CHAPTER IV.

LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF MENTAL DEFICIENCY.

§ 80. THE general principles that determine the legal relations of idiocy are so obvious, and the fact of its existence so easily established, that little occasion has been afforded for doubt or diversity of opinion. The maxims of the law have sprung from the suggestions of common sense, and its provisions have equal reference to the best interests of its wretched subjects and of those who are about them. It may be mentioned as a curious fact, however, that while the idiot is denied the enjoyment of most of the civil rights, he is quietly left by the constitutions of the several States of the union, in possession of one of those political rights, that of suffrage, the very essence of which is the deliberate and unbiased exercise of a rational will. How this anomaly has arisen, it is not easy to conceive. A natural jealousy of any attempt to encroach upon the popular right, might apprehend evils to this institution in allowing the mental qualifications of voters to be too closely scrutinized, but such fears could hardly have been expected in view of the unlimited control maintained by the law over the property and personal liberty of idiots.

§ 81. The little indulgence shown to imbecility in criminal courts, sufficiently indicates that either the psychological nature of this condition of mind is very imperfectly understood, or the true ground on which the idea of responsibility reposes is not clearly perceived. Whichever it may be, it may no doubt be attributed to the prevalent habit of studying the moral and intellectual phenomena in sound and

healthy minds only, without a suspicion, apparently, of the great modifications they present, when the development of the cerebral organism is interrupted by disease. It will be necessary, therefore, before coming to any positive conclusions relative to the legal accountability of imbeciles, to bring into 'view some considerations on this point, which have been too much, if not altogether, overlooked.

§ 82. Our moral and intellectual constitution is constructed in harmony with the external world on which it acts and by which it is acted upon; the result of this mutual action being the happiness and spiritual advancement of an immortal being. Thus endowed with the powers of performing the part allotted us, and placed in a situation suitable for exercising and developing them, we become accountable for the manner in which they are used, -to our Maker, under all circumstances; to our fellow men, when the institutions of society are injured. All legal responsibility, therefore, is founded on this principle of adaptation, and ceases whenever either of its elements is taken away. The intellect must not only be sufficiently developed to acquaint the individual with the existence of external objects and with some of their relations to him, but the moral powers must be sound enough and strong enough to furnish each its specific incentives, to pursue that course of conduct which the intellect has already approved. It is nothing that the mind is competent to discern some of the most ordinary relations of things, and is sensible of the impropriety of certain actions; for so long as the individual is incapable, by defect of constitution, of feeling the influence of those hopes and fears and of all those sentiments and affections that man naturally possesses, an essential element of legal responsibility is wanting, and he is not fully accountable for his actions.

§ 83. In the normal mind the idea of crime is associated with those of injury and wrong; can we then impute crime where there is neither intention nor consciousness of wrong? For want of the higher and nobler faculties, the actions of the imbecile are contemplated by him solely in relation to himself; not a thought enters his mind respecting their con

sequences to others. For the same reason that he puts to death a brute, that of mere personal gratification, he murders a fellow being, and is constitutionally unable to appreciate any difference in the moral character of the two actions. In the latter case, as in the former, he has a selfish object in view, and is restrained from pursuing his purpose by none of the considerations that actuate the sound and well-developed mind. The natural right of every one to the undisturbed possession of his own life, and the sentiment of wrong awakened by the infliction of injury, are things as far beyond the sphere of his contemplations, as the most difficult problem in mathematics, and he merely feels the animal impulse-which to him has the strength of a natural rightto appropriate to himself whatever will conduce to his momentary gratification. The thought of the wounds inflicted on the friends and connections of his victim by his decease, cannot restrain him, because the feelings of benevolence and sympathy which they suppose, are utter strangers to his own bosom; and it would be preposterous to expect him to be influenced by a regard to feelings which he never experienced himself. The sense of future accountability cannot restrain him, for the idea of an Almighty, All-seeing Being, ever witnessing his actions, is too confused and too limited in his mind, to present the slightest check to the indulgence of his caprices and passions. The fear of punishment cannot restrain him, because his intellect can discern no necessary connection between his crime and the penalty attached to it, even if he were aware of the existence of the penalty. To make such a person responsible for his actions. to the same degree as one enjoying the full vigor and soundness of the higher faculties, is therefore manifestly unjust; because an essential element of responsibility is a power to refrain from evil-doing, which power is furnished by the exercise of those faculties that are but imperfectly, if at all, developed in the imbecile. The law looks only to the intention, not to the amount of injury committed; and since there can be no criminal intention where there is no consciousness of wrong, it cannot properly reach those wretched objects,

who, to use the expression of one of them, whose case will be shortly noticed, "can see no difference between killing an ox, and killing a man."

§ 84. Many, it is true, find it hard to be convinced that one who labors under no delusion, and enjoys a certain degree, at least, of moral liberty, may still not be responsible for his criminal acts. They see, perhaps, that he has intelligence enough to perform the inferior kinds of employment, and feel assured that observation must have made him acquainted with the consequences of such acts, even though a stranger to that high moral power which instinctively teaches the distinctions of right and wrong. "He knew better," is their language, "and therefore justice requires his punishment." The error of this reasoning arises in the vulgar habit of estimating the strength and extent of the moral faculties by the ability to go through certain mechanical duties, and provide for the wants and exigencies of the present moment. Not only has this ability no connection with the moral sentiments, but it is not even an index of the measure of intelligence; any more than the skill of the bee or beaver in erecting their structures, is indicative of great intellectual resources. These degraded specimens of our race are not without the capacity of being educated in a limited degree; and thus like those inferior animals which man has made conducive to his comfort, they are trained to perform some kinds of service with tolerable merit. This, however, no more proceeds from the kind of intelligence that discerns moral truth, than the isolated talent for music or construction not unfrequently met with in the complete idiot.

§ 85. For the purpose of illustrating and confirming the above views, some account will now be given of a few criminal trials, the subjects of which seem to have been affected with mental imbecility, stating very briefly the facts as they are found recorded, and accompanying them with such reflections as the particular circumstances of the case require. They are well worth the consideration of every honest and unprejudiced inquirer, for he will find in them a kind of information which he can obtain from no other

quarter, and he will be able to see for himself, how little of true philosophy has presided over this department of criminal jurisprudence.

§ 86. In November, 1821, John Schmidt, aged 17, was tried at Metz for parricide. He had manifested, from an early age, a proneness to mischief and even cruelty. As soon as he was old enough to run in the streets, he would amuse himself by throwing stones into the rivulet, that ran through the village, in order to spatter and hurt the people who were passing by, many of whom were injured by him. They contented themselves, however, with charging his parents to take care of him, for he was even then considered to be mad.

The first count in the indictment charged him with wounding on the head his sister-in-law, in one of their domestic quarrels. The second charged him with an attempt on the life of one of his cousins, whom he pushed into the water while fishing by the side of a pond, and then laughed at his struggles to extricate himself. When he finally succeeded, Schmidt approached him and asked if he were wet, and if the water had reached his skin; the boy, to show that it had, opened his shirt, when Schmidt plunged a knife in his bosom. Happily, the wound was not severe.

On the night of the parricide, the father was boiling potashes. At four o'clock in the morning he called to his wife to come and assist him in lifting the kettle from the fire, but she refused and ordered John to go. John went in his shirt, and set the kettle on the floor, and while his father was bending over to stir the potashes, he struck him a blow with a hatchet lying near, that felled him senseless to the ground. He then ascended to the garret, where his brother and sister were sleeping, and severely wounded the latter with the hatchet. On being seized by his brother soon after, he asked to see his father, who had just expired; and when gratified in this wish, he uttered these remarkable words:"Ah, my dear father, where are you now? What will become of me? You and my mother are the cause of my misfortunes. I predicted it long ago, and if you had brought