to support as far as possible the main principles of the scheme they find it necessary to point out certain defects, The question of administrative and legislative devolution is dealt with in paragraphs 212 and 213, and upon these subjects this Government has only two suggestions to offer. First, in the opinion of this Government, the demarcation of the Imperial and Provincial spheres, both legislative and administrative, should be effected by statute and not by any species of constitutional practice. As regards legislation in particular it would, in practice, be inconvenient that the powers of the Provincial and Imperial legislatures should not be clearly and unmistakably defined, and it is further important that that definition should be a statutory definition in order to avoid any possible doubt as to the competency of the respective legislatures and to escape the possibility of legislation by one body encroaching on the sphere of the other body. In the second place I am to suggest that although the question of the relaxation of the control of the Government of India in the administrative sphere can be dealt with at any time, and need not therefore necessarily be decided now, yet in the opinion of this Government some relaxation will undoubtedly be necessary in view of the greater powers which it is proposed to give not only to the Provincial Governments but also to the Provincial Legislative Council. The Governor-in-Council is inclined to doubt whether it is correct to say that a general relaxation of the control of the Government of India would be opposed by Indian opinion, as is suggested in paragraph 213 of the report. The Governor-in-Council has reason to believe that the contrary is the case. It is, however, unnecessary to enter into the details of this question, as it is one that can be dealt with independently of the proposed reforms. The next matter which calls for discussion is the Provincial Executive, which is dealt with in paragraphs 214 to 224. On this most important and difficult question the Governor-in-Council, I am to say, regrets that he is unable to accept the proposed scheme of Government as one which is likely to work satisfactorily in practice. The Governor-in-Council is aware that the proposal is intended to meet a period of transition only. But it is not possible to say with any approach to certainty how long this period of transition is likely to last, and it is therefore not easy to accept for an indefinite period a scheme which is open to serious objection. That such a scheme as is proposed could not be accepted as permanent is recognised in paragraphs 233 and 354 of the reports. But whatever the transition period may be, the work of administration has to be continued, and in the opinion of this Government it is unsafe to accept a form of Executive which is admittedly open to serious criticisms merely because it furnishes a convenient stop-gap. This Government, I am to say, fully appreciate the ingenuity of the proposed solution, and the advantages which it offers in theory in the way of future development on settled lines. But administration is a practical business. It is proposed to substitute for a form of Government which, whatever its defects, is well tried and has in the working produced results which are far from negligible, a machinery which is wholly untried and which is, it is believed, without precedent in the history of the world. Therefore, I am to say that the Governor in Council considers that the burden of establishing the practicability of the new form of Government lies very heavily upon those who advocate it. I am further to point out that criticism directed against the existing form of Government or the development of that form which is found in paragraph 217 of the report is open to the obvious answer that the form of Government criticised is at least, one which can be seen at work, while no such answer is possible to any criticism of the new scheme. Further, when it is admitted, as in paragraph 217 of the report, that an extension of the existing form of government would not have been unfavourably received in India, it is surely not unfair to argue that the merits and the validity of the new proposal should be established by those who advocate it beyond all reasonable criticism. Also it is, as every practical man must admit, difficult if not impossible to forecast what difficulties may arise in the working of machinery so novel and so complicated, and therefore it is impossible to feel that such criticism as is attempted can be exhaustive. Of the existing form of government we know the best and the worst, but of that which is proposed the virtues and defects can only be conjectured. On these general grounds, the Governor in Council is most reluctant to make a leap in the dark which the proposal implies. He prefers most strongly to adhere to that which is known and can be trusted and to proceed upon that basis rather than to risk a doubtful experiment. He considers that the new scheme is obnoxious to criticisms which are at least as cogent as those which can be suggested against a development of the Executive Government upon the present lines and therefore the burden has not been discharged by those who are endeavouring to substitute the new scheme for the old. In addition to these general considerations, there are certain special criticisms which the Governor in Council wishes to offer for the consideration of the Government of India. What he finds it impossible to accept is the proposed division of the Executive Government into two portions. He regards it as a fundamental principle that the responsibility of the Executive Government, or Cabinet, or whatever it may be styled, shall be one and undivided. He considers that the suggested division of functions contains the seeds of friction which will, in all probability, lead to a complete deadlock, and he doubts whether it is in fact possible to divide the functions of government in the manner proposed. Yet, such a division is essential for the successful working of the scheme. It is proposed that the subjects with which Executive Government have to deal should be divided into two portions known as the reserved and the transferred subjects. The report seems to assume that it will be easy to classify the functions in question and allot them to councillors on the one hand or Ministers on the other, in accordance with a pre-conceived plan. It is necessary to point out that this presupposes that each Member of Council under existing conditions exercises independent control as regards the subjects allotted to his charge. This, however, is not the case. Apart from cases in which it is necessary to obtain financial sanction, which will be dealt with hereafter, the whole theory of Government by Council postulates that in all cases other than those of secondary importance, the orders of two members of council will be obtained. It is in fact this feature of Government by council which renders it in the eyes of the Indian public distinctly preferable to that by a single Head. So long as the public feel that orders in all matters of importance receive the concurrence of at least two Members of the Government, particularly if one of those Members is an Indian, they feel confident that questions or issues will have been considered in all their aspects, and that justice will be done to all concerned. It appears, however, to be assumed that it will be possible to divide the functions of government into two separate compartments, with reference to one of which the Councillors will act and the Ministers will advise, and with reference to the other the Ministers will act and the Councillors will advise, and it is assumed that the number of cases in which their functions will overlap will be comparatively few in number and such as can be easily settled in the event of the difference of opinion by reference to His Excellency the Governor. But is it possible to demarcate the various functions of government into two distinct spheres, and to lay down that questions arising in one sphere shall be dealt with by one part of the Government and those arising in the other sphere by another part? A reference to the records of Government will show that there is scarcely a question of importance which comes up for discussion and settlement in any one of the departments of Government which does not require to be weighed carefully in the light of considerations which form the province of another department of Government. The primary duty of the Government as a whole is to preserve peace and order, to protect the weak against the strong, and to see that in the disposal of all questions coming before them the conflicting interests of the many different classes affected receive due attention. And it follows from this that practically all proposals of importance put forward by the Minister in charge of any of the departments suggested for transfer in Illustrative List No. 11 appended to the Report will involve a reference to the authorities in charge of the reserved departments. It is more correct to say that, so far from questions on which the functions of the two portions of the government overlap being few in number as is implied in paragraph 221 of the report, there are few, if any, subjects on which they do not overlap. Consequently the theory that, in the case of a transferred subject in charge of a Minister, it will be possible to dispense with reference to departments of Government concerned with the control of reserved subjects is very largely without foundation. It is undesirable to burden this letter with detail. But a reference to one question which is at present attracting the attention of this Government will show that this statement is fully justified. Take, for instance, the question of introducing free and compulsory education. At first sight it would seem to be impossible that this question should impinge to any material extent on the functions of those departments which are intended to be reserved for the Executive Council. It would seem to be in its nature so entirely educational that, except in so far as financial provision is required, no other department would have to be consulted. But, as the discussions in Council have shown, there are a number of points in which other departments are concerned. In the first place it is clear that the introduction of compulsary education must, if experience in England is any guide, be accompanied by a large increase in the number of prosecutions of parents for not sending their children to school. It is possible that the enforcement of this policy in manufacturing areas, where the children earn good wages in the mills, might lead to discontent on the part of the mill-hands and consequent disturbance. The matter must therefore be considered from the police point of view. Secondly, the disposal of this large number of prosecutions might involve a great strain on the magistracy. This would have to be considered from the point of view of the judicial department. Thirdly, the compulsory attendance of children at schools in rural areas, particularly at harvest time, might reduce the supply of labour in areas where that supply is inadequate, and render it impossible to gather the crops as they ripen. This might seriously affect the ability of the ryot to pay his assessment, and would therefore have to be brought to the notice of the revenue department. Such instances are by no means rare. It cannot, in the opinion of the Governor-in-Council, be too clearly recognised that the functions of government must remain under one authority, and that any attempt to divide them on stereotyped lines can only result in confusion. I have dealt so far with the impossibility of allocating responsibility for separate subjects to individual members of the Government, due to the necessity for considering government as a whole. I am now to consider how far it is possible to impose complete responsibility on the Ministers and at the same time secure an uniform standard of financial control throughout the whole Government. In this connection I am to express a feeling of disappointment at the somewhat inadequate method in which this question has been dealt with in the report. The matter is discussed in paragraphs 221 and 256, and the assumption underlying those paragraphs appears to be that the ordinary procedure will be that the Council and the Ministers combined are to frame a budget which will thereafter be presented to the Legislative Council. In framing this budget as well as in passing it through the Council the Governor-in-Council will be entitled to demand that adequate provision shall be made for reserved subjects. When this is secured, and when the whole budget has been passed by the Legislative Council, the Ministers in charge of the transferred subjects will apparently be at liberty to expend the lump budget grants placed at their disposal without control or check other than the somewhat shadowy veto of His Excellency the Governor. It is apparently contemplated that some friction may arise when these budget grants are fixed, but that as soon as the budget is settled, the possibilities of conflict between the Councillors on the one hand and the Ministers on the other will disappear. Each will have their own grants and the Ministers will be responsible to the Council (or to their constituents it is not clear which) for the manner in which they spend them. It is difficult to believe that this is seriously intended. At the present moment, as is well known, all proposals put forward by various departments of Government have to be referred to the Financial Department for sanction. The latter department decides, in the light of standing orders issued by the Secretary of State, whether from a financial point of view they are expedient and whether they are within the powers of the Provincial Government to deal with, or whether they must be referred to higher The question is one of very great import- 1 is to perform the duty assigned to the Treasury in England? Is the Finance Department to be concerned with the transferred subjects or not? If the answer to this question is Yes, it is clear that the head of Finance Department, who is ex-hypothesi a Councillor, must control the method in which grants made for transferred subjects are expended. He must therefore become responsible along with the Ministers and responsible to a very marked extent. Thus the theory that the Ministers and Ministers alone are responsible to the Legislature becomes untenable. If the head of the Finance Department is not to exercise any control, then it will be necessary to set up another finance department under the control of the Ministers whose duty will be to superintend the expenditure of grants made for transferred subjects. In the latter case there will inevitably be different financial standards for different departments under the same Government, and this must eventually lead to friction, waste, and maladministration. The result is that it is impossible in the opinion of this Government to contend that the proposals of the report will achieve their object, namely, delegation of responsibility to Ministers. The essential indivisibility of the functions of government and the necessity recognised in all governments throughout the world of maintaining the unity of financial control at once renders this impracticable. But there is still one feature more which in the opinion of this Government calls for serious criticism. It is proposed that the Ministers shall, if they require revenues beyond those allotted to them, after the provision of funds for reserved subjects, be at liberty to propose taxation for which they and they only shall be responsible. Now it seems to this Government that where taxation is concerned it is quite impossible to say that the Ministers shall be responsible and the Councillors shall not. The public would most certainly hold the whole Government responsible, so that there too the proposal in the report to transfer responsibility by compartments would prove a failure. The odium of new taxation should rest upon those whose policy has made that taxation necessary. But this will not inevitably be the case under the proposed scheme. It is not improbable that the demands of the reserved subjects may compel the Governor-in-Council to allocate so large a portion of the available funds to those subjects as to leave no sufficient surplus for the administration and development of the transferred subjects. The power to impose fresh taxation is vested in the Ministers alone, and they may be compelled to appeal to the Legislative Council to impose fresh burdens on the public to meet expenditure which is not required by any policy of theirs. This would place the Ministers in a false position, and inevitably give rise to undesirable friction. On this ground also it appears expedient that proposals for fresh taxation should emanate from the whole Government. Finally, it is proposed that the Minister who is first appointed should be on his trial for a period of training, and at the end of this period his constituents should decide whether or not his policy has been such as to justify them in re-electing him to the Legislative Council. Now it is hardly necessary to observe that the electorates throughout this Presidency must be ignorant, and it will be necessary, if they are to arrive at a fair estimate of the virtues or defects of the retiring Minister, that they shall have a clear idea of what he has done. He may act on his own responsibility or in concert with another Minister, or as one of the entire Government, or against his will under the control of the Governor, I am to urge that it would be impossible for the It will public to distinguish between these cases. be difficult even for a highly educated person such as a collector to distinguish between the authorities responsible for the various orders which may reach him. It would be impossible for the ordinary agriculturist voter to know that the order directing him to vaccinate his child comes from the Minister whom he returns to Council. because the latter is concerned with sanitation, and that another order under the Police Act directing him to attend a roll call every day comes from an Executive Councillor with whose continuance in office he has nothing to do. The difficulties inherent in the introduction of an electoral system in rural areas in this Presidency are already considerable. It will be impossible to expect from the voters, 80 per cent. of whom will be illiterate, more than general ideas on the subject of what they consider right or wrong in the actions of their representatives. If before judging the latter they are expected to possess the knowledge of a correct classification, which at the present moment is not possessed by anyone who has not a close acquaintance with the work of the secretariat, it is obvious that their votes cannot be given intelligently, and that the theory that the Ministers will be responsible to their constituents is in practice an illusion, I am further to point out that the convention insisted on in paragraphs 221 and 222 that the two portions of the Government should form, not two Governments but one Government, and that the decision should be loyally defended by the entire Government is likely to lead to difficulties more serious than appear to be recognised in those paragraphs. It is possible, it is even probable, that occasions will arise when the decision of that part of the Government which is responsible for the reserved subjects will not meet with the approval of the Ministers, and it is equally probable that the decisions of the Ministers with reference to the transferred subjects may not be approved by the members of the Executive Council. In such cases it would be extremely difficult for the Government to act as a whole in the face of the public. Where all the members of Govern. ment have a voice in the decision of any matter, as in the form of executive advocated by this Government, any member can fairly subordinate his own views to the decision of the whole body of which he is a member. He has had his say in the matter, he has recorded his vote, and if the decision goes against him, as a member of the Government he is perfectly entitled to uphold the decision of the majority. But here it is proposed that the Minister or member of the Executive Council, as the case may be, should support a decision of which he heartily disapproves and as to which he has had no deciding voice. In the form of government advocated by the Governor-inCouncil the decisions are, in reality, the decisions of the whole Government and can be defended as such. In the opinion of the Governor-in-Council this is a most serious objection, which it is difficult to accept even for a period of transition. I am now to invite attention to the formidable list of duties which the new scheme will impose upon the Governor. It will be for him to decide inter alia (a) who should be selected as Minister or Ministers (paragraph 218), (b) whether the allotments for reserved subjects should be insisted on or not (paragraph 254), (c) whether a subject belongs to the reserved or transferred sphere (paragraph 221), and to decide in cases where a subject trenches on both spheres, (d) whether legislation should be certified or not (paragraphs 252 and 253), (e) whether a Bill should be assented to or returned for consideration (paragraph 254), and (ƒ) whether the proposals made by a Minister as to a transferred subject shall be vetoed (paragraph 219). The majority of these duties are imposed upon the Governor owing to the suggested division of the two spheres of Government, and in the opinion of this Government the burden, in practice, will be intolerable. Every one of these decisions may give occasion for friction between the Governor and the Minister, or possibly between the Governor and the Legislative Council. An occasion for political agitation may arise out of all or any of these matters. The last duty in particular will impose upon the Governor the necessity of keeping a close and constant watch on every order issued in the transferred sphere. It may be objected that it is proposed to issue for the guidance of the Governor an instrument of instructions such as is contemplated in paragraph 219. Without the text of the proposed instrument it is difficult to criticise in detail, but the Governor in-Council is of opinion that it is impracticable to provide in such an instrument instructions which can be exhaustive, having regard to the diversity of the difficulties which can be foreseen, and when allowance is made for the unforeseen difficulties, the impracticability of the proposal is even more obvious. If the instrument is not exhaustive it ceases to be of much value. In the nature of things it cannot be exhaustive, and it will merely serve to fetter the discretion of the Governor in circumstances which cannot have been anticipated when it was drafted. If, therefore, the control of the Governor is to be the ultimate safeguard, as it will be in many matters under the proposed scheme, there should be no endeavour to fetter that control in the manner proposed. The above remarks, I am to say, contain the main criticisms which the Governor-inCouncil offers for consideration with reference to this portion of the subject, but he would again insist that it is beyond human sagacity to forecast with accuracy the manner in which such machinery as this will work. There may be other and more serious difficulties which have not been foreseen and which time alone can bring to light. has so far set The Governor-in-Council out what appears to him to be the principal objections to the form of Executive Government proposed in the report. I am now to set out the main lines of the alternative which he advocates as being suitable to the conditions of this Presidency. I. The executive should consist of five members including the Governor. There should be four members of Council of whom three should be Indians. Of these three, two should be chosen from among the elected members of the Legislative Council. The Governor should have power to appoint a |