fame ftory, is placed here, though it properly belongs to the foregoing head. It became the duty of that lady to demand juftice against her lover, for whose prefervation, in other circumftances, fhe chearfully would have facrificed her own life. The ftruggle between thefe oppofite paffions directed to the fame object is finely expreffed in the third fcene of the third act: Elvire. Il vous prive d'un pére, et vous l'aimez encore ! Chimene. C'ft peu de dire aimer, Elvire, je l'adore ; Ma paffion s'oppose à mon refentiment, Dedans mon ennemi je trouve mon amant, Et je fens qu'en depit de toute ma colere, Not lefs when the objects are different than when the fame, are means fometimes afforded to gratify both paffions; and fuch means are greedily embraced. In Taffo's Gerufalemme, Edward and Gildippe, husband and wife, are introduced fighting gallantly against the Saracens : Gildippe receives K 4 ceives a mortal wound by the hand of Soliman : Edward inflamed with revenge, as well as concern for Gildippe, is agitated between the two different objects. The poet * describes him endeavouring to gratify both at once, applying his right hand against Soliman, the object of his refentment, and his left hand to fupport his wife, the object of his love. PART V. INFLUENCE OF PASSION WITH RESPECT TO OUR PERCEPTIONS, OPINIONS, AND BELIEF. NONSIDERING how intimately our percep CON tions, paffions, and actions are mutually connected, it would be wonderful if they should have no mutual influence. That our actions are too much influenced by paffion, is a known truth; but it is not lefs certain, though not so well known, that paffion hath also an influence upon our perceptions, opinions, and belief. For example, the opinions we form of men and things, are generally directed by affection: an advice given by a man of figure, hath great weight; the fame advice from one in a low condition is despised or neglected: a man of courage * Canto 20. ft. 97. rage underrates danger;. and to the indolent the flightest obstacle appears unfurmountable. This doctrine is of great ufe in logic; and of ftill greater use in criticism, by ferving to explain several principles of the fine arts that will be unfolded in the courfe of this work. A few general obfervations shall at present suffice, leaving the fubject to be profecuted more particularly afterward when occafion offers. There is no truth more univerfally known, than that tranquillity and fedatenefs are the proper ftate of mind for accurate perception and cool deliberation; and for that reason, we never regard the opinion even of the wifeft man, when we discover prejudice or paffion behind the curtain. Paffion, as obferved above*, hath fuch influence over us, as to give a falfe light to all its objects. Agreeable paffions prepoffefs the mind in favour of their objects, and difagreeable paffions, no less against their objects: a woman is all perfection in her lover's opinion, while, in the eye of a rival beauty, fhe is awkward and disagreeable: when the paffion of love is gone, beauty vanishes with it,-nothing left of that genteel motion, that fprightly converfation, thofe numberlefs graces, which formerly, in the lover's opinion, charmed all hearts. To a zealot every one of his own fect is a faint, while the most upright of a different fect are to him children * Page 120, children of perdition: the talent of speaking in a friend, is more regarded than prudent conduct in any other. Nor will this surprise one acquainted with the world: our opinions, the refult frequently of various and complicated views, are commonly fo flight and wavering, as readily to be fufceptible of a bias from paffion. With that natural bias another circumstance concurs, to give paffion an undue influence on our opinions and belief; and that is a strong tendency in our nature to justify our paffions as well as our actions, not to others only, but even to ourselves. That tendency is peculiarly remarkable with refpect to disagreeable paffions: by its influence, objects are magnified or leffened, circumftances fupplied or fuppreffed, every thing coloured and disguised, to answer the end of juftification. Hence the foundation of felfdeceit, where a man impofes upon himself innocently, and even without fufpicion of a bias. There are fubordinate means that contribute to pervert the judgment, and to make us form opinions contrary to truth; of which I fhall mention two. First, it was formerly observed *, that though ideas feldom ftart up in the mind without connection, yet that ideas fuited to the prefent tone of mind are readily fuggefted by any flight connection: the arguments for a favourite opinion * Chap. I. Se opinion are always at hand, while we often fearch in vain for those that crofs our inclination. cond, The mind taking delight in agreeable circumstances or arguments, is deeply impreffed with them; while those that are difagreeable are hurried over fo as fcarce to make any impreffion: the fame argument, by being relished or not relished, weighs fo differently, as in truth to make conviction depend more on paffion than on reafoning. This obfervation is fully juftified by experience to confine myself to a single inftance; the numberless abfurd religious tenets that at different times have pestered the world, would be altogether unaccountable but for that irregular bias of paffion. We proceed to a more pleasant task, which is, to illuftrate the foregoing obfervations by proper examples. Gratitude, when warm, is often exerted upon the children of the benefactor; efpecially where he is removed out of reach by death or abfence*. The paffion in this cafe being exerted for the fake of the benefactor, requires no peculiar excellence in his children: but the practice of doing good to these children produces affection for them, which never fails to advance them in our esteem. By fuch means, strong connections of affection are often formed among individuals, * See part. 1. fect. 1. of the present chapter. |