war. were with power to carry on peace negotiations. The language of the firman and the inexplicable delay in producing it, made the British doubt the sincerity of the mission. So they too permitted to go back without any more reply. In the meanwhile, the Afghans were being repulsed in every theatre of The Amir's plan of campaign, though excellently conceived, had practically failed. Not only was the Afghan rising in Peshawar city which was to take place at the same time as the seizure of the Khyber pass traced and nipped in in the bu, but the Khyber pass was placed outside the danger zone by driving the Afghans off the mouth of the pass. The attempts of the Afghan troops to raise the tribes on the border against the British were not attended with any success. These tribes occupy ing as they do the position comparable to a certain degree with Afghanistan between India and Russia, would have greatly embarrassed the position of the British if they had taken sides with the Amir. But thanks to the past policy of the British towards these unruly tribes, which has kept them loyal to the British connection in spite of the close ties such as religion, which would otherwise have naturally drawn them to the Afghan side. Moreover, the successful air raiding of the British on Jellalabad and Kabul, and the failure of the Afghans to adopt any reprisals, has had some effect on them. The successes achieved by the British in the actions that took place on the 9th and 11th May, the subsequent occupation of the important town of Dakka, a severe defeat later on the 17th May, and a stern repulse near Asmar in Chitral territory resulted in the Afghans giving up all ideas of stirring up the tribes in that part of the country. The tribes too showed no disposition to respond to the friendly overtures of the Afghans. But General Nadir Khan has to some extent succeeded in making the British withdraw their militia posts in the Upper Tochi, and South Waziristan. After many vain attempts he has obtained the adherence of Darwesh Khel and the Mahsuds and entered Waziristan. No effort has been spared by him to get into possession of Thal. But all to no purpose. The sight of the British relief force seems to have created a panic in the Afghan army and the immediate retreat towards Khost abandoning their point of vantage was the result. The British aeroplanes employed in reconnoitring have found out that the Afghans have abandoned Yousuf Khel also, which formed the head-quarters of Nadir Khan. Earlier in the war the British lost Spimwam; but this loss has been made good by the gain of the impregnable fortress of Spim Bal dak in the southern area. The withdrawal of Nadir Khan to Khost and the letter from the Amir again seeking armistice show that all is not well in Afghanistan. One is really astonished to find the Amir maintaining his innocence in the affair and attributing the out-break of war to some misunderstanding. The dominating influence exercised by Torzi in regard to foreign policy and the encouragement that the vigorous propaganda campaign carried on by this man to stir up the people of Afghanistan and this country has received from the Amir prove beyond doubt that the theory of war now put forward by the Amir has no foundation at all. The mass of evidence in possession of the British conclusively proves that the Amir planned the war of offence with a view to distract the attention of his people from internal affairs, promising them much booty. The Viceroy has rightly repudiated the allegations made by him regarding the origin of the war and has proposed terms for armistice which are both lenient and reasonable.' It is gratifying to learn that while pointing out the difficulties in observing certain terms the Amir has gladly accepted the Viceroy's offer and has appointed his plenipotentiaries to treat with the British Government. The Viceroy too has made the necessary arrangements to meet these Afghan representatives. In a few days, peace with Afghanistan will be an accomplished fact. If there is one lesson more than another which we learn from the past history of the British relations with Afghanistan, it is the danger of premature peace. The conduct of the Afghans in the previous wars would make everyone pause a while before giving ready acceptance to any offer of peace. In this connection we have to bear in mind what Lord Roberts wrote after the war of 1879. "I felt that the Afghans had not had the sense of defeat sufficiently to convince them of our strength and ability to punish breach of treaty, and therefore a peace made now, before they had been thoroughly beaten, would not be a lasting one and would only end in worse trouble in the near future." Everyone who has been carefully following the course of events in the present war will have no need to entertain any fear on this account. It is not too much to hope that as a result of peace negotiations it will be possible to renew the friendly relations between the two countries and place them not on the whims and fancies of hotheaded monarchs but on the goodwill and right understanding of the Afghan people. But the realisation of such a hope largely depends on the attitude of the nation as a whole, TOPICS FROM PERIODICALS European Theories of Government Mr. W. A. Dunning, Professor of History and Political Philosophy in the Columbia University writes in the current number of Political Science Quarterly about the various bodies of doctrine which occupied the chief place successively in current European speculation. There were three principal bodies of doctrine of which the first was constitutionalism which dominated thought till the middle of the 19th century; the second was nationalism which reached the climax of its sway over men's minds in the sixties; and the third was socialism. After the Congress of Vienna, especially conspicuous was the idea that some kind of constitution-of fundamental law written or unwritten-was of the essence of a rational and workable system. The demand for a well defined legal basis for the government, whether monarchic, aristocratic or democratic, became the central feature in the programme of the liberal party in every State. Theoritical debate developed new and striking doctrines only as to the content and not as to their desirability of the written code. As to the essential requirements of constitutional government, theory was practically unanimous in holding that there must be, first, some guarantee of rights to the individual, and second a separation of executive, legislative and judicial powers. Theories of the Rechtsstaat or the constitutional state were largely concerned with the effort to reconcile the functions of a representative assembly with those of a hereditary Monarch and to partition sovereignty neatly between the prince and the people. The Charte Constitutionelle of Louis XVIII was based on the will of the Monarch. That of 1830 supported the doctrine that the fundamental law rested upon a compact between the king and the elected representatives; and formal modification of the constitution required the joint action of parliament and crown. The French Liberal writer, Benjamin Constant, developed the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people in the general spirit of Montesquieu, rather than in that of Rousseau. In his analysis of constitutional monarchy, the royal power regulates and harmonizes the movements of the executive power, the judicial power, the hereditary assembly and the elective assembly which are represen⚫ ted by the ministry, the Courts, the second chamber and the house of representatives. Constant's view that the Monarch is an organ of Government rather than the sovereign of the state was quite characteristic of the transition from monarchic to popular sovereignty. Guizot was anxious to guarantee against any exaggeration of power in either Monarch or people. De Tocqueville openly imitated the model of Montesquieu and continued in the lives of Aristotle, Polybius and Machiavelli. He pointed out in the first place the qualifications permeating the idea of sovereignty which was the ultimate law-making authority, but was not absolute in any human will whether individual or collective. He brought into prominence two elements in the American system (1) the extreme decentralisation of administration and (2) the exalted political function of the higher judiciary. Both of these play an important part in the successful career of constitutional democracy. Tocqueville's general purpose is to show that successful democracy rests not so much on written constitutions, as on the history and character the environment, manners and morals of the people. The two above-mentioned features of America are not formally embodied in the written constitution and are not due to any artificial work. He finds that the evil of democracy lies in the tyranny of the majority; and the same majority that makes the law makes also public opinion, German Democracy at the Cross-roads It is impossible to forecast what will be the precise results or the final form of the work of the Constituent National Assembly in Germany. An article in a recent number of The Round Table explains briefly the salient features of the old Imperial German Constitution, summarises the reasons why it was not a democratic constitution and finally indicates the defects revealed by theory or practice in the old constitution. There is no analogy between the German imperial system and that of other countries enjoying self-government and representative parliamentary institutions. The German policy is not made in the Imperial Cabinet, nominally made by the Imperial Chancellor and by the Federal Council, practically by the King and Government of Prussia. Neither the Federal Council nor the Reichstag could make or unmake a Government or Ministers. Both in law and in practice the control of the Reichstag over the purse had been whittled down to virtual impotence. And the Imperial budget covered only a part of the taxation of Germany. The will of the Reichstag as representing the German people could not be made to prevail in the last resort. The key of the situation and the cornerstone of the governmental arch of the Empire were the powers, strength, traditions and principles of the Prussian monarchy which is the Prussian Government. This Prussian root has been immensely strengthened by the Emperor's personal policy. He has buttressed up his formidable position by tightening and extending in every way the dynastic bonds between the Hohenzollerns and other ruling families of Germany. Imperial penetration which is Prussian penetration, thus subtly and surely, aimed at controlling through the Prussianised rulers, the Governments of the nonPrussian States. The Federal Council was for all practical purposes of policy and administration an organ tuned and effectively controlled by Prussia, And against this bulwark the watch of opposition of liberalism, of social democrats and of Radicals had until 1918 beaten in vain. Thus, if Germany is to have a democratic Govvernment, no tinkering of the old constitution will suffice. The machinery of government must be recreated on different principles in a different spirit and for fundamentally different objects. Secondly there must be a no less drastic reconstruction of the constitution and Government of Prussia. Regarded historically, the situation at the end of 1918 reverted to the situation in the spring of 1848. The leaders of 1848 grasped very clearly that unless Prussia was dissolved in Germany' the revolution which would have given a liberal democratic and unifying constitution on truly nationalist lines would end in a collapse and in the triumph of reaction. They recognised that the failure of the Revolution to master Prussia was the main cause of the reaction of 1849. The subsequent conversion of Germany to the principles of militatism, based on the Gospel of Power, was the result of this collapse. Germany has now imposed on herself the task of demolishing the work of Bismarck and the postBismarckians and of extirpating Prussianism without destroying Prussia. A similar task was imposed on the men of 1789 in France. They had to destroy the achievements and principles of Richelieu and of Louis XIV without destroying France. The substitution of a Republic and a President for the Empire and the Emperor is not the most striking point. A Republic, unitarian or federal is not in itself necessarily democratic. In the draft constitution framed for Germany there are several large defects. But if the Revolution has for the moment made Junkerdom important, it has not reduced the predominance of Prussia in Germany though it has put the predominance in a different setting. In a word, the difficulty of dissolving Prussia in Germany has been increased rather than diminished by the Revolution! The Chinese Press The Tang Dynasty of China (618-907 AD.) observes a writer in the Asiatic Review for April encouraged learning and patronised literature and started a government organ in which were published imperial edicts, rescripts and memorials It was issued irregularly until 1351, when it was issued four times a moon. But for many years until it ceased publication it appeared daily. The issue was limited; but it was copied and circulated throughout the country in the form of proclamations and posted outside yamens and city-gates. Anonymous placards were frequently used for giving expression to the discontent and dissatisfaction of the public against acts of oppression and injustice. These were usually written in a popular style and were often caustic, cutting and satirical, as well as full of sharp and witty quotations. The Peking Gazette since the establishment of the Foreign Legations in Peking after the war of 1859-60 was the principal source from which foreign ambassadors derived their official news and the policy, opinions and news of the Chinese rulers. This gave one an insight into court and official life and etiquette as well as enabled one to gain a knowledge of the manners and customs of the people. Modern journalism in China may be said to date from 1864 when an American Missionary, Dr. Y. J. Allen started a monthly magazine which had a wide circulation and was read by officials and literati. In 1872 the first daily newspaper was published in Shang-Hai. It maintained a high reputation for intelligent and wise criticism and was even welcomed at the Peking Court and remained the leading organ of Chinese opinion for many years. Other newspapers were published mostly at the treaty ports where the editors were free to express their opinions and advocate reforms which they were not allowed to do in the interview. With the ipauguration of the national post office and the extension of railways, there was a boom in newspaper production. During 1903 the young China party captured most of the press and were taking lessons from the Japanese regarding the use of printing machinery and the arts of process-engraving. When the Revolution broke out in 1911, there were no less than 700 newspapers which have now reached to over a thousand. In 1906 a daily newspaper for women was started in Peking. There are also a considerable number of magazines which have a wide circulation; and a women's magazine has advocated equal rights for women and their economic independence. In 1907 a Press-law was drawn up by Government giving the ministry power to control, censor and when necessary muzzle the Press. This was superseded by a more stringent law which led to what was known as 'cartoon' warfare between the Government and the Press. The Chinese editors are not only masters of classical literature but also artists and poets; and they portrayed by their cartoons the vices of evils caused by officials, foreign oppression through loans, indemnities and abuse of power; humiliation and shame from the conduct of the Chinese towards foreigners, the ignorances, indifference and vices of the people, etc. The Chinese editors are able to satirise, deride and goad by the use of a single character; and the Pictorial Press was very good in derision and scorn. The effect of modern journalism on mandarins was most salutary. It has led to the agitation for reform and the spreading of progressive ideas among all classes, created a desire and demand for a constitution and parliament, with a view of regenerating the country financially politically and socially. The growth of the native press has largely removed the apparent indifference and unconcern of the people. It has largely taught the Chinese to think for themselves and taught them to work out their own salvation without the intervention of other nations. Egyptian Administration. The present crisis in Egypt makes it imperative on all students of the politics of the British Empire to learn something of the nature of the British protectorate over that country, the character of the British rulers and their ideals. Sir Malcolin Mc Ilwraith, in a paper that is published in United Empire (April number) explains the more salient and distinguishing characteristics of British policy towards Egypt and the personal temperament and character of the various British rulers who have presided over that country's destinies since 1882. Earl Cromer who was in power from 1803 to 1907 laid the foundations of all succeeding regimes. The leading feature of his rule was the gradual gathering together of all the threads of administration and their concentration in the hands of one man marked out in all possible respects for supreme power. He had to struggle continuously with those forces which resented his encroachments on their powers and prerogatives and which resisted his authority by active opposition or passive obstruction. There were trials of strength between the more daring spirits among them and Earl Cromer; and the choice lay between the personal government of the Khedive Abbas II and the personal government of Lord Cromer. The marvellous financial transformation and material development of the country which he effected are well within the knowledge of all. His successor Sir Eldon Gorst inaugarated a new policy which the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith desired to try, viz., to get the cordial support and collaboration of the Khedive. The experiment proved a failure both from a political and from an administrative point of view. The period was one of administrative sterility and the only measure of reform was the improvement of Provincial Councils. The demand for full Parliamentary institutions and agitation continued and culminated in the assassination of the Premier Boutros Pasha, the retirement of Sir Eldon Gorst and the accession of Lord Kitchener to power. Kitchener breathed a new spirit into the administration. During his regime (1911-14) a large number of innovations of various kinds were introduced, most of them intended to ameliorate the lot His of the fellaheen. administrative talents were no less remarkable than his military genius; but his greatest defect as a civil administrator was a positive passion for despatch at any price. Much of his legislation was seriously prejudiced by his unwillingness to allow reasonable time for its elaboration. There was certainly no stagnation under his regime and routine was reduced to a minimum. He took a special interest-no doubt largely military-in means of communication. Since the proclamation of the British Protectorate, there have been a Sultan instead of the Khedive and a British High Commissioner in the place of the Consul General. This change has not greatly altered the outward aspect of affairs. The protectorate de facto has been converted into a protectorate de jure. The High Commissioner is placed in a position corresponding to his political importance; and this change will lead to the disappearance of the diplomatic corps of other states in Cairo, and the substitution for it of commercial consuls, as in other British dependencies. |