who had perished of want and fatigue. Kutúsof took advantage of the disastrous state of Napoleon's army, and pursued it with activity, while the Kozáks harrassed it on every side, and prevented its foragers from going to any distance, for when they did, they seldom returned.

An affair of some consequence tcok place at Liakhero; and in an engagement at Viasma, the French had about 7,000 men hors de ligne, of whom more than 2,000 were made prisoners, and besides they lost a standard and three cannon. The Russians had 800 men killed and 4,000 wounded. The corps of Davoust, of the Viceroy, and of Prince Poniatóvski, who were engaged, presented a total of about 40,000 combatants, without reckoning the corps of Ney; while the number of regular troops under the orders of Generals Platóf and Milaradovitch did not exceed 25,000 men.

Boutourlin says, Kutúsof may be reproached for not having arrived by forced marches at Viasma before the French, so as to have barred the passage, and caused him to come to a decisive battle, in order to open his communications with Smolensk. He allows that the chances of success were in favour of the Russians, and that if even the fortune of arms had declared against them, they had a free retreat upon Juckrof; "while the defeat of the enemy would infallibly entrainât après elle la ruine complète de leur arméc, qui, coupeé de toutes ses communications, se serait trouvée reduite à la cruelle alternative où de mettre bas les armes où de chercher son salut individuellement en se debandant.” Since such was the case, we are not surprised that the prudence of Kutúsof caused a general discontentment in his own army, by losing so good an opportunity, de frapper un coup aussi brilliant que decisif; in fact, of terminating at once their fatigues, their anxieties, and the war. We leave the Colonel to extricate Kutúsof from the dilemma in which he has placed him, and to find a new mode of defence for a most glaring deficiency of military skill.

The condition of the French army became daily more and more miserable; for, besides want of provisions, they had to contend with the petrifying cold of a most severe climate, from which they had few means of protection, and had not even the knowledge requisite for the utilization of those which were in their power. On the 26th of October, (7th of November,) the snow fell, and the cold commenced, in consequence of which, the roads became slippery and almost impracticable for the small remnant of the horses of the French, which they had not the means of shoeing for the season. Sir R. Wilson, in his " Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in 1817," says, that the French army would have regained its position on the Dvina and the Borysthenes, without any serious injury, had it not been for a sudden intense frost, and a total neglect of providing horseshoes suitable to the climate; and he was much taunted for this discovery, as it was triumphantly, and by some indignantly called. That the horses were not frost-shod, however, was not the fault of the French, as is evident from the want of means to do it; and beyond all question, this deficiency was a very serious evil, and led to most ruinous consequences. Former cold and fatigue, skirmishes, and combats, ruined the French army, and the course of their retreat was strewed with the dying and the dead. The frightful pictures of the retreat of the French exhibited by Sir R. Wilson, Labaume, Larrey, &c. are all confirmed by Boutourlin, who reports, that the dying became cannibals, and in a ferocious delirium, devoured the remains of their comrades, who had died but a few minutes before. We shall draw a veil over other scenes equally revolting to human contemplation.

The Viceroy had received orders to take the direction of Duchovstchina, and Poretché upon Vitepsk, so as to give succour to Oudinot, who was pressed by Wittgenstein; and he therefore passed the river at Dórogobujé. He was followed by the Kozáks, &c., who harrassed him, and although he had the advantage in an engagement at Duchovstchina, yet he was obliged, for want of the power of resistance, to rejoin the army at Smolensk.

In the kitchen of the King of Naples there were found flayed eats and boiled horse-flesh, p. 147, 2d.

Napoleon reached Smolensk, with his Guards, on the 28th October, (9th November,) and on the following day was joined by Davoust and Ney. As he had been closely followed by the Russians, and as Kutúsof, repeating the same manœuvre which had succeeded at Moscow, had already seized the roads of Roslavl and Mstislavl, and threatened his communications with Orgha and Borrissef, and the Beresina, he could not long remain in this town. Besides, the offensive motions of Count Wittgenstein, and Admiral Tchitchagóf, may have caused well-founded apprehensions for his rear, and precipitated his retreat, so as to reach the Beresina before the two armies of the right and left should be able to unite and prevent his passage. A party of his Guards left Smolensk on the 1st (13th) November; with the rest he quitted that town on the 2d, (14th); the corps of the Viceroy, of Davoust, and of Ney, with which that of Poniatóvski had been amalgamated, followed him in succession at intervals of a day. They were pursued by the Russians; much and severe skirmishing took place, which was followed by the battle of Krasnoyé. Napoleon wished to sustain himself here till the arrival of Davoust's corps, and resolved to accept of battle; and indeed on the morning of the 5th (17th) he began the attack, in which he was worsted. Davoust's corps having joined him, he ordered the retreat upon Liadi, which he reached, notwithstanding all the efforts of the Russians.

While affairs were going on at Krasnoyé, Platoff prepared to take possession of Smolensk, which he did on the morning of the 5th, (17th,) after the French had evacuated it Davoust's corps had left this town in the night, between the 3d and 4th, (15th and 16th,) and, as we have seen, had joined Napoleon at Krasnoyé. But Ney's corps only left Smolensk in the night, between the 4th and 5th, (16th and 17th,) after having blown up a part of the fortifications. Buonaparte's retreat upon Liadi left Ney's corps at the mercy of the Russians, who intercepted it between Sinolensk and Krasnoyé. Near the last place, Milarádovitch awaited his arrival, which was announced by the Kozáks towards three o'clock P. M. of the 6th, (18th.) The French advanced in a thick fog, unperceived by the Russians, till within 250 paces of their batteries, which opened forty pieces of cannon, and showered grape upon the advancing columns. Far from being disconcerted, Boutourlin avows, that they "threw themselves upon the batteries with admirable fury and courage," and with rare intrepidity. Whole ranks fell, and were instantly replaced by others, whom a similar fate awaited. Although extenuated, they evinced the most heroic obstinacy, but at length were obliged to retire some versts in disorder. "Marshal Ney, seeing the absolute impossibility of avoiding the loss of the greatest part of his corps, resolved to save a part." At the head of about 4000 troops, less in disorder than the rest, he took his course, at the fall of night, towards the village Sirokoreniyé, where he passed the Dnieper upon the ice, which was yet but very weak. During the passage, he was attacked by a regiment of Kozáks, who took 10 cannons and 300 prisoners. He escaped with the remainder of his troops towards Gusinoyé. The troops du gros du son corps reinained upon the great road, and, separated from their chief, at midnight sent a parlementaire to General Milarádovitch, offering to capitulate. The proposition having been received, 8,500 laid down their armis. By adding to this number 3,500 prisoners taken by the Russians during the combat, it appears that an attack on the 6th (18th) November, cost the French 12,000 prisoners, without speaking of the slain, besides twenty-five cannon and much baggage.

On the same day, Napoleon left Liadi for Dubbròvna. All his cavalry being dismounted, he united the officers who still had horses, and formed four companies of them, each of 150. The Generals performed the functions of officers, and the Colonels those of under-officers. This squadron, called sacred, was put under the orders of General Grouchy, and was destined to serve as an escort to Napoleon; but it only existed some days, as all the horses died of fatigue and famine.

Above 26,000 prisoners, of whom seven were Generals, and more than 300 Officers, many standards, and 116 cannon, without counting 112 found by the centenier, Naskin, were the trophies of the signal advantages which the

Russian army gained on the 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 7th, (15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th,) of November. Besides, the French had above 10,000 men killed, drowned in the Dnieper, and dead from inanition and cold. The total loss of the Russian army did not exceed 2000 men hors de combat. "This battle," says the Colonel, "est un des plus beaux faits d'armes of our age," so fertile in memorable events, for the half of the enemy's wing was destroyed. The manoeuvres of the Russians present an exact application of the true principles of the art of war, The Colonel says, that in quitting Smolensk, the French had still a total of 70,000 men, while the Russians did not count above 50,000. Yet, in spite of this inferiority in number, the Russians, wherever they fought, were stronger than their enemies, because Prince Kutúsof took care not to allow them to engage but with isolated corps of the French army." Allowing the relative strength of the armies to be as stated above, of course every one will conclude that the true principles of war, and the engaging of isolated corps, would have availed but little to the Russians had the French not been ruined by cold and hunger. The Russians fought well; but Napoleon's army, at least the most important part of it, became the prey of a northern winter.

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Colonel Boutourlin avows, however, that we may reproach Kutúsof avec raison for not having, par trop de prudence, executed a plan proposed for the operations of the 5th, (17th,) as by this he priva son armée de la gloire de pulveriser d'un seul coup l'armée de Napoleon. This was assuredly a dreadful mistake of Kutúsof's; but, says the Colonel, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de rappeler, que cet excés de circonspection même, n'etait que la consequence du système de temporization adopté par le Maréchal, et qui assura la délivrance de la Russie." Before we can coincide with the Colonel's reasoning, or Kutúsof's vrais principes de l'art de guerre, we must be persuaded, that it is better, even when an occasion presents itself of pulverising our enemies at once, to adopt a système de temporization, and to destroy it piece-meal, and run all the hazard of repeated defeats, and sustain the useless losses of reiterated attacks.

The Russian army marched to Románovna, where the head-quarters of Kutúsof were established, while the troops were cantoned in the surrounding villages. A division of grenadiers, with a regiment of Kozáks, remained at Sirokireniyé, and a brigade, with another regiment of Kozáks, was stationed at Krasnoyé, with the design of collecting les marauders ennemis, who wandered between that place and the Dnieper.

Napoleon had retreated to, and remained at Orsha, so as to collect the debris of Ney's corps. Platóf reached Ney on the afternoon of the 7th, (19th,) near Gusinoyé, and prevented his retreat by Lubávitsi, by throwing him back upon the woods which border the Dnieper. On the 8th, (20th,) at eight o'clock of the morning, he again overtook him near Dubrovka, and took 800 prisoners, and le mena battant even to the village of Jakubovo, where a desperate combat was fought, and of which the French kept possession. Napoleon, instructed of the critical position of Ney, sent to his succour the corps of the Viceroy. Favoured by the motions of this corps, and especially by the obscurity of the night, Ney effected his retreat upon Orsha, and reunited himself to the French army.

The Colonel says with much partiality, that Kutúsof, seeing that the enemy had profited by the delay necessary to reduce Ney's army, before marching to gain the advance of Napoleon, determined to employ only the advanced guard in the pursuit; and that, in order not to fatigue his troops uselessly, he directed, by gentle marches, the mass of his army upon Kopis, where he proposed to pass the Dnieper. But Napoleon, "who, in his disaster, only thought of saving his person by gaining the Niemen, caused his troops to make such fatiguing marches, that one could not follow him without also risking the ruin of the Russian troops." "The half-famished, starved, and spirit-broken troops of Napoleon, could make marches, in which they could not be followed by the well-clothed, well-fed, and elated army of the Russians!!!" This is the truth; for in fact the condition of the Russian army

was bad enough at this epoch; it could not make head against the French -not from disinclination, but from absolute incapability.

Colonel Boutourlin censures Napoleon for not having changed his route devastée of Smolensk, turned to the left at Gjatsk, and proceeded by Sisévka, Beloi and Poretchyé, upon Witepsk. He complains also of his having marched his corps so far separate from each other upon the same road of desolation, and not scattered, and rather advancing by several roads nearly on the same parallel, so as to have separate sources for obtaining provisions. He is of opinion that Napoleon should have retreated by the right bank of the Dnieper from Smolensk to Orsha. And he thinks personal safety alone could dictate to Napoleon, when, despairing to save his army, he took the shortest and the best-known road; sacrificing all the corps which, disposés en échelons, performed the functions of a rear-guard, destined to cover the retreat of his escort.

Although Kutúsof, by Colonel Boutourlin's own account, allowed two opportunities to escape him, in the retreat from Mojaisk to Orsha, of striking a decisive blow and finishing the war, yet he concludes his Ninth Chapter by saying that his conduct "est digne des plus grands éloges,” and that by his system of prudence he had succeeded in giving mortal blows to the army of Napoleon. Much as we value Kutúsof, we should suppose, if he had commanded the French, and Napoleon the Russians, the former would never have reached Viasma, far less Smolensk.

In the Tenth Chapter the author gives a minute account of the plan of operations for the secondary Russian armies,-of the landing of Count Steingell at Revel with 10,000 men, and of his march to Riga, and afterwards upon Druja,-of the offensive steps resumed by Count Wittgenstein, after having received reinforcements,-of the battle of Polótsk, and of the attack and capture of the town by the Russians,—of the retreat of Count Steingell behind the Dvina,—of the pursuit of the French beyond the Dvina by Wittgenstein and Steingell, and their junction at Lepel,—of the combat of Tchasniki,-of the capture of Witepsk by the Russians,-of the battle of Smoliantsi, of the repulse of the Austro-Saxon army into the duchy of Warsaw by Admiral Tchitchagóf,-of the Admiral's march towards the Beresina,of the occupation of Minsk by the Russians,—of the combat of Borissof,—of the battle of Volkoviski,—and of the retreat of General Sacken, &c. &c.

The Eleventh Chapter contains an account of Napoleon's retreat and arrival at Borissof,-of the defeat of Admiral Tchitchagof's advanced guard, -of the celebrated passage of the Beresina, at Studenki, by the French,of the combat of Staro-Borissof and the capitulation of Partonneaux's division,-of the battles of Stakhof and of Studenki,-of the retreat of the French upon Wilna,—of the departure of Napoleon from the army, &c. &c. This chapter is all so interesting, that we scarcely know which points to select for the reader's entertainment. The passage, however, of the Beresina merits particular notice.

As we have already seen, the French army was re-united at Orsha on the 8th (20th) November, in a very critical situation. Two armies, on the right and left, endeavoured to get into its rear, and cut off its retreat, while it was pursued in the centre by Kutúsof. By forced marches, Napoleon escaped Kutúsof, but he fatigued his troops, and with the remainder of them, amounting only to about 40,000, it was impossible to defend the line of the Dnieper. It was not easy to execute a retreat. Tchitchagof was moving forwards to intercept his communications with Minsk, and Wittgenstein shut up the roads from Orsha to Wilna. Buonaparte determined, by forced marches, to reach Borissof before Tchitchagfó, but on arriving at Bobr, he found that there was no hope of getting to the Beresina before the army of the Danube. His case was now extremely hard; for there appeared no other chance of escape but by opening a passage for himself sword in hand. But at this critical juncture Napoleon shewed himself worthy the character he had justly acquired of a great captain. He measured the immensity of the danger" with the eye of genius, and dis

covered resources, where a General, less able, or less determined, would not have suspected even their possibility." It is really delightful to find such compliment paid by a Russian officer to the greatest enemy his country ever encountered; and when we suppose it also to be the language of the Emperor Alexander, it assumes the highest character for impartiality and dignity of sentiment.

Buonaparte outwitted his enemies by a feigned show of wishing to cross the Beresina at one place, while he had resolved to accomplish it at another. He resolved to pass the Beresina near Studenki, ten or twelve miles above Borissof, at a place favourable for the construction of bridges. By a seasonable frost, the marshes on the borders of this river were frozen, and even supported the artillery. Thus, by one of those mysterious dispensations of Providence, which elude the knowledge of mortals, the cold, which had hitherto proved the most dreadful scourge of the French army, now contributed to the safety of its remnants. Buonaparte caused some troops to cross the river by swimming, so as to examine the opposite bank; he then raised batteries, under protection of which two bridges were constructed, and finally accomplished the passage of the river, notwithstanding some opposition of the Russian army, which arrived too late to oppose him successfully. Till the return from Elba-an event unparalleled in history-the passage of the Beresina was perhaps the most glorious deed in the military life of the Corsican chieftain-of the inordinately ambitious Emperor of the French. This great event took place on the 15th (27th) of November, and was followed by wonderful activity on the part of the French. Having gained the right bank of the Beresina while surrounded by formidable armies, they fought their way on the 16th, (28th,) defiled upon Zembin during the night between the 16th and 17th, (28th and 29th,) and reached Pletchinitsa on the 17th (29th), while the imperial quarters were fixed at Kameni. On the 18th (30th) Napoleon's head-quarters were at Pletchenitsa, on the 19th (1st December) at Stariki, on 21st (the 3d) at Molodetchno, on the 22d (4th) at Biscuitsa, and on the 23d (5th) at Smergoni, where were assembled all the principal officers. Buonaparte having made good his rapid flight, and thus saved the wreck of his army from almost certain death or captivity, now confided the command of the army to the King of Naples, and immediately departed by post for Paris.

Buonaparte's conduct at this crisis of his life has been much canvassed, and very opposite opinions are still entertained respecting it. The sentiments of one of the enemy, and of an enlightened and liberal individual, such as Colonel Boutourlin, therefore deserves the highest attention. The Colonel thinks that Buonaparte was justifiable in quitting his army, upon the ground that he was not merely chief of that army, but because the destiny of France was entirely placed upon his head. "His first duty, therefore, in these circumstances, was less to assist the agony of the ruins of his army, than to watch over the safety of the French empire. He could not better fulfil this duty than by returning to Paris, so as to hasten, by his presence, the organization of new armies."

While Colonel Boutourlin speaks of the cruel losses with which the French paid for the passage of the Beresina, he admits the disappointment of the Russians at the event. They had hoped, that, by the operations of the secondary armies, all the avenues for Napoleon's return would have been closed, and while his army surrendered, that he himself would have become their prisoner.

He

The Colonel defends Tchitchagof, Wittgenstein, and Kutúsof, against different accusations which have been brought against them, relative to the escape of Napoleon, while he brings forward others himself. accuses Tchitchagof of having manoeuvred avec une lenteur qui eut une influence funeste sur l'ensemble des operations, and for not having joined General Tchaplits on the evening of the 15th, (27th,) so as to have attacked the small number of the French who had then crossed the Beresina: he also blames him for a halt which he made at Stakhof, as well as

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