delay in passing such bills into law, plainly it is part of its duty, in proper cases, to differ from the opinion of the House of Commons and to stick to its own. Since it cannot turn out a Ministry and, if the newspapers will not report its debates, cannot appeal to the People, how is it to obtain a decision? Doggedly to throw out bills would not work; this would preserve only too well the continuity between the recent House of Lords and the new Second Chamber. There must be some machinery for settling such disputes; but, as its frequent use is hardly desirable, the composition of the Second Chamber and the mode of selecting discreet and docile persons as members of it become supremely important. On these matters the Conference have produced recommendations of great weight and of extreme ingenuity, but here they parted company with unanimity, for here they had to descend from the abstract to the concrete.

In case of a definitive difference of opinion between the two Chambers, the plan adopted for its final settlement is this. A Committee or Free Conference of the two Houses, not exceeding sixty in number, is to be chosen at the beginning of each Parliament; and to it differences between the Chambers may be referred. If this Conference fails to arrive at a compromise acceptable to both Chambers, the matter goes over to the following Session and then is taken up in the same body again. If the same compromise is then arrived at by a majority of three, it goes before both Houses again.

'If they both agreed to it, it would pass. If they both disagreed to it, or if the House of Commons alone disagreed, it would lapse. If, however, the House of Commons alone agreed to the Bill and it had been accepted by the Free Conference by a majority of not less than three of the members present and voting, it would be submitted for the Royal Assent.'

Thus it will be seen that if, in the discharge of its chief function, that of revising House of Commons Bills, the Second Chamber should adopt an amendment, in no case could that amendment be passed into law, unless the House of Commons accepted it; in no case could the Electorate be consulted or have anything to say to it, unless the Government should think fit to advise a dissolution; and in every case, in which the Commons

members of the Free Conference stood firm and obtained the concurrence or even the absence of three of the Second Chamber members, the House of Commons would get its way after a postponement merely to the next session. If so much is to depend on the discovery of three just men in the Second Chamber moiety of this Committee, the composition of the Second Chamber and the selection of its members become the crux of the scheme.

How then shall we choose these members, who are to make good the weaknesses of the House of Commons, to correct its errors, to revise its bills, to enlighten the People, to comprehend its will, if they can, and to give effect to it, when it is adequately expressed? Is it the People itself that is to choose? Is it the Crown? Neither; it is the House of Commons, but the House of Commons decently disguised.

This remarkable result was arrived at by a process of exclusion; and, so far as the Report goes, the Conference was moved more by the reasons against the five alternative plans rejected than by any stated argument in favour of the plan chosen. First, nomination by the Crown, acting through (which presumably means on the advice of) its Ministers, was rejected. Naturally so. This plan or the threat of it may do once, but after that it is exploded. It was all very well for passing the Parliament Act of 1910, but the Parliament Act has no friends now. The reason given, however, is worth noting.

"This plan appeared unlikely to find favour with the country, because it did not provide any guarantees for the fitness of the persons who might be nominated, and because it would be liable to be frequently employed as a reward for political party services.'

Apparently, in the view of the Conference, the country does not think much of Ministers.

Direct Election was then considered and rejected, less on its merits than in the interests of Ministers and of the House of Commons. Second is second, and first is first. A second chamber directly elected by the People might not know its place; it might become the more attractive, possibly the more influential, body. That would never do. Besides, coming straight from the

People, enjoying their confidence, mirroring their views and ideas (and let us hope also fulfilling its function of comprehending them), it would inevitably become a rival of the House of Commons. That would be very awkward. Ministers would have two masters to serve and to fear.' No doubt one master is enough; but the Conference does not seem to think much more of Ministers than, in its opinion, does the country.

Election by Local Authorities was of course rejected. Who wants a Second Chamber of local nobodies? Nor did selection by 'some weighty, important and independent authority' find favour. It sounds well, but what it really comes to is election by a Joint Standing Committee of both Houses, and one is not surprised that it was rejected, though not unanimously. The reasoning, however, is odd.

"The majority thought it essential to provide a broader basis for the Second Chamber than election by any Commission, even one set up and renewed by Parliament, could furnish. These members sought that broader basis in the election of a Second Chamber by Parliament itself. . . . What was necessary was that it should be, as far as possible, a representative body. They held that since direct election by the voters had been ruled out by difficulties . . . which had been deemed insuperable, the nearest approach to the advantages claimed for the method of direct election was to vest the selection of the bulk of members of the Second Chamber in the persons whom the voters had chosen to represent them in Parliament.'

At this point the Conference apparently found itself confronted by that characteristic of the House of Commons, which its members seem to think regrettable but inherent, namely, its subjection to the party system and to party spirit. Enough members thought this objection insuperable, even if the panacea of Proportional Representation were applied, to lead the Conference to seek some electing body for the Second Chamber other than the House of Commons as a whole. 'An election by the whole of the House of Commons must inevitably become a purely party contest; a contest which would be managed by the party Whips and would turn upon the party pledges or party services of the persons to be elected, too little regard being paid to their personal qualifications.'

this war earned for themselves a right to generous treatment.*

Again, the landholding, the agricultural, the industrial, the commercial, and the Anglo-Indian interests, in short, the capitalist and productive interests, must be carefully protected in a representative system in which without checks of a communal kind all control would pass into the hands of professional politicians. How vastly important, for example, the agricultural interest is, may be seen from the statement in the Census Report (p. 405) that of actual workers in India 71 per cent. are engaged in pasture and agriculture, and only 29 per cent. in all other occupations combined.'

The facts that have been adduced amply justify the conclusion that conflicting interests are so many and so great that India cannot yet be regarded as a nation speaking with a voice of unchallengeable authority. If the balance is to be held even, so that the opposing interests may in time come into some sort of harmonious cooperation, it can only be done by the continued rule of the Power which, in virtue of its attitude of detachment, has given proof of its capacity for the task. Whatever measure of self-determination may be regarded as now due to India, it must fall far short of the extravagant demands of the extremists; for to surrender at this stage of India's development the destinies of the many inarticulate millions to a microscopie minority of individuals, congregated for most part in the cities would be a gross betrayal of a trust. As Sir Rabindranath Tagore has said, 'The narrowness of sympathy which makes it possible for us (Hindus) to impose upon a considerable portion of humanity the galling yoke of inferiority will assert itself in our polities in creating the tyranny of injustice. That tyranny will surely not be allowed to rear its head.

Art. 10.-A TAME HOUSE OF LORDS.

Report of the Conference on the Reform of the Second Chamber. Letter from Viscount Bryce to the Prime Minister [Cd. 9038]. H.M. Stat. Office, 1918.

THE Second Chamber Conference was appointed on Aug. 25, 1917. It began work on Oct. 2. During the next six months it held forty-eight sittings and it reported in April last. Its members were chosen in equal numbers from both Houses, but one member, Mr T. P. O'Connor, was throughout absent in America. The experience of the members was wide and varied. Lord Bryce, the Chairman, and Mr J. A. R. Marriott brought wide historical knowledge and a special study of constitutions and second chambers to the service of the Conference. Law was represented by Lord Loreburn. Many members had held high office at home and abroad, and all had long been trained in public affairs. Few of the Peers would be called strong House of Lords men, and some had sat in the House of Commons so long that they might have no little bias in favour of the Commons House. The other half were probably decided House of Commons men.

Of the many recommendations of the Conference two stand out conspicuous: one is the mode in which the Second Chamber is to be constituted; the other is the method in which differences arising between the two Chambers are to be composed. Even more remarkable perhaps than these recommendations, as to which there was some difference of opinion, were the preliminary assumptions, as to which it seems there was none. The Conference began by considering what functions were appropriate to a Second Chamber; and it was found that agreement existed' on four points. Theoretically, no doubt, this procedure was logical, but one cannot help wondering whether all those who agreed about the appropriate functions quite foresaw to what political proposals those premises would lead them in the long run. The Conference was discreetly handled. If the members had begun by going through the actual powers of the House of Lords and considering seriatim what should be taken Vol. 230.-No. 457.

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